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ABSTRACT

Justifying the Plaintiffs Receipt
of Punitive Damages
by
Marlisa Moschella
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair
Emeritus Professor of Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis addresses the punitive damages reform issue of whether or not the plaintiff
should receive the award. Reformers argue the purposes of punitive damages would be
better served with other distribution options; and prioritized societal gains, above the
gains of the plaintiff. The various purposes of punitive damages show that receipt by the
plaintiff is in accordance with original intentions of punitive damages and serves justice.
The historical and modem purposes of punitive damages such as vengeance satisfaction,
redeeming honor, repairing insult, and supporting ‘private attorneys general,’ are
maintained by the plaintiff receiving damages. These purposes provide an important
incentive to the plaintiff to pursue litigation. Incentive for this pursuit mitigates the
inherent burden placed upon the plaintiff and serves justice since the plaintiff is
procedurally the “least advantaged” participant. Therefore, the status quo should be
maintained to provide incentive and to ensure justice in civil law.
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PREFACE
It all started on May 16, 2002,1 was having lunch with my father. He’s an attorney.
As he sat down, he enthusiastically declared that his firm had won a case against Mobil
Oil Guam and the jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $2.8 million in
punitive damages. He was so excited. He called to the server for some water and was
slapping the table and gesturing his fists in the air as if he had just won a title match. I
questioned the amounts awarded; it seemed strange that a civil case spurred reactions
similar to that of winning the lottery. My father explained that the compensatory
damages equaled the amount stolen from the plaintiff and the punitive damages served to
punish Mobil Oil for the fi-aud they had committed. I questioned the process because
someone had become a millionaire from punishing a corporation. How is this at all like
criminal punishment? Do criminal victims receive awards when the offender is
punished? Last time I checked, murder victims and rape victims receive no such award.
If anything, they receive the satisfaction that the offender is behind bars and will suffer
the consequences of his or her actions. I suppose that ordering a corporation to pay a
large amount of money would serve the same purpose, but why is the money going to the
plaintiff? Would it not serve society better if it were donated to the University’s business
school to teach future businessmen some ethics? My father’s explanation was, “That’s
civil law.”
That day changed my life. About 5 months after that day, I moved to Las Vegas, and
applied to UNLV’s Ethics and Policy Studies (EPS) Program. I had a Bachelors degree
vi
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in philosophy, but was raised by a lawyer. So the EPS Program was a good match.
When I began, I knew absolutely nothing about punitive damages. Now, all my questions
about punitive damages have been answered. Thanks to EPS’s eclectic program. Dr.
Craig Walton, Dr. Alan Zundel, and my Thesis Committee members UNLV Law
Professor Robert Correales, and Criminal Justice Department Professor Dr. Hong Lu, I
was able to accomplish not only a Master’s Degree, but also the satisfaction of knowing
why plaintiffs receive punitive damages.
I humbly thank friend and colleague Cecilia Mun, whose intelligence, analytical
skills, humor and alcohol tolerance has assisted me in pursuit of my degree. (Not to
mention the argument diagrams in the bar and the discourse in the garage.) All the
problems she has helped me solve over a glass of wine were just as beneficial as any
graduate seminar; may the wine of friendship never run dry.
I thank my family whose encouragement has helped me achieve this degree. My
older sister Christina - attorney turned happy - thank you for constantly building my
confidence and for proofreading every paper I have ever written since my undergraduate
upper division classes; I could not have done without your prose. And of course my
father who has inspired me in all the ways he hoped not to. Although I may not have
gone to law school, thank you for the capacity and the motivation to pursue what I love.
And I cannot forget my son, Sebastian, who has been the most faithfiil and patient of all
persons. As I typed and studied through the night, sacrificed time with him in order to
get this degree, he has always been supportive, thank you.

V ll
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INTRODUCTION
In BMW o f North America, Inc. v. Gore^ (1996), an Alabama case, the plaintiff was
awarded $4000 in compensatory damages. In addition, the jury awarded the plaintiff $4
million in punitive damages.^ The punitive amount was based upon the total number of
automobiles sold nation-wide that had been similarly damaged and fraudulently repaired.
The repairs were found fraudulent since BMW had transported the repainted cars to the
United States and did not disclose information regarding the repair to Alabama
consumers. The entire damages amount was to be awarded to the single plaintiff. In
1997, the punitive award was appealed twice and reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court to $50,000.
This case, and many similar to it, represent why punitive damages have been under
scrutiny. Not only are the large amounts criticized, but also the process in which a single
plaintiff has the possibility of receiving amounts calculated by assessing the harm to the
plaintiff as well as the cumulative potential or actual social harm.
This thesis addresses the punitive damages reform issue of whether or not the plaintiff
should receive the award, or if the purposes of punitive damages would be better served
with other distribution options. In order to determine whether the policy process should
be reformed, I examine the justice served by the different purposes of punitive damages
' BMW o f North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
^ David E. Hogg, “Alabama Adopts De Novo Review for Punitive Damage Appeals:
Another Landmeirk Decision or Much Ado About Nothing?,” Alabama Law Review 54
(Fall 2002) : 223 n2.
viii
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as described by modem judicial literature as well as historical perspectives. I conclude
that the status quo should be maintained.
I argue that certain purposes of punitive damages validate the plaintiff receiving the
damages. These purposes include: vengeance satisfaction, honor redemption, insult
reparation, and supporting ‘private attorneys general.’ These purposes provide an
essential incentive to the plaintiff to bring civil wrong-doings to court. Incentive for this
pursuit mitigates the inherent burden placed upon the plaintiff, and serves procedural
justice since the plaintiff is the “least advantaged” participant in the proceedings.^ Thus
in order to continue to fulfill these purposes, the status quo should be maintained. The
plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive damages award in order to reinforce
incentive to the plaintiff and to ensure justice in civil law. These purposes outweigh the
counterarguments for reform.
Punitive damage awards and the process that surrounds them is not common
knowledge. So I begin with a general description of the arena of civil law.

Civil Law
Civil law has three main branches: tort law, contract law, and property law.'^ When
an individual, or a company treated as an individual, has wronged or harmed another,
justice calls for a corrective procedure. If the “harm is caused through the fault of
another person(s) which calls for compensation or redress (tort law), or because of some
^ See pages 4 9 - 5 1 , infra. Chapter 2 Serving Justice, ProceduralJustice, The Least
Advantaged and the Difference Principle.
Jules Coleman, "Theories of Tort Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy
(Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 1. accessed on 1 April 2004.
ix
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unfairness or other impropriety due to the processes of exchange or other voluntary
agreements in society (contract law), the case is taken to civil c o u r t . C i v i l law
procedures deal with socially declared ‘wrongs,’ but they are treated as ‘private wrongs’
since the decision to pursue litigation is left to the party who claims they have been
wronged.^ This ‘private wrong’ aspect is unique to civil law.^
Another aspect of civil law that characterizes it within the private law arena is the
outcome: the damages are received by the plaintiff,* as opposed to the state. Remedies
under civil law include restitution, monetary compensation, and punitive damages.^

^ Tom Campbell, Justice, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 21.
^ Antony Duff, "Legal Punishment", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 4. Accessed on 16 April 2004. “Civil law
deals in part with wrongs which are non-private in that they are legally and socially
declared as wrongs —with the wrong constituted by libel, for instance: but they are still
treated as ‘private’ wrongs in the sense that it is up to the person who was wronged to
seek legal redress.” See also Marc S. Galanter and David Luban, “Poetic Justice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” The American University Law Review 42:1393
(Summer 1993) : 2: “A civil wrong is an injury to a private party or to the state in the
role of a private party.”
^ Duff, "Theories o f Criminal Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 4. Accessed on 16 April 2004. “Civil
wrongs are typically viewed as ‘private’ matters because it is the victim’s burden to
weigh what happened, to identify the alleged wrongdoer, and to bring a case against him.
The law provides the institutions (such as the courts or arbitration services) through
which that case can be brought.” ... All civil law requires “the injured party to decide
whether to pursue, or to abandon a case, and whether to insist on extracting the damages
the court awarded,” or to do without them.
* Ibid. 5. If a plaintiff wins a case, “the defendant may have to pay her damages, as
compensation for the harm that she suffered, and for which she has sued.”
^ Steven H. Gifts, s.v. “punitive damages,” in Law Dictionary, 3d ed., (1991).
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, are defined as “monetary
compensation in excess o f actual damages; a form of punishment to the wrongdoer and
excess enhancement to the injured; nominal or actual damages must exist before
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Thus, for further reference in this thesis, it is important to note that punitive damages
processes work in a specialized arena of the legal system - civil law. In this arena the
transactions are between private parties, the burden to pursue litigation is on the plaintiff,
and the result, if the defendant is found guilty, of civil law cases involves a monetary
payment to the plaintiff. What is unique and distinguishes civil law from criminal is the
private law aspect.

Summary o f Chapters
The academic and legal discourse regarding punitive damages involves the questions
of whether or not the amounts of the award are excessive, and therefore possibly breach
Constitutional Rights, whether this form of punishment is justified, and whether the
public policies behind punitive damages may best be served by alternate forms of
distribution. Chapter One presents the public discourse surrounding punitive damages.
Reformers argue that punitive damages have reached proportions that are excessive and
that the system provides too few guidelines for their calculation. In this chapter, after
reviewing the different views for reform, the significant cases, and current punitive

exemplary damages are awarded.” Further specific conditions for the awarding of
punitive damages are addressed in Chapter One regarding the discourse as well as in
Chapter Three regarding the punishment purposes. Punitive damages in some states
specifically require for tort law clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with
regard to the plaintiff. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article:
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law o f Punitive Damages,” Southern California Law
Review, 56 (November 1982): 9. Malice is defined as “a state of mind; [which has] the
desire to harm another that accompanies and provides a reason for intentional act.”
Willful misconduct or reckless conduct is defined as “conduct involving a conscious
choice o f a course of action entailing a disproportionately great risk of harm to another
relative to the utility o f the conduct, and undertaken with knowledge of the danger or of
facts that would disclose the danger to a reasonable person.”
xi
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damages policy; I conclude that although certain cases reflect large amounts of punitive
damage awards, these large awards are rare, the amounts are usually reduced, and the
appellate courts have constructively presented guidelines to address justified calculations.
But, however few, large punitive damage amounts have lead the debate further to the
justice behind the distribution o f awards. One of the most recent debates involves the
question of whether the plaintiff should receive the award in addition to compensation or
actual damages, or if the purposes of punitive damages would be better served with
alternate forms of distribution such as split recovery awards, where the award is shared
with the state. It is this aspect of the punitive damages discourse I focus on in this thesis.
Chapter Two begins with presenting two theories of justice I chose to apply to civil
law procedures: corrective justice and procedural justice. Civil law seeks to achieve
justice through compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensatory damages
correct civil law wrongs through restitution and follow corrective justice principles.
Punitive damages are applied to wrongs that deem further punishment. The justice of
punishment is discussed in Chapter Three. Since my focus involves the justice behind
the distribution of the punitive damages award, after it has been determined necessary; in
order to determine if the plaintiffs receipt of the punitive damages award properly serves
justice, I present John Rawls’s procedural justice theory of “justice as fairness.” I argue
that the plaintiff receiving the award ensures justice because the plaintiff in a civil law
suit is, in a procedural sense, the “least advantaged.” According to the second justice
principle for “justice as fairness,” inequalities in society should be arranged so that they
benefit the “least advantaged” participant. After determining how the plaintiff is the least
advantaged participant, I conclude that the damages should continue to be received by the

XU
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plaintiff. But the theories of justice are not the only justification for this process.
Punitive damages serve many purposes, all of which should be justified. So I examine
the purposes of punitive damages.
The punishment theories of retribution and deterrence are most often referred to for
the justification o f awarding punitive d a m a g e s . T h e evaluation of justified punishment
through these theories is presented in Chapter Three. I also review whether or not
punishment for retribution and deterrence justifies the plaintiff receiving the award. I
conclude that retribution and deterrence do not require plaintiff receipt. But retribution
and deterrence are not the only punishment aspects encompassed by punitive damages.
Punitive damages have also historically served the punishment purpose of vengeance
satisfaction. And punitive damages have served a means to punish elite groups or
corporate entities. Although retribution and deterrence do not provide specific reason for
the plaintiff to receive the award, vengeance satisfaction and the punishment of corporate
entities do provide reason. But the purposes of punitive damages do not cease at
punishment.
History also reveals that initial purposes for punitive damages included the restoration
of personal honor and the repair o f insult for the plaintiff. Chapter Four investigates

Duff, "Theories of Criminal Law", 6. Punitive damages are mainly “intended to
punish or burden the defendant.” See also Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages:
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,” 2. There are “at least
seven purposes for imposing punitive damages [that] can be gleaned from judicial
opinions and the writings of commentators: (1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the
defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense;
(4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating the
victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintifFs attorneys’
fees.”
X lll
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these purposes to demonstrate how they developed, and how they also justify the plaintiff
receiving the award.
Thus, these purposes -vengeance, honor, insult, and punishing corporations - serve to
support a further purpose for punitive damages, incentive to private attorneys general.
Chapter Five addresses why incentive to the plaintiff is significant to civil law. First, the
system is complex, passive, and costly. These characteristics give reason for incentive,
since the burden to pursue litigation rests solely on the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s duty to
take on the burden of litigation is referred to as the “private attorney general”' ' principle
and is unique to the civil law system. To support the ‘good’ to society which is produced
by the private attorneys general as they bring civil wrongs to justice, the system of civil
law provides an incentive, the possibility of receiving punitive damages. Therefore, the
plaintiff receiving the punitive damages award maintains the system of civil law by
inducing the plaintiff as a private attorney general.
In conclusion, I recommend the status quo. Summing up the reasons presented in this
thesis. Chapter Six argues that the plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive
damages award. This process supports purposes of incentive and justice. The proposed
reforms for distribution addressed in Chapter Six, split-recovery statutes and societal
damages, remove or lessen the incentive to the plaintiff and are also premised upon large
award amounts. Since plaintiff incentive is significant to justice in civil law, and large
award amounts are rare, the purposes of the status quo outweigh the counter-arguments
for change.
" Duff, "Legal Punishment", 3 - 4 . The incentive is also important to the civil justice
system because it helps to maintain the private attorney general principle, in which “the
plaintiff is required to bring the case to court on their own - with no or little assistance
from the police.”
xiv
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CHAPTER 1

DISCOURSE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The discourses that pursue the reformation o f punitive damages are eclectic, from the
legal community to economists, and from the moral philosophy behind the law to issues
in the business community. This chapter examines the different perspectives on reform:
(1) that punitive damages are excessive and should be limited or capped; (2) that they
should be removed from civil law and dealt with through criminal punishments; and (3)
that the receipt of punitive damages should be split between the plaintiff and the state, or
that they should be societal damages, which are received and distributed by the state.
Although all the above reform issues are worthy of further discussion and analysis,
apart from this chapter, the remainder of the thesis will focus on the issue of whom
should receive the punitive damages. The arguments that the award should be split
between the state and the plaintiff or that they should be deemed societal damages will be
introduced in this chapter and addressed further in my final recommendations.

The Discourse on Excessiveness
Development of the Concern
The issue o f limiting or regulating punitive damage awards is not recent. The
development and intensification of concern for reform of punitive damages manifest in
1967 by Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit in the case of Roginsky v.

1
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Richardson-Merrell, Inc. ' Judge Friendly anticipated potential dangers in modem mass
tort litigation when he denied the awarding o f punitive damages due to violations of due
process.^
Concerns expressed in this case were that repetitive* punitive awards for a single
manufactured product, which was viewed as a single course of conduct, could subject a
defendant to liability that had never been considered prior to mass tort litigation.
Moreover, the cumulation of a nationally calculated punishment was not in proportion to
the similar maximum penalties authorized by the criminal law, and exceeded any level of
existing civil sanction that could be thought necessary to serve punishment or deterrence.

' Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 378 F.2d 832; 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6863.
Summary “Although other theories o f liability for compensatory damages had been
advanced in the complaint, plaintiff withdrew all except negligence and fraud upon the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all
claims for injury by cataract as unsupported by sufficient proof of causation and on the
fraud and punitive damage claims as unsupported by the evidence; the motions were
denied. The judge instructed the jury it must first determine the issue of causation; if it
found for the plaintiff on that, it should then pass upon the other issues, which he
explained in a charge to which defendant took no exception. He helpfully submitted six
separate questions: (1) causation, (2) negligence, (3) fraud upon the FDA, (4) amount of
compensatory damages, (5) liability for exemplary damages, and (6) the amount thereof.
The jury gave affirmative answers to all the questions relating to liability and fixed
compensatory damages at $17,500 and punitive damages at $100,000, which the judge
later declined to eliminate or reduce, 254 F. Supp. 430 (1966).”
* Ibid. “On appeal defendant contends that its motions for directed verdicts should
have been granted; it argues also that evidence erroneously admitted, much of it in
support of what it considers the unsubstantiated fraud count, could have prejudiced the
jury's determination of the issues of negligence and of conduct warranting the award of
punitive damages. It also raises other objections to the receipt of evidence and complains
that the award o f punitive damages, "unless restricted to fixed and measurable amounts,"
violates due process. We affirm the award of compensatory damages but find that the
evidence was not sufficient to warrant submission o f the punitive damage issue to the
jury.” Rehearing Denied May 8, 1967.
* Repetitive - referring to products liability and other mass tort cases, where punitive
damages may be repetitively invoked against a single course of conduct.
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Judge Friendly also expressed concern that there seemed no strict guidelines for jury
decision-making, nor mechanisms for effective control of aggregate awards J
This case raised questions regarding the fairness and constitutionality of punitive
damages, since the requirements for proportionality to compensatory damages and civil
sanctions were not specifically outlined. There were no specific guidelines for juries to
follow in determining the amount of punitive damages. With this, national corporations
were sent back to the drawing board for calculating the risk o f liability for a single
product. Mass tort litigation had escalated and a variety of businesses were held
nationally responsible for their actions. Areas included asbestos, formaldehyde, DES,
Agent Orange, and automobiles.* By the late 1980’s large corporations were threatened
with the possibilities of bankruptcy from mass tort law suits. For instance, “A.H. Robins,
a pharmaceutical company that manufactured the Daikon Shield, an intrauterine device

^ John Calvin Jeffries Jr., “A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages,” Virginia Law Review 72:139-158 (1986): 141 - 142.
* Richard A. Seltzer “Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency, and Control,” Fordham L. Review 52:37 (1983). From
footnotes, “n5 Approximately 700 lawsuits have been filed against Ford Motor Company
arising out o f an alleged defect in the transmissions o f Ford cars and trucks manufactured
between 1966 and 1980. Sylvester, $ 280M Legal Bill fo r a 'Better Idea"!, Nafl L.J.,
Sept. 27,1982, at 18, col. 2. The Center for Auto Safety has predicted that Ford may
eventually spend $ 280 million paying claims for damages resulting from this
transmission defect.” “n7 A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Daikon Shield lUD,
reported that a total of 3,258 lawsuits had been filed against it in connection with the
Daikon Shield; 1,685 of these had been resolved, most by settlement, several by dismissal
and only nine by trial, o f which seven resulted in judgments for the defendant and two
resulted in judgments for the plaintiff. Affidavit of R.P. Wolf, Secretary and Assistant
General Counsel of A.H. Robins Co., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Daikon Shield" lUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert, denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). As o f May, 1981, an additional 2,309 claims
had been brought against Robins, of which 2,003 had been resolved by settlement or
abandonment.”
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that caused an immense swath of injuries . ..went into bankruptcy in anticipation of a
flood of product liability verdicts with an increasing punitive component.”®
Reformers continued to argue that punitive damage awards have increased in the last
few decades. They argued that unconstrained and unprecedented punitive damage
awards continued to overwhelm the court systems, and that “increases in the size and
frequency of punitive damages awards brought an associated increase in the amount of
harm caused by any constitutional defect that infect[s] punitive damages procedures.”^ In
other words, they argued that i f the punitive damages procedures were unconstitutional,
the larger the punitive damages award, the larger the harm caused. The accusation of
unconstitutionality was based upon claims that excessive and multiple calculations of
awards violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment,* as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth amendment’s protection for due process
of law.^ Excessive awards were seen as ‘unusual punishment’ and multiple calculations
of awards for a single course of conduct were accused of violating due process. Claiming
these constitutional violations, reformers felt that punitive damages procedures should be

®Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” 9.
Also from ENDNOTE 117, “ 11 juries had awarded $24.8 million in punitive damages and
more than 5000 Daikon Shield cases remained unresolved” during their bankruptcy
petition.
* Malcom E. Wheeler, “The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures,” F/rg/ma Law Review 69:269-351 (1983): 271.
* Jeffries, 147.
^ Ibid. and also see Wheeler, “The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures,” 272. “violates due process primarily because those procedures
create an unnecessary and undue risk of an improper verdict on the issue of liability on
the measure o f compensatory damages, on the issue of whether to award punitive
damages, and on the measure of punitive damages.”
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reviewed above the state jurisdictions with heightened federal judicial scrutiny. They
argued that plaintiffs, their lawyers, and society in general viewed tort litigation as a
profitable opportunity and the scales of justice were tipped with excessive multiple fines.
Reformers solicited caps for punitive damage awards as well as specific instructions for
juries in calculating awards.'®
But mass tort litigation is just one of the many areas of concern for punitive damages
reform. Punitive damage awards are awarded in different proportions for various areas of
civil law' ' when the wrong has been declared warranted of punishment.'^ Several
landmark cases are often referred to when discussing the development o f the issue of
punitive damages. Each one of these cases set precedence for the issue of excessiveness
for punitive damages.

'° Wheeler, 272.
" Tort cases (Automobile, Premises liability. Product liability. Intentional torts.
Medical malpractice. Professional malpractice. Slander/libel,...), Contract cases (Fraud,
Seller/Buyer plaintiffs. Mortgage foreclosures. Employment discrimination. Rental/lease,
Tortious interference. Partnership dispute. Subrogation...), Real property cases. List
taken from Thomas H. Cohen and Steven K. Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in
Large Counties, 2001,” Bureau o f Justice Statistics Bulletin, (U.S. Department of Justice
Office o f Justice Programs, April 2004, NJC 202803); [on-line]
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gOv/bjs/pubalph2.htm#civil; accessed on 1 July 2004. “Table 7.
Punitive damage awards in civil trial cases for plaintiff award winners in State courts in
the Nation’s 75 largest counties, 2001,” 6.
For example, from BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 701 So. 2d 507;
1997 Ala. LEXIS 126, under section I. ... “Alabama, by statute, provides notice
concerning the conduct that will subject one to punitive damages in this state. Ala. Code
1975, § 6-11-20, expressly set forth defines the acts, as well as the state of mind: ‘(a)
Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for
wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the
plaintiff. ...”
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In 1989, the case of Browning-Ferris Industries o f Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
7nc.,'* the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether or not the Eighth Amendment'"'
is violated by punitive damage awards that are grossly out of proportion to the
compensatory awards. The Supreme Court held that the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil litigation since it is between private parties.
The Supreme Court clarified that with ‘private parties’ litigation, the prosecution is not
initiated by the state government nor does the state have any part in the receipt of the
damages award.'* The court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines
clause was designed solely to prevent the government, or the legal authority from
excessive punishment or fines.
The justification of legal punishment is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, but
in general, legal punishment needs justification because the community grants the legal

’* Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989). Also see Bruce J. McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future
Punitive Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” Alabama Law Review,
48:175; (Fall 1996), 3 of 41.
U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendment VIII: Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
From the Legal Information Institute, [on-line], accessed on 26 April 2005;
www.law.comell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html#amendmentviii.
'* McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages
Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” 3 of 41. “The 1989 decision in BrowningFerris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., disposed of the Eighth
Amendment challenge, but left open the due process issues. Browning - Ferris Industries
(BFI) claimed a $ 6 million punitive damages verdict was excessive in an antitrust case
where the compensatory damages were about $ 50,000. A 7-2 majority held that the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil litigation between
private parties "when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right
to receive a share of the damages awarded."”
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system full responsibility and authority to punish.'® Community consented authority,
particularly to harm a citizen, needs justification. It is reasonable to assume that the
purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to ensure that the authority to punish is not
abused. The Supreme Court holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
private litigation implies that civil courts have the responsibility to determine excessive
or disproportionate fines or punishments and that it is not a federal issue. Since the
damage amounts are decided by a jury; and the victim, a member of the community, who
receives the damages, not the legal authority. This rationale reinforces the private law
aspect of civil litigation, which is an important distinction between civil and criminal
law.'*
In the early 1990’s, there were two cases that addressed the procedural due process
issue of punitive damages. In 1991, the case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip}^ and in 1993, the case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
Both cases awarded large amounts for punitive damages that were upheld by the Supreme
Court. This means that the Court did not find the large damages in violation of due
process. Although in each case dissenting opinions expressed concern for the need of

'®To punish meaning to cause harm to citizens of the community for said wrongs.
Will be discussed further in Chapter Three.
'* See Introduction, Civil Law for more on the private law reference to civil law. This
importance will also be addressed in detail and its influence on punitive damages
procedure in Chapter Five.
'* Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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more detailed and strict jury instructions and limitations on determining punitive
damages amounts.^®
Following these cases, advocates for reform of punitive damages lobbied for
guidelines and limits on punitive damages in order to ensure due process?' Advocates
emphasized predictability as a requirement for punitive damage procedure in order to
concur with due p r o c e s s , o r seen as the right to fair notice. In other words, they felt the
courts should advise some way to measure or predict the amounts of damages that the
McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages
Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” 3. “In 1991, the Court finally reached the
due process issue, at least procedural due process, in the Alabama case of Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip. ... The jury awarded a general verdict of $1.04 million to
Haslip. The appellate courts, based primarily on plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument,
were willing to assume that about $200,000 represented compensatory damages (albeit,
mostly mental anguish rather than out- of-pocket economic loss). The majority held that
the Due Process Clause does apply to punitive damages procedures but that the Alabama
general jury charge and Alabama's system of post- trial judicial review met at least the
minimum requirements o f procedural due process. .. .Lastly, the majority opinion
intimated that a 4:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was "close to the line."”
“In 1993, the West Virginia case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
came before the Court. In that case, a "slander of title" suit, the jury awarded $ 19,000 in
compensatory damages (for having to defend a frivolous declaratory judgment action
initiated by TXO) and $ 10 million in punitive damages. ...The Supreme Court plurality
affirmed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' holding that the award o f punitive
damages was reasonable. The plurality also explained away the 526:1 ratio by comparing
the $ 10 million verdict to TXO's potential profit of $5-8 million, had the fraudulent
scheme succeeded.”
Law.com Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/ s.v. ‘due process of law’ a
fundamental principle o f fairness in all legal matters, both civil and criminal, especially
in the courts. All legal procedures set by statute and court practice, including notice of
rights, must be followed for each individual so that no prejudicial or unequal treatment
will result. The universal guarantee of due process is in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which provides "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," and is applied to all states by the 14th Amendment. From
this basic principle flows many legal decisions determining both procedural and
substantive rights
^ Hogg, “Alabama Adopts ...,” 3. Referring to Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 12(1991).
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defendants could face - other than previous cases as examples. Just as criminal
defendant punishments were pre-set depending upon the convicted charge, punitive
damages needed predictability, but had no set scale to follow. The court usually would
only advise the jury to impose the minimum amount of punitive damages necessary to
deter the defendant.^^ One prominent proponent of reform is Washington, D.C. lawyer
Theodore Olson^'* declared in congressional testimony in 1995:
O ver... three decades in the legal profession, I have seen how changes
in the civil justice system affect the decisions of those who are sued or
who are exposed to lawsuits. I have seen the civil justice system become
more expensive, anomalous, inefficient, arbitrary and unpredictable [due
to punitive damages]....the frequency and magnitude of punitive damage
awards are exploding out of control [like] ...an unchecked virus.^^
Shortly after this declaration came a case which set important guidelines for civil
litigation and punitive damages, and perhaps the most notable case regarding the
excessiveness o f punitive damages. In BMW v. Gore^^ (1997), a single plaintiff was

^ Ibid. Prater, supra note 3, at 1022. referring to Nathan C. Prater, “Punitive Damages
in Alabama”, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 1006, 1015-17 (1996).
Olson’s firm represents the Civil Justice Reform Group. See also Theodore Olson,
Gihson, Dunn & Crutcher, “Some Thoughts on Punitive Damages,” (edited remarks)
CivilJustice Memo. No. 15 (Washington DC.: Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan
Institute, June 1989); [on-line] http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ cjm_15.htm.;
accessed on 18 September 2003.
Stephen Daniels, and Joanne Martin, “The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of
Punitive Damages: Article: Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas:
Defining Public Policy Problems”, Wisconsin Law Review 71 (1998) : 10.
BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 701 So. 2d 507; 1997 Ala. LEXIS
126. Summary “The facts are set out in their entirety in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), and we note them here only briefly: Dr. Ira Gore, the
purchaser of a BMW automobile, sued BMW of North America, Inc. ("BMW"), alleging,
among other things, that BMW and Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., the foreign
manufacturer of the automobile, had fi-audulently failed to disclose to him that the
automobile he was purchasing had been repainted after being damaged by acid rain
during its shipment from Germany. At trial, BMW admitted that the car had been
9
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initially awarded by the jury $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the punitive damages amount was
grossly excessive and violated due process; as a result the award was reduced to $50,000.
This was the first time the United States Supreme Court had reversed a punitive damages
judgment on the basis of due process.^^ Punitive damages reform issues addressed by
this ruling included not only the violation of due process, but also guidelines for
determining the award amount to ensure the awards were not excessive.
The primary support for the violation of due process was reasoned in two parts. First,
the state could not legitimately impose the interest of the nation or neighboring states on
the defendant, since the original punitive damages amount was calculated upon nation
wide instances of the disclosure violation. The implications of this affected not only
punitive damages and civil litigation,^® but also how companies do business at each end
of the nation. State regulations for businesses vary. When the initial punitive damages
judgment against BMW was made ($4 million), BMW adjusted their national policy to
accommodate the minimum regulation for one state, regardless of what the other states
required. BMW’s policy adjustment can be interpreted as punishment deterring further
similar harm. But the Court struck down the award, and its rationale protects businesses
damaged and that BMW had a nationwide policy not to advise its dealers of predelivery
damage to new cars when the cost o f repair did not exceed three percent (3%) of the car's
suggested retail price.”
McKee, 4.
^ McKee, From the Introduction; “The publicity this case received has revived
public debate about whether Alabama's juries are "out of control." However, this opinion
has far more than a mere parochial impact on Alabama's judicial system. The May 20,
1996, decision marks the first time a majority of the Supreme Court has found a verdict
amount to be too high. Thus, the BMW decision is of great national importance to all
civil litigators and their clients.”

10
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who have varying policies for varying states. As much as the states have the right to
different regulations, they are not in-tum allowed to punish a company for the ‘good’ of
the nation, based upon their particular regulation.
The second primary support for the violation of due process was that the defendant
did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the possible sanction o f its failure to
disclose.^^
The public policy behind the court’s due process analysis was as follows: (a) that
there were no aggravating factors associated with reprehensible conduct, for if there were
then the defendant could refer to the reprehensible conduct sanctions for fair notice; (b)
that no consumers, nor competitors were threatened with potential harm that threatened
the health or safety of others, the only harm found was economic; and (c) that the
punitive damages award was substantially greater than the possible statutory fine of the
state for similar misconduct, the maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama
Legislature for violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2,000.®*'
The U.S. Supreme Court implied that punitive damages law was analogous to
criminal law. Just as criminal sanctions are required to be known, or can be known if the
public so chooses to find out - for instance the penalty for murder, theft, or rape - so too
must punitive damages be known with the above three distinctions. The knowledge of
penalty is an important factor in the justification of legal punishment. In order to justly
punish a member of the community that has committed a crime, it is assumed that the

BMW o f North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. See Syllabus of the case.
Ibid. See p. 25 of 45, under the section Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct, Ala.
Code §8-19-11(b) (1993).

11
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guilty criminal is a rational (mature and participating) member of the community that is
aware of its laws as well as its penalties.®'
So, for the sake of fairness and due process, civil litigation was given guidelines to
follow for punitive damages procedure; that the state can only punish for what is in the
interest of the particular state and its constituents, and that adequate and fair notice
should follow those three guidelines.
Most importantly addressed in the BMV v. Gore case was the dollar amount of the
punitive damages award, and how the U.S. Supreme Court came to determine its
excessiveness. The Court outlined three indicators of excessiveness. First, the award
was deemed excessive because there were no aggravating factors that evidenced a high
degree of reprehensibility on the part of the defendant.®® Secondly, the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages was clearly outside of the acceptable range.®® And
thirdly, the punitive damages award amount was also largely disproportionate to the

®' Further detail of this justification is discussed in Chapter Three in regards to the
justification of punishment in general. But for this point, it is important to note the
implications of this decision.
®®BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. page 9 of 45 point (c). Indicates the harm was
purely economic, there was no indifference to, or reckless disregard for the health and
safety of others, there was no patter of tortuous conduct, no evidence of bad faith, no
unlawful conduct, no false statements, affirmative misconduct, or concealment of
evidence of improper motive.
®®Ibid. point (d). $2 million dollars was 500 times the amount of the plaintiffs actual
harm. The Court does express that there are no set mathematical multipliers that should
apply to the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; but that in this case, the
ration was clearly too high.
12
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comparable civil or criminal sanctions for similar conduct. Furthermore, there was no
indication of why a more modest amount would not have been sufficient.®''
The second and third indicators of excessiveness clarified hy the Court regulates
punitive damages awards by requiring that it be in proportion to the compensatory
damages as well as the comparable state civil and criminal sanctions. Although there are
no specific ratios for proportion, the above three factors (amount o f harm, amount of
compensatory damages, and the amount of existing similar sanctions), when taken into
consideration together, govern calculation of a reasonable and proportionate punitive
damages award.
The first indicator o f excessiveness requires the presence of aggravating factors in the
harm. More importantly, it also requires the jury take these factors into account when
determining the award amount. This means that analogous to criminal law, that there are
gradients to punishment that fit the crime - meaning a murder punishment will receive
longer incarceration or a more severe penalty than theft - so too must punitive damages
amounts be proportionate to the weight of the harm.®® The calculation dollar amounts
that are appropriate to noneconomic harm or loss is a difficult task. In BMW’s case,
since there was no evidence of grossly aggravated reprehensihility, the award of $4
million dollars was excessive. Juries have been criticized to take only into account the
®'*Ibid. point (e).
®®BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. page 6 of 45. See LEdHN15, “The principle that
exemplary, or punitive, damages imposed on a defendant should reflect the enormity of
the defendant’s offense reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others.” That damages must be proportionate implies that there is a
recognized gradient of harm: violent being more than non-violent, trickery or deceit
being more than negligence, torts being more than economic injury, repeat misconduct
being more than individual instance malfeasance. See LEdHN 16,17,18,19.
13
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economic prosperity of the defendants, and calculate based upon what would deter the
defendant from repeating their action. So that if the defendant was a large profitable
international company, the damages award would be justified to be larger than for a
smaller company. Although the profits and deterring the defendants do need to be taken
into account, the degree of harm is just as important. So, in determining the amount
worthy to punish, the amount of harm as well as the amount to deter must be taken into
account.
Even after BMW v. Gore in 1996, reformers continued to argue that juries are not
capable o f calculating a justified dollar amount for punishment, and this creates erratic
awards. Reformers argue that the arbitrariness of putting a price on punishment is a
result of subjective moral judgments. And because people have difficulty translating
moral wrongs into dollars, this results in punitive awards that are unpredictable and
arbitrary.®^ Jury instructions continued to consist only of factors that measured the
gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct, reinforcing that the
purposes o f punitive damages are to punish and deter.®® So, advocates continued to argue
for more judicial review of punitive damages awards.

®^ Cass Sustein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, “Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),” Chicago Working Paper in
Law and Economics (2003) : [on-line] www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/
WkngPprs%2026-50/50.sustein.pdf; accessed on 10 December 2004.
®®Samuel David Bowden v. Caldor, INC. et. AL, 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md.
LEXIS 407, June 2, 1998. Opinion by Eldridge, J., III. A. “We have stated that the
‘purpose o f punitive damages is ...to punish the defendant for egregiously bad conduct
toward the plaintiff, [and] also to deter the defendant and others contemplating similar
behaviour.’” Owens-Coming v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-538, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161
(1996). B. “n9 [referring to] Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15,
111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042, 113 L. Ed. 2d, 18 (1991), the Supreme Court observed: ‘Under
the traditional common-law approach, the amount o f the punitive awards is initially
determined by a jury instmcted to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter
14
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At the state level, further judicial review of the jury awards was addressed in the 1998
Maryland case of Bowden v. Caldor, Inc.^^ The Maryland Court o f Appeals issued nine
guidelines to be followed by the trial judge, if a judgment is sent back for review, in order
to determine if a punitive award is excessive. Although these guidelines did not
specifically apply to jury instruction, they did expand the judicial review of the award
amount upon appeal.
These nine guidelines included the three indicators of excessiveness explicated in
BMW V. Gore: (1) that the award must be proportionate to the harm; (2) that the award
must he proportionate to civil and criminal sanctions; as well as (3) comparable to the
compensatory award; and added: (4) that the award should not be disproportionate to the
defendant’s ability to pay, in that the award must not bankrupt or impoverish a defendant;
(5) that the deterrence value of the amount awarded by the jury is relevant; (6) that the
award can be compared with other final punitive damages awards for similar harms in the
jurisdiction; (7) that the defendant’s past punitive damages awards can be considered in
mitigation of post-verdict proceedings; (8) if the harm was a result o f a single occurrence
or episode, then the punitive damages award cannot be multiplied or compounded, if the
compensatory damages were based upon separate torts; and (9) that reasonable plaintiff
costs and expenses resulting from the defendant’s malicious and tortuous conduct,
including expenses of litigation not covered by the compensatory award can be
considered in the judicial review of an award of punitive damages.®^

similar wrongful conduct. The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial and
appellate courts to ensure that is reasonable.’”
®®Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md. LEXIS 407
39

Ibid. Opinion by Eldridge, J., III. B. (1) - (9).
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Although these guidelines are not rigid rules, they offer examples of how states can
propose principles that can be followed to ensure justice. These guidelines encompass
the main purposes of punitive damages, to punish and deter. The principles emphasize
the consideration of proportionality to harm as well as a moderate amount to deter. The
principles also clarify aspects that should be considered in regards to the defendant’s
wealth, similar past awards paid by the defendant, whether it was a single or multiple
episode(s) of the harm, and plaintiffs costs. At this juncture in the discourse, these
guidelines encompass most concerns of reformers (due process, excessiveness, and
guidelines for award amount) and consider both the defendant and the plaintiff. But, case
law precedence is not the only influence in the reform of punitive damages.
Although BMW v. Gore can be seen as a great stepping stone for punitive damages
reform, special interest groups"" continue to lobby. Special interest groups have played a
large role ensuring state and federal political policy agendas continue to include punitive
damages reform. The progression of the punitive damages excessiveness issue continues
today.
For instance, the 2004 Keep Our Doctors in Nevada"* (KODIN) initiative argued that
physicians were leaving Nevada due to the increase of medical malpractice insurance
"" Such as: American Tort Reform Association (www.atra.org, argue for limits on
punitive damages). Civil Justice Reform Group, Health Coalition on Liability and Access
(HCLA) (www.hcla.org, argue that “damages should be limited to $250,000, or twice the
compensatory damages (the total of economic plus noneconomic losses), whichever is
greater.” See HCLA’s Issue Briefing 2003, accessed via on-line on April 18, 2005; The
National Chamber Litigation Center, and also see Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, No
Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America’s Social
Agenda, (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1996), 96-108.
"* Nevada Secretary o f State Dean Heller, Elections Division website. Ballot Question
#3 Keep Our Doctors in Nevada, State elections held on October 26, 2004. [on-line]
http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/2004_bq/bq3.htm, accessed January 11, 2005.
16
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rates. KODIN felt the current legislation did not provide enough protection for doctors
and their insurers from large jury verdicts, and thus the cost of liability insurance was
double that o f doctors in other large cities. Since this was forcing doctors to leave the
state, in turn the patients would suffer with a limited availability o f doctors to choose
from. The proposal was passed and limited the amount of recoverable noneconomic
damages to $350,000 per action, with no exceptions."® This is just one of several
instances in which interest groups have been effective in reforming punitive damages
procedures. Once proposal was passed, advocates from the opposition to the issue
attributed the passing of the bill to the large advertising budget for the campaign."®
Although the success or failure of political campaigns based upon the advertising budget
is an issue all in itself, this example shows that punitive damages continue to be a
political hot item that is not left to the courts. “Interest groups wanting fundamental
changes in the civil justice system have been successful in strategically representing
"®Ibid. From explanation of Ballot Question #3 “If passed, the proposal would limit
the fees an attorney could charge a person seeking damages against a negligent provider
of health care in a medical malpractice action. ... The law currently provides that a
person seeking damages in a medical malpractice action is limited to recovering
$350,000 in noneconomic damages from each defendant, with two exceptions.
Noneconomic damages is money paid to the injured person to compensate for pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, and disfigurement, while economic
damages is money paid to compensate for the injured person's medical treatment, care or
custody, loss of earning and loss of earning capacity. The two current exceptions to the
$350,000 cap on noneconomic damages allow an injured person to receive more than
$350,000 if: (1) the wrongdoer committed gross malpractice, or (2) exceptional
circumstances justify an award in excess of the cap. The proposal, if passed, would
remove the two statutory exceptions to the existing $350,000 cap, and limit the recovery
of noneconomic damages to $350,000 per action.”
"®Paul Harasim, “Ballot Initiatives: Doctors outspend lawyers,” Las Vegas Review
Journal, 29 October 2004. “Trial lawyer Jim Corckett said the poll results show ‘how
powerful a message can be if it’s advertised enough.’ .. .Campaign contribution and
expense reports filed ... with the secretary of state’s office show that from Jan. 1 through
October 21, Keep Our Doctors in Nevada spend $3.3 million to influence voters.”
17
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punitive damages as a compelling policy problem requiring governmental action.”""
Punitive damages reforms, whether initiated by interest groups, or from other sources
have been and continue to be implemented.
Data from general jurisdiction courts in 16 States for which
information was available indicate that tort filings rose 43% between 1975
and 1998. Most of this increase occurred between 1975 and 1986. To deal
with this increase, most States enacted some sort of tort reform to
discourage litigation."®
Reforms that were enacted included “placing caps on the amount o f punitive damages
that can be awarded, requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish punitive
damage liability, and making punitive damages proportional to the type of offense
alleged.”""
Caps, or limitations on punitive damages, were a strongly supported reform in the
1980’s to combat excessiveness."® Caps on damages may have limited amounts, but they

"" Daniels, and Martin, in Conclusion of “The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of
Punitive Damages;...,” 14 o f 24.
"®Marika F. X. Litras, Sidra Lea Gifford, Carol J. DeFrances, BJS Statisticians,
David B. Rottman, Neil LaFountain, Brian J. Ostrom, “Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts, 1996: Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996,” Bureau o f Justice
Statistics Bulletin, (U.S. Department o f Justice Office of Justice Programs, August 2000,
NJC 179769); [on-line] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ttvlc96.htm; accessed on 1
July 2004, in Tort Reform in States, 10.
"" Ibid. According to the Tort Reform Record taken in 1999, 30 states had made some
type of punitive damages reform from 1986 - 1999.
"®States that enacted legislation that limited punitive damages in the 1980’s include:
Colorado: Punitive award may not exceed compensatory damages. (1986); Georgia:
$250,000, limit does not apply to product liability cases. (1987); Kansas: Limits punitive
award at lesser o f defendant's annual gross income or $5,000,000. (1988); Nevada: Limits
punitive damages to $300,000 in cases in which compensatory damages are less than
$100,000 and to three times compensatory damages in cases of $100,000 or more Note:
product liability, insurance bad faith, discrimination, toxic torts, and defamation cases are
excluded.) (1989); Virginia: $350,000 limit on punitive damages. (1987). From © 2002,
The American Tort Reform Association, [on-line] accessed on 26 April 2005;
18
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did not lower the amount of lawsuits. One empirieal study investigated the patterns of
financial jury verdicts and the effects, if any, that caps"® have on punitive damages.
Studies found that the presence or absence of caps has no statistically significant effect on
whether or not the suits went to trial or were settled,"" yet they still affected the amounts
of punitive awards.
I do not agree that the perceived problem of excessive awards should be addressed
vrith caps or multiplying standards. This would suggest that the courts had the ability to
limit the price of the harm. This is opposed to the BMW v. Gore guidelines that advise
the award should be proportionate to the harm. If particular harms are deemed extremely
malicious with grave aggravated intent to harm, then a proportionate large amount of
damages is applicahly fair. Caps and multiplying standards that are placed prior to
specific knowledge of harm and calculated prior to trial, limit the possibility of an
unprecedented or unimaginable harm. Since juries must now take into account the three
guidelines provided by BM W v. Gore, the reprehensibility to the harm, the proportionality
to the compensatory damages, and the proportionality to the existing state statutes;
excessive caps should be proportionate to the harm and do not require limits. Caps, like

http://www.atra.org/show/7343; “States With Punitive Damage Limits” As of June 30,
2001. See website for complete list.
"®A set limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be awarded, a maximum
amount that can be charged.
"" Thomas A.Eaton, D. B. Mustard, and S. M. Talarico. “The Effect of Seeking
Punitive Damages on the Processing of Tort Claims.” University o f Georgi. (Aug. 2004).
[on-line] www.terry.uga.edu/~dmustard/torts.pdf; accessed Fall 2004. 23. “Tort suits
with uncapped punitive damage claims were more likely to be disposed by trial as
compared to suits with capped punitive damage claims. Furthermore, tort suits with
uncapped punitive damage claims were less likely to be disposed by settlement than suits
with capped punitive damage claims.”
19
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those enacted in the recent Nevada election, limit the amount of recoverable
noneconomic loss to the plaintiff, with no exceptions.
Furthermore, with the predictability of caps, businesses have, and will continue to
calculate harm as a business loss. For example, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,®" the
jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages to the injured in the Ford Pinto explosion.
The figure was calculated after the jury learned “that Ford relied on a study that showed
that the costs o f recalling the Pinto for modification would outweigh the benefits, which
were estimated at $200,000 per bum death avoided and $67,000 per injury avoided, by
$100 million.”®' With limited awards, “offenders will be temped to treat the law not as a
norm demanding compliance but merely as a type of tax on activity such as predatory
pricing.®® The difference is fundamental. ... ‘Don’t do X’ or ‘Either don’t do X or else
pay’.. .Only by imposing punitive damages of a different order from compensatory
damages can a jury convey the message that a norm is categorical, that it demands
compliance and not cost-benefit analysis.”®®
The possibility of businesses, professionals, or any member of society calculating the
cost of noneconomic harms into their annual budget spreadsheets is and should be of
greater concern to the nation than the possibility o f large punitive damages awards. If

®" Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 1981)
®' Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” 17.
®®Ibid. Predatory pricing refers to when competitive companies drastically lower
prices in order to steal customers from the competition. Example: citing Browning-Ferris
Indus. V. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
®®Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice,” 15.
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juries calculate unjust awards, they can be, and have been, appealed and remanded if
necessary.
The pursuit of reform for punitive damages has not ceased. Law review journals
continue to be filled with articles debating the reform of punitive damages. Interest
groups continue to lobby for reform on the state and federal level. The National Chamber
Litigation Center®" is just one example of the special interest groups that continue to
pursue reform; they have filed approximately 20 amicus®® briefs regarding punitive
damages decisions in the last few years.
As there are two sides to every issue, the next section takes a look at the views that
argue that punitive damages are not excessive, despite above developments.
Criticisms to the Excessive View
The excessiveness of punitive damages is often attributed to the ‘litigation
explosion,’®" a development from about the 1970’s in which the nation has experienced

®" See www.uschamber.com, “The National Chamber Litigation Center (NCLC) is a
membership organization that advocates fair treatment of business in the courts and
regulatory agencies. NCLC provides litigation support and advocates on legal and
regulatory issues on behalf of the U.S. Chamber and other organizations to challenge
anti-business laws.” Viewed website on 4 December 2004. See also the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA) at http://www.atra.org/. “ATRA’s mission is to bring
greater fairness, predictability, and efficiency to the civil justice system through public
education and legislative reform, and to put an end to lawsuit abuse.” Viewed website on
26 April 2005. Other organizations listed on the ATRA website include the American
Justice Partnership, American Tort Reform Foundation, Citizens for a Sound Economy,
Health Care Liability Alliance (HCLA), Overlawyered.com, The Federalist Society, The
Rand Institute for Civil Justice, etc.. .specific State Tort Reform Coalition website links
are also available.
®®Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v., “Amicus Curiae: one who gives information to the
court on some matter of law which is in doubt. See 264 F. 276, 279.”
®" See Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America
Unleashed the Lawsuit, (New York : Thomas Talley Books-Dutton, 1991).
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an enormous increase in the number of lawsuits due to plaintiffs seeking profit, not
justice. But in actuality, tort legislation which allowed for punitive damages provisions
may have been the cause of the increase in litigation, which is a result of changing social
values. In the past three decades, important legislation has been passed that involved
punitive damages. One example is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act which was passed
by Congress in 1974 and went into effect one year later. The Act included in the main
provisions of the awarding of “punitive damages in individual suits of up to $10,000 and
$100,000 or one percent of net worth - whichever is less - in class action suits.”®® This
Act was a success for several national women’s groups that addressed the issue of credit
discrimination against women because of gender and marital status. With acts such as
these, it is not surprising that the number of punitive damages awards, and cases that
were able to award them, began to increase.
Despite the emphasis on the increase in the number of punitive damage awards in
reform literature, empirical studies have shown that punitive damages awards in cases are
rare. “Fewer than 5% o f civil cases filed result in trials; plaintiffs prevail in
approximately half of the tort cases that go to trial; and punitive damages are awarded in
only 2-5% o f the tort cases in which the plaintiff prevails. Thus, for every 1000 tort
claims filed, typically only 50 are resolved by trial, only 25 produce trial outcomes
favorable to the plaintiff, and only 1.25 impose a punitive damage award.”®® According

®®Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, “Women and Interest Group Politics: A
Comparative Analysis o f Federal Decision Making,” The Journal o f Politics Vol. 41, No.
2:362 - 392 (May 1979) : 369.
®®Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico, “The Effect o f Seeking Punitive Damages on the
Processing of Tort Claims;” 2-3. Referring to (Eaton et al., 2000; Smith et al. 1995),
(DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al., 2000; Moller, 1996) “In all tort cases the
plaintiff prevails 50% o f the time. There are significant differences in win rates for
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to the most recent study of “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, [in] 2001,”
from the Bureau o f Justice Statistics Bulletin the total amount o f “punitive damages, [for
the year] estimated at $1.2 billion, were awarded to 6% of plaintiff winners in trials. The
median punitive damage award was $50,000.”®"
It is also important to note that most punitive damages awards, if at all large, are
dependent upon the type of case. Studies show that the majority of punitive damages
awards as well as the largest amounts are awarded in cases that are not personal. In 2001,
according to the above study, the largest total amount of punitive damages awards was
awarded in business to business cases."" Of all the tort trial cases (356) in 2001, 138
were business cases. And the total amount of punitive damages awarded for the year for
business cases alone was $854,658,000 out of the total of $1,221,877,000. The median
for the contract cases was $83,000. Compared to the total awarded for the 217 tort cases
being $367,149,000 with a median of $25,000. The business case awards are more than
double that o f the entire tort cases put together - which include automobile, product
liability, medical malpractice, slander/libel, etc... That punitive damages are most often
in business contract or securities cases is not a recent development.

different types of tort claims. The plaintiff prevails in fewer than 40% of products
liability trials (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al. 2000), a type of claim for which
punitive damages are a major concern., and (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Lubin, 1998).”
®" Cohen and Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,” 1.
Under Highlights. Also see page 6, “Punitive damages were awarded in 6% of the 6,487
trial cases in which the plaintiff won damages. Punitive damages totaled over $1.2 billion
and accounted for about 28% of the $4.4 billion awarded to plaintiffs overall.”
"" Ibid. See page 6, Table 7. Punitive damage awards in civil trial cases for plaintiff
award wiimersin State courts in the Nation’s 75 largest counties, 2001.
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In 1997, the RAND Corporation released a study on Punitive Damages in Financial
Injury Verdicts, finding that “almost half of all punitive awards were made in cases in
which the damages were financial, rather than personal in nature. These verdicts, which
we call financial injury verdicts to distinguish them fi’om personal injury verdicts,
comprise disputes arising from contractual or commercial relationships including, for
example, disputes arising from insurance or employment contracts or from unfair
business practices.”"' According to the study, between 1985 and 1994, the types of
punitive damages awards were mostly in contract disputes (258 of 647), and the largest
award amounts were found in securities disputes ($30,269,389 as the mean, which is very
high, in comparison to all the other category means which were below $7,033,676). So,
from this study, although the mean punitive damages award was overall, $5,344,876; a
large portion of that mean was weighted from one type of case.
Who are the participants in these cases with such large amounts? Contract cases
often involve business disputes; businesses comprised a substantial percentage (44%) of
all contract plaintiffs,"® businesses suing businesses. The question then is, does the
average consumer need to be overly concerned about the large punitive damages awards?
Perhaps, since these large awards will have a third party effect on the economy. But

"' Erik Moller, Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen J. Carroll, background to Punitive
Damages in Financial Injury Verdicts, (Santa Monica: RAND Institute for Civil Justice,
1997) : 4. emphasis in text, [on-line] http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR889/;
accessed on 1 September 2003.
"®Thomas H. Cohen and S. K. Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large
Counties, 2001.” Bureau o f Justice Statistics Bulletin. 3. See also to page 4, “For contract
trials the estimated win rate surpassed 70% in seller plaintiff (77%) and mortgage
foreclosure (73%) cases and exceeded 60% in buyer plaintiff (62%), rental lease (65%),
and subrogation (67%) cases. Conversely, plaintiffs prevailed in 44% of employment
discrimination cases and 46% of partnership disputes.”
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realistically, it is not an explosion o f any kind. In fact, with the few exceptions that were
mentioned in the previous section, punitive damages have not at all been miming the
country ragged with law suits. Realistically, punitive damages frequency and amount has
been steady for the past 20 years.
The RAND study also showed that the actual number of punitive damages awards in
financial injury verdicts has decreased, contrary to what reformers have claimed.
[In] the entire population of financial injury verdicts ... for each of the
five-year periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1994.... The number of punitive
awards has decreased between these periods, both in absolute numbers and
as a percentage of the overall number of verdicts. Punitive damages were
awarded in about 16 percent of all financial injury verdicts in the 19851989 period and in about 13 percent o f all financial injury verdicts in the
1990-1994 period. This change reflects the facts that plaintiffs are
winning at a slightly lower rate, and given that they have won the case,
plaintiffs are also being awarded punitive damages at a slightly lower rate
as well."®
The study also showed that the mean for the amount of the awards in these cases did
increase between the two periods.
However, the mean award amount increased fi"om $3.4 million to $7.6
million between these two periods. In addition, punitive damages
represent a larger portion o f all damages awarded, rising from about 44
percent of all damages awarded in the 1985-1989 period to slightly less
than 60 percent of all damages awarded in the 1990-1994 period.""
The increase in the amount of the awards over the ten year period could be attributed
to social factors like inflation. Over a short period of time, businesses have become
larger, affecting more persons nation wide, are worth more money, and invest more. It is
also important to mention that the 1991 Civil Rights Act “dramatically changed the

"®Moller, Pace, and Carroll, background to Punitive Damages in Financial Injury
Verdicts, in Variation in Punitive Damage Awards Over Time, 21.
"" Ibid., 22.
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recovery system by granting a statutory right of compensatory and punitive damages to
employees who are victims of intentional sexual discrimination.”"® It does follow that
once a statute is passed allowing for persons to file for punitive damages, which was not
allowed previously, there will be a coinciding increase in the number o f suits and damage
awards.
In this sense, “we are not faced with an inexorable exponential explosion o f cases, but
rather with a series of local changes, some sudden but most incremental, as particular
kinds of disputes move in and out of the ambit of courts.”"" Therefore the increase in
cases and awards can simply be evidence of social change. The court system is not a
stagnant non-participatory institution. The court system is an active participant in social
change and policy making, just as are the legislative and executive branches of
government. “Litigation implies accountability to public standards,” a way for society to
“correct the [private] market.”"® When seen in this view, the upsurge of litigation is a
positive indication of a desired democratic decentralized government working on behalf
of society in order to express the normative views that often change with generations.
Litigation is a part of political and social change, and therefore should not be carelessly
viewed as adverse to society.

"®Christy Lynn McQuality, in Introduction of “No Harm, No Foul?: An Argument
for the Allowance of Punitive Damages Without Compensatory Damages Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981a,” Washington & Lee Law Review 59:643 (2002) : [*644]. Also in n l “In
addition to making punitive and compensatory damages available to victims of Title VII
sex discrimination, the 1991 amendments also provided a jury trial to these victims.”
"" Marc S. Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” Maryland Law
Review, Inc. 46:3 (Fall 1986) : 21.
"®Ibid.
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Arguments to Reform the Distribution
Large punitive damage awards have led to arguments stating that the plaintiffs sue not
to seek justice, but for hopes of a ‘windfall’ gain. The argument against the plaintiff
receiving the punitive award is that it is an inappropriate way to compensate plaintiffs for
taking the trouble to sue. Groups seeking reform argue that allowing plaintiffs to keep
the awards motivates frivolous or unjust lawsuits, since plaintiffs may seek damages in
hopes of never going to court, but threaten defendants to pay settlement damages.
Furthermore, they contend that plaintiffs bringing civil suits to court should be seeking
justice, not windfall gains. When there is the potential for receiving the punitive awards
in addition to compensatory awards, in some cases in significant amounts, the motive for
trial becomes morally questionable, for punishment in any form should only be pursued if
it is deserved."®
Arguments that support plaintiffs receiving punitive damages insist that punitive
damages assist the plaintiff with legal fees required to pursue litigation, which are not
covered under compensation. They also argue that contingent fees"" do not encourage
frivolous litigation.

"®Referring to the punishment theory of retribution, discussed in detail in Chapter
Three.
"" Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “Attorney’s Fees,” “A contingent fee is a charge made
by an attorney dependent upon a successful outcome in the case and is often agreed to be
a percentage o f the party’s recovery... often used in negligence cases and other civil
actions hut it is unethical for an attorney to charge a criminal defendant a fee
substantially contingent upon the result. ABA DR 2-106(C).”
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In a contingent fee arrangement, a lawyer who takes a case must pay
the costs of the litigation up front, for the chance of a percentage return of
an ultimate recovery. It simply makes no economic sense for a contingent
fee lawyer to bring frivolous litigation because there is only cost and no
benefit. Besides logic, the evidence shows that contingent fee lawyers
provide an important function in screening out cases of dubious merit.®"
In response to this, it is argued that:
[0]ffsetting a plaintiffs litigation expenses is not an appropriate
function of civil litigation. ... If the law doesn’t allow plaintiffs to
recover certain damages (for instance, attorneys’ fees, or as-yetunthought-of forms of pain and suffering), [then] they shouldn’t be able to
recover for those damages through the catch-all proxy of punitive
damages.®’
Those opposed to plaintiffs receiving punitive awards are not in favor of doing away
with punitive damages. They agree that punitive damages have their justification as
punishment to the defendant. But, they do feel that the punitive damage awards should
instead be paid partially or entirely to the state.
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a
tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should receive
anything more. And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the
tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the
compensated sufferer, and not to the public on whose behalf he is
punished.®®
In this view, “the public on whose behalf he is punished” refers to the theory that “the
justice of particular actions [is dependent upon punishment] being authorized by a stable.

®" Daniel J. Capra, “An Accident and a Dream: Problems with the Latest Attack on
the Civil Justice System,” Pace Law Review 20 339 (Spring 2000) : 35.
®’ Volokh, Alexander. “Punitive Damages and Environmental Law: Rethinking the
Issues.” Reason Public Policy Institute. Executive Summary. Policy Study No. 213 (Sept.
1996). 11.
®®Catherine M. Sharkey, in Introduction o f “Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,”
113 Yale Law Journal 347 (Nov 2003) : 50, from [ENDNOTE74] quoting Chief Justice
Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654
672-73 (1877).
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effective, and to the extent possible, democratic legal institution”®®that represent society
and punish on behalf of society. This means that a just punishment, to which the
definition of punitive damages refers, should be an assigned to the responsibility of the
government. Since punitive damages are said to fulfill the punishment goals of
retribution and deterrence,®" and society supports punishment only if it is legally
authorized,®® it is argued that legal authorization of punishment was developed by society
not for the sake of morality, but for the sake of politics to maintain social order and
preserve the peace.®" Moreover it is argued, despite the moral obligations of punishment,
legal procedures were established for political purposes, to maintain social order, not to
maintain morality. For anyone in society to punish another, and avoid punishment in
return, legitimacy of this act in the community needed to he established. Thus society
developed the legal punishment system to take responsibility for legitimizing
punishment, developing rules and procedures, and deciding what is punishable and how.
According to this legal punishment theory, in order for legal punishment by an institution

®®Guyora Binder, “Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?,” Buffalo Criminal Law
Review 5:321 (2002): 333. Referring that “Kant required that just actions had to
conform to moral standards,” as well as legitimized government institutions.
®" David G. Owen, “The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages f Alabama Law
Review 40:705-739 (Spring 1989). (General statement from overall intent of article.)
®" Binder, “Punishment Theory: ...” 328. “. .. vigilante justice is not morally wrong,
and that legally authorized punishment o f the guilty is not morally right. The wrong of
vigilante justice is a political wrong and the right to punish conferred by law is a political
right.”
®" Ibid., 322. “The legitimacy of punishment is bound up with the legitimacy of the
norm it enforces and of the institutions promulgating the norm, imposing the punishment,
and inflicting it.”
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to be justified?® the crime must not only be an offense against the individual, but also
against society at large.®® Since punitive damages are only applicable in instances where
malice and willful misconduct are present, it is argued that the act is found offensive
enough for justified legal punishment, it is declared a wrong against the plaintiff and as
well as against society. Since the wrong is also deemed a social harm, reformers argue
that punitive damage awards should go to the state - the institution that is responsible for
the punishment.
This conclusion leads to the argument that there is a “philosophical void between the
reasons we award punitive damages and how the damages are distributed.”®" According
to the legal justification of punishment (for the sake of society as a whole), it is
philosophically correct that the damages assessed for the purpose o f punishment should
go to the state, not the plaintiff. Reforms arguing damages should be received by the
state are split-recovery statutes, which are currently practiced in eight states,®" and the
most recently proposed introduction of societal damages.®’

®®Binder, “Punishment Theory:...,” 333. “While Kant required that just actions had
to conform to moral standards, he required more: he also held that the justice of particular
actions depends on their being authorized by stable, effective, and , to the extent possible,
democratic legal institutions.”
®®Ibid., 328. The question of justifying institutionalized punishment is not a
question of morality “but of legitimacy.” Since punishment is for the society, not just for
the individual, it is legitimized through the institution.
®" Sharkey, “Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,” 12, *381. [Cited at note 53]
Quoting the court in regards to Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781
N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002) see her endnote 108.
®" Sharkey, 11, *374.
*’ Ibid.
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These reforms use a “central concept. . . that societal, as opposed to individual,
interests may be vindicated by punitive damages.”®® Split-recovery procedure varies
from state to state. The basic process has a portion of the punitive damages award
distributed to a state general fund, or some type of state managed compensation fund for
specific victims. The proportions vary between states.®® The goals of split-recovery
statutes are (1) “to discourage plaintiffs from bringing [frivolous] punitive damages
claims by decreasing the amount of their recovery,®" (2) to eliminate the “windfall gains’
to the plaintiff,®® and (3) as a revenue raising measure for the state.®"
Compensatory Societal Damages®® proposes that in “pattern or practice”®®torts,®"
since a “defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part of a pattern o f similar repeated

®®Ibid., [endnote72]*373 From endnote72: “Current law recognizes that punitive
damages may serve the societal objective of deterring similar conduct by the defendant.
. to ‘punish ... and deter ...’, [dual purpose] focus solely on vindicating society’s
interests”.
®®Volokh, see Table 5: States that divert part of punitive damages awards to public
purposes, 41-42.
®" Sharkey, 11. “The Illinois split-recovery statute [ ] was enacted specifically to
discourage punitive damages,”
®®Ibid. “a plaintiff is a fortuitous beneficiary of a punitive damages award simply
because there is no one else to receive it. [endnote 85].”
®" Ibid. also see endnote86, endnote87, endnote88.
®®Ibid., 15. Part III A New Category of Compensatory Societal Damages.
®®Ibid. Repeated conduct that likewise affects multiple parties, as opposed to single
tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple victims.
®" Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “mrt” : a wrong; a private or civil wrong or injury
resulting from a breach o f a legal duty that exists by virtue of society’s expectations
regarding interpersonal conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. 26
N.E. 2d 254, 259.
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conduct, a higher punitive damages award is permissible.”"" The punitive damages since calculated based upon the repeated conduct - should be held by the state in order
for the other harmed plaintiffs, who did not directly participate in the specific legal case,
to collect after judgment.
Those against the plaintiff receiving the award view the main purpose of punitive
damages as punishment which is provided by the state in order to balance societal harm.
Those who support the plaintiffs receiving the award view punitive damages’ main
purpose as assisting in the civil litigation process by enforcing the motive and means for
plaintiffs to bring cases to court. In order to determine the most appropriate distribution
purpose of punitive damages, this thesis reviews first, the justice theories that should be
applied to punitive damages procedure; second, the legal punishment theories that
punitive damages fulfill; and thirdly, the historical and immanent"’ purposes of punitive
damages.

"" Sharkey, 15. refer also to her endnote 149.
"’ inherent
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CHAPTER 2

SERVING JUSTICE
Justice first assumes that equality is inherent in basic human worth,' for in order to
conclude that there should he fairness, you must assume that equality is inherent or
agreed upon. The laws that govern society aim to ensure equality and thus uphold
justice. The aims of these laws and whether they actually achieve justice are two distinct
discourses. The former is often referred to as ‘formal justice’ and the latter as ‘material
justice.’^ So when discussing the justice o f procedures and rules, it is referred to as the
formal justice aspect. Justice in law is positive or an action-requiring virtue - “righting
wrongs through punishment, ensuring compensation for victims, or in some other way
' Campbell, Justice, 246. “...the distinctive discourse of justice presupposes the ideal
of basic human equality, what I call the ‘prior equality’ of equal human worth,
complemented by the practical recognition of differential deserts on the part of
responsible agents, so that justified inequalities are based on unequal worthiness.”
^ Ibid., 26. [First to consider is] “.. .the principle of formal justice, since it involves
the application of whatever criteria of distribution are being used in a consistent manner,
irrespective of the content or substantive merits of the criteria in question. The
justification of the criteria, as distinct from their accurate implementation, is then
regarded as a matter of substantive or material justice to be determined by the exercise of
further moral judgment.” See also John Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition,
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), §38 Rule of Law p.
206. “I have already noted that the conception o f formal justice, the regular and impartial
administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system.”
See also Whitney North Seymour Jr., “The American Legal System,” Why Justice Fails,
(New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973), 6. Seymour points out the
distinction between procedure and substance. “If there is any flaw in our implementation
of these key concepts [referring to trial by jury and cross examination processes], it is our
tendency to rely more on procedure than on substance.”
33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

responding appropriately to the perpetration of injustice.”^ As discussed in the
Introduction, Civil Law responds or addresses wrongs through compensatory and punitive
damages policies. In this chapter, I will focus on the formal justice aspects of
compensatory and punitive damages. The theories I chose to discuss these aspects are
corrective justice and procedural justice.
First, I will discuss corrective justice, according to Aristotle, and how it applies to
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages and corrective justice principles focus
on restoring balance to the assumed equilibrium that existed between both parties prior to
the private transactions. An unequal or wrongful transaction is one that requires
correction through compensatory damages. If the wrongful transaction is deemed worthy
of punishment by the courts, then punitive damages are applied. The justice of punitive
damages as ‘punishment’ will be discussed in the next chapter. In order to determine
justification for the policy of whether or not the plaintiff should receive the damages, or if
the damages should go to the state, I will discuss procedural justice, according to John
Rawls. Procedural justice focuses on determining correct procedures that would ensure
justice in society. And as I will show, according to Rawls’s procedural justice principles,
the plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive damages award in order to ensure
justice.

Ibid., 3.
34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Correction
Victims to any crime carry the burden of loss until the legal system can shift that
burden. In the case of civil law, the burden is shifted from the victim to the wrong-doer
through monetary payment. The ‘shift’ is based upon the principles of corrective justice.
Aristotle recognized justice as the regulating factor in good human relations.'' When
relations or transactions are not equal, they are deemed unjust.^ With different types of
relations and transactions, different types of injustice are entailed. Aristotle distinguishes
the justice or injustice of human relations that deal with honor, possessions, safety, and
success; and those justices or injustices that are caused by a man’s desire for profit.^ This
type of justice or injustice has two parts, one ensuring equal distribution of citizenship in
the community and the other rectifying private transactions;^ the second type of justice or
injustice falls under the discourse of civil law.

^ Martin Ostwald, (transi), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, (Prentice Hall, Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey, 1999). Book V. 1130a. “...justice alone of all the virtues is
thought to be the good of another, because it is a relation to our fellow men in that it does
what is of advantage to others, either to a ruler or to a fellow member of society.” Future
references as NE 1130a.
^ NE 1130a.20 - 25. “ .. .unjust in the wider sense of ‘contrary to the law.”
®NE 1130b. 1-5. In Book V. 2. Partial justice: just action as distribution and as
rectification “The capacity of both is revealed in our relations with others, but while the
sphere o f the former is everything that is the concern of a morally good man, the latter
deals with honor, material goods, security, or whatever single term we can find to express
all these collectively, and its motive is the pleasure that comes from profit.”
^ NE 1130b.30. “One form of partial justice and of what is just in this sense is found
in the distribution of honors, of material goods, or of anything else that can be divided
among those who have a share in the political system. For in these matters it is possible
for a man to have a share equal or unequal to that o f his neighbor. A second kind o f just
action in the partial sense has a rectifying function in private transactions, and it is
divided into two parts: ...” (continued below)
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Aristotle further recognized two aspects to private transactions, those that are
voluntary and those that are involuntary.^ In civil cases of voluntary transactions, like
contracts, property agreements, or employment, the parties are assumed to enter into the
original transaction willingly, each with their personal expectations of desired outcome to
the agreement. Civil law also has forms of involuntary transactions - accidental harms known as torts.
When a transaction has been determined to be unjust, rectification (correction) is
based upon the principles of corrective justice. Correction first views the participants of
these actions as equal. But just transactions can be based upon proportional equality.
That is, even if the participants are not actually (physically or socially) on equal standing
prior to the transaction, given the voluntary nature, in the transaction they are treated as
equals. Thus the transaction itself is in proportion.^ The transaction is deemed unjust
when it violates the proportion.
Since the intent of the voluntary transaction between private parties assumes that they
both agree to the transaction, rectification or corrective justice, is concerned only with the

* NE 1131a.2 - 8. (continued from above) "...(a) voluntary and (b) involuntary
transactions, (a) Voluntary transactions are, for example, sale, purchase, lending at
interest, giving security, lending without interest, depositing in trust, and letting for hire.
They are called voluntary because the initiative in these transactions is voluntary, (b)
Some involuntary transactions are clandestine, e.g., theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring,
enticement of slaves, assassination, and bearing false w itness;...”
^ NE 1131b.32 - 1132a.l-2. “Now the just in transactions is also something equal
(and the unjust something unequal), but <it is something equal> which corresponds not to
a geometrical but to an arithmetical proportion.” See footnote 24 on Ostwedd page 120 121. “An ‘arithmetical proportion’ is for us not a proportion at all but a series in an
arithmetical progression. In it the first term is larger than the second by the same amount
by which the third term is larger than the fourth: a - b = c - d. It is ‘something equal’
because in such proportions the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes: a +
d = b + c.
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injustice or violation of proportion in the transaction. It is this ill-proportion which
corrective justice aims to restore. “The only difference the law considers is that [which]
brought about the damage”

in the transaction, and not the moral implications of the

wrong or the character of the participants (such as the malice and intent on which
punitive damages are based). It is for this reason that corrective justice is applicable to
civil law and compensatory damages."
Corrective justice rules are concerned with ensuring or restoring the appropriate terms
and conditions for persons to conduct fair private transactions. Corrective justice rules
are less concerned with offering guidance regarding “the actual [moral] duties [we have
as citizens] to avoid or prevent harm ... to one another.”'^ The injustice focused on in the
rules o f corrective justice is that which was created hy the transaction, and it is for the
judge to restore equilibrium. The correction is made by imposing the loss or burden on
the guilty by taking away any gain made by the defendant from the transaction and
transferring this gain back to the plaintiff. This is achieved with the payment of

"’V£1132a.3-4.
" See Ostwald footnote 24, p. 121, quoting Ross, Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, 1925)
“The problem of ‘rectificatory justice’ has nothing to do with punishment proper but is
only that o f rectifying a wrong that has been done, by awarding damages; i.e., rectifactory
justice is that of the civil, not that of the criminal courts. The parties are treated as equal
(since a law court is not a court of morals), and the wrongful act is reckoned as having
brought equal gain to the wrongdoer and loss of his victim; it brings A to the position A +
C, and B to the position B - C. The judge’s task is to find the arithmetical mean between
these, and this he does by transferring C from A to B ....”
Coleman, "Theories o f Tort Law", 14. Corrective justice is concerned with the
appropriate “ .. .conditions under which it is fair to impose duties to avoid or prevent
untoward consequences, [and it] offers little guidance regarding the actual duties to avoid
or prevent harm that we owe to one another.”
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compensatory damages which include pecuniary damages, non-pecuniary damages, and
hedonic losses," to balance the wrong.
In this sense, corrective justice simply focuses on restoring balance once a wrong has
already been done. But, when taking into account what should have been or should not
have been done, or what could have been done to prevent the wrong, these are
considerations the civil legal system assesses to justify punishment, or the application of
punitive damages, not for compensation. This is what separates compensatory and
corrective justice from punitive damages and punishment in civil law.

Procedural Justice
Punitive damages are added when the wrong is deserving of punishment, and takes
obligations to society into account." After a guilty judgment, if punitive damages are
determined necessary, then the question (for this thesis) is, who shall receive this award
in order to serve justice properly? This question is not a matter of rectification, as
explicated above. Nor is it strictly a matter of punishment, for once the award is ordered,
punishment is served (either way - to the plaintiff or to the state). Therefore, receipt of
the damages requires a process, a procedure, a policy. So, in order to determine whether
the plaintiff should receive the punitive damages award or if the award should go to the
state, I now investigate the theory of procedural justice.

" Volokh, 8. “compensatory damages include pecuniary damages - which is out-ofpocket expenses, or loss of wages; non-pecuniary damages - nonmonetary losses like
pain and suffering; and hedonic losses - for the lost pleasure of life.”
" Justifications of the Punishment aspect further discussed in Chapter Three.
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Procedural justice theories, specifically in regards to legal system," attempt to
determine the just process for criticizing, reforming, and creating the rules of law so they
would properly serve justice. The emphasis in procedural justice is the fair and accurate
method for devising rules of law ." For procedural justice, fair and accurate application
of correct rules should ensure just results." John Rawls’s theory o f ‘justice as fairness,’ is
“a theory o f just procedures, so that whatever results from these processes is itself just.”"
According to Rawls, the main purpose of a legal system is to coerce rational persons
in the community to maintain order through public rules. The legal system and its rules
“regulate ... conduct and provide the framework for social cooperation.”" In order to
maintain order, Rawls emphasizes that the rules of law must have the citizen’s liberty as a
priority and a sense of regularity. Thus, the maxims that the rules of law are derived
from include the priorities o f liberty and regularity in order to ensure social cooperation.
" John Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, §10 Institutions and Formal
Justice, 47-48, “Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities and the
like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and
they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As
examples of institutions, or more generally social practices, we may think of games and
rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property.” See also 51, “Formal
justice in the case o f legal institutions is simply an aspect of the rule of law which
supports and secures legitimate expectations.”
" Ibid., 207-210.
" Ibid., §38 Rule of Law p. 206-207. “One kind of unjust action is the failure of
judges and others in authority to apply the appropriate rule or to interpret it correctly. ...
The regular and impartial, and in this sense fair, administration of law we may call
‘justice as regularity.’ This is a more suggestive phrase than ‘formal justice.’”
" John Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” in the introduction by Pojman, L.(ed),
Ethical Theory Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989),
577-589.
19

Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 207-208.
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These maxims include (1) that “ought implies can.”^° This means that every rule of law
inherently includes the ability to be achieved by rational persons.^' (2) That “similar
cases [are] treated similarly.”^^ This ensures that society can be assured that arbitrary
changes will not he made given similar circumstances - this adds to predictability in
rules; (3) that “there is no offense without the law.”^^ This implies that the rules be
known and have been “expressly promulgated, meanings clearly defined, that statutes be
general both in statement and intent and not be used as a way o f harming particular
individuals . . . And (4) that rules of law define the notion o f natural justice. This
means that the rules o f law “intend to preserve the integrity of the judicial process....
The precepts of natural justice are to insure that the legal order will be impartially and
regularly maintained.”^^ Impartiality is mandatory in order to determine whether any
decision or rule would be considered just, or if any action would serve justice.^^

Ibid., 208.
Campbell, 120-121. Defining a rational participant. “... in the original position,
where the parties are confined to those with the capacity to take part in society and who
must, therefore, have the minimum requirements of moral agency: that is, they must
inter alia, have the capacity to have, and effectively pursue a conception of their own
good.”
^ Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 208-209.
Ibid., 209
" Ibid.
" Ibid., 2 0 9 -2 1 0 .
^ Ibid., 51. “For it is supposed that institutions are reasonably just, then it is of great
importance that the authorities should be impartial and not influenced by personal,
monetary, or other irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases.”
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Procedural justice embraces and hopes to achieve impartiality through emphasis on
correct procedure.
Correct Procedure
Rawls’s political theory of justice uses a hypothetical contractual procedure to
understand the role of justice in society. The initial analysis of a hypothetical state of
society allows political philosophy to depict what the social and political rules and the
system of government ought to be and how these rules could then sustain particular
policies.^^
Rawls’s approach crucially depends on the characterization o f the imagined state of
nature, which includes the qualities of the participants. His imagined state of nature
begins with participants hypothetically entering into a contract^^ which establishes the
foundations of a legal system. Entering into this contract would assist persons to achieve
personal goals" in community life, as opposed to living without the benefits of political

Campbell, 94. “hnagining and thinking through the implications of a hypothetical
state of nature is a way of getting to know the content of the social and political rules and
the system o f government that ought to be created and sustained in the here and now.”
"R aw ls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 1 0 - 11, “...we are not to think of the
original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of
government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are principles that free
rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.” See also
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 577 - 578. Rawls’s Social contract theory
“corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of social contract. The
original position is not, or course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much
less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”
" It is assumed that persons would desire assistance from the community and a
system to achieve desires and life goals. See also Campbell, 92. The Social Contract is
an agreement between potential citizens about the terms on which they are to enter into
either social or political relationships. It posits a situation - “state of nature” - in which
41
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arrangements. By entering into a contract, citizens consent to and allow the operation of
social and/or political organizations which enforce social order. Since the entrance into
the contract is considered a fair^^ situation for all rational persons, Rawls argues that it is
“possible to base political obligation on ... the premise that citizens have an obligation to
obey just laws,”

since they agreed to enter into the contractual agreement with others in

order to receive the benefits of a politically organized society.
Once this mutual obligation is established, next Rawls explicates a process which
produces a hypothetical deliberative state in which the rules of law can be judged,
reformed, or established. This begins with “the original position.”
The Original Position
This hypothetical contractarian method begins with a hypothetical state for decision
making, the “original position.” The strategy of using the original position hopes to
ensure impartiality by insisting that “all causes of bias and partiality are excluded from
[deliberation], thus achieving an impartial and fair outcome.”^^ This hypothetical state
requires three things: (1) that the participant has the capacity to take part in society meaning they can contribute to the free market, and have the minimum requirements of

persons who have no existing political (and perhaps social) rights or obligations reach
(usually unanimous) agreement about the basis on which to establish a social and/or
political system in which they do have recognized rights and obligations.
Campbell, 95. ‘Fair’ because one can choose not to enter into the contract,
“...freedom is a matter o f autonomy (uncoerced and informed choice) and equality has to
do with equal capacity to bargain on the basis of equal procedural rights and equal claims
on the outcome.
Ibid.
Ibid., 98
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moral agency/^ in order to deliberate in regards to principles of justice; (2) the
participant must be (hypothetically) free and equal, in order to achieve fairness; and (3)
the participants deliberate under a “veil of ignorance.”
Free, means un-coerced and not under any prior obligations or constraints. No hidden
agendas, no party affiliations, no causes to pursue, purely free for decision making and
deliberation in the hypothetical contract. This freedom is not only from oneself, but also
from other participants. During deliberation, participants are viewed as independent and
autonomous sources.
Rawls argues that this freedom will ensure that participants will deliberate with
“mutual disinterest” in regards to the claims for the benefits o f social cooperation.^'' So,
in pursuit of their disinterested claims, “the parties are free to propose and argue for the
principles o f justice that they believe would be of greatest benefit to themselves; and it is
assumed that they, as rational persons, will agree only to the best bargain they can obtain
in return for the benefits of social cooperation.”^^ This is what Rawls calls possessing
“rational autonomy” - “the rationality of the intelligent and prudent person, the capacity

Campbell, 120-121. Defining a rational participant, “...in the original position,
where the parties are confined to those with the capacity to take part in society and who
must, therefore, have the minimum requirements of moral agency; that is, they must
inter alia, have the capacity to have, and effectively pursue a conception of their own
good.”
Ibid., 101. “Rawls defines that the parties are egoists since they do not seek to
harm anyone else, but says they are mutually disinterested in that they care only about
their own welfare, taken in isolation. They have normal human desires although they feel
no envy, and are not interested in benefiting or harming others for its own sake.”
" Ibid.
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to discover and follow the most effective means to a chosen end.”^^ So the rationally
autonomous participants in the hypothetical contract will ensure that decisions, rules, and
laws are fair and just, not only for their “mutually disinterested” selves, but for all
persons in society. The “mutual disinterest,” since it is coercion-free, forces one to apply
to the self what in a disinterested, unbiased, and impartial way is applicable to the whole.
In addition to freedom, there must he equality. Since the basis of any discourse in
justice begins with the assumption of equality,^^ the hypothetical contract ensures
equality is prefaced when deciding the rules of law. In order to debate just rules of law in
the original position, persons must have equality in procedural rights, equal access to
important sources of valid claims on societal resources in relation to basic social
institutions, and equal worth which is “symmetrical with respect to one another.”^*
The achievement of hypothetical equality for deliberation is possible because we are
rational agents: we have the ability to imagine, understand, and apply hypothetical

Campbell, 101. “People in the original position possess what Rawls calls ‘rational
autonomy’, a property he equates with the notion of rationality found in Kant’s
hypothetical imperative or in neoclassical economics,...” For reference to Kant, see
James W. Ellington, (transi.), Immanuel Kant: Grounding fo r the Metaphysics o f Morals
with On a Supposed Right to Lie Because o f Philanthropic Concerns, 3" ed. (Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1981). Third Section: Transition
From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason, The Concept o f
Freedom Is the Key fo r an Explanation o f the Autonomy o f the Will, 447 (marginal
number), page 49. “What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e., the
property that the will has of being a law to itself? The proposition that the will is in every
action a law to itself expresses, however, nothing but the principle of acting according to
no other maxim than that which can at the same time have itself as a universal law for its
object. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the
principle of morality. Thus free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the
same.”
37
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equality. Thus the nature of respect for and understanding of equality is rooted in the
equality of persons as moral agents.^^
Now that the conditions of the particular participants in the original position are
determined, justice as fairness further clarifies the process with the ‘veil of ignorance.’ In
order for the original position to determine just procedures leading to fair decisions, or
rules of law, the persons in the original position (free and equal) must imagine
themselves under a ‘veil of ignorance.’ The veil ensures theoretical impartiality in the
original position. This veil is a hypothetical state in which one does not know one’s
status in society in regards to material possessions, occupation, or status. The veil also
makes deliberation void of gender, age, intelligence, strength, or talent. Rawls argues
that the original position, with a veil of ignorance, would “ensure that no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance
or the contingency of social circumstances.”'"'
For example, in everyday personal or social conversation, when asking whether or not
an individual approves or disapproves of, for instance, the increase or decrease of taxes,
their response is usually supported by their personal position in society, how the rise or
lowering of taxes would affect them personally. It is not unjust to prefer to support a
political law, a political party, or choose a side of a political issue based upon the benefits
and burdens o f your person. But when placed in the position of reforming, creating, or

Campbell, 102. Referring to Kantian constructivism. Constructivists contend the
“principles of justice are generated from the ideal of the moral person through the model
of the original position.” Persons in the original position create/construct principles of
justice, and “the constructing parties are equal.”
^ Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 578. The contingencies of social
circumstances are detailed in regards to determining the least advantaged group.
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criticizing the rules of law in order for them to be determined for society - everyone
would prefer that the persons in deliberation are not only considering themselves, but the
justice that is to be served to society as a whole or what is right in itself, with no bias or
personal preference. This is why Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance “remove[s] all
the possibilit[ies] of unfairness in the decision to be made, by rendering each [person]
entirely ignorant of any particular fact ahout themselves which might lead them ... to
favor themselves at the expense of those with different qualities.”'"
Furthermore, parties under the veil of ignorance are “ex hypothesi, ignorant of the
content of their [personal] sense of justice.”"^ This means that they have no bias or
preference to determining what is just in society (such as religious beliefs or ethical
theories). This ignorance is essential for the logical independence of the contract method
since “the motivation of the parties is the furtherance of their own [independent ignorant]
interests, [and] all that they know is that they are creatures who will have a sense of
justice in actual society.”"^ So the sense of justice that they do possess, and will refer to,
is that of the basic human equal worth. Thus, the veil of ignorance will result in a
“procedural fairness based on the strategy of ensuring that all causes of bias and partiality
are excluded from the original position, thus achieving an impartial and fair outcome.”'"'
These characteristics of the original position - free, equal, and ignorant to their own
social positions, or status - are monumental to procedural justice in establishing

Campbell, 102.
Ibid.
Ibid., 102-103.
Ibid., 98.
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impartiality in order to deliberate upon which principles should guide the criticism of the
rules of law. Thus the principles chosen to guide the rules of law would be the result of a
purely just procedure since persons determining them are free, equal, and ignorant; and in
turn the principles would guide deliberation to justice.
Rawls hoped that “the principles [of justice] would be chosen [in the original position
and] match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way.”''^
Furthermore, since the original position would ensure impartiality, it would also
determine “limitations on argument[s]”‘'^ during deliberation. Disagreements regarding
justice could be limited, accepted, rejected, and directed by the fairly chosep principles of
justice.
Determined Principles of Justice
For Rawls, the original position procedure results in two principles of justice. The
principles of justice are broad in the sense that they could be applied with specific
délibération to all rules o f law, or questionable situations that require regulation - they
assist us in deciding what the rules ought to specify. These principles should be used to
regulate, reform, or criticize the basic institutions o f society, which in turn will determine
the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.
The first principle states that: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty

Campbell, 98.
Ibid.
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 578. These principles are to be used to guide
and “regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions.”
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for all.”''* It implies that rational participants in society will value, and therefore desire,
equality of basic liberties."^ These hasic liberties are “primary goods,” as defined by
Rawls; “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth,...[as well as]
self respect.”^" These “primary goods” can he governed by institutions, and are required
by any person in order to pursue any conception o f the good^' in their life. Once the
primary goods are constituted, in the original position, the next question is “how these
goods are to be distributed;”^^ in other words what are justified distributive procedures?
Although the first principle requires equality in liberties, Rawls recognizes that there
are inherent inequalities in basic liberties which develop within society.

For, although

everyone should be equal, not everyone is in fact equal. Advantages and disadvantages
in society occur for reasons that include natural abilities or talents, or privileges, honor.

'* Ihid. 578. See also Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 266.
" Ihid., 588-589. “The argument for the two principles of justice does not assume that
the parties have particular ends, but only that they desire certain primary goods.. . . The
preference for primary goods is derived, then, from only the most general assumptions
about rationality and the conditions of human life.”
Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 54. “ ...For simplicity, assume that the
chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties, and opportunities,
and income and wealth. (Later on in Part Three the primary good of self-respect has a
central place.)” See also Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 583. Also see Campbell,
104, “ ‘the social bases o f self-respect’, ... conditions necessary for individuals to
maintain a feeling of their worth as moral agents.”
Ihid., 54. “.. .primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to
want. These goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.” See
also Campbell, 104. “conception of the good in a well ordered society which respects the
individual’s moral powers to follow out in his life a conception o f the good and an ideal
of justice.”
Campbell, 105.
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 587.
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and wealth that are inherited from birth or gained through certain advantaged
circumstances. There are leaders and there are followers. Some choose to lead, and
some choose to follow. Not everyone can be the president at the same time, and not
everyone wants to be president, and so forth. In recognizing the inherent inequalities that
develop in society, the second principle entails the necessity to turn attention from
assuming that ‘all persons are created equal’ to inherent social goods that one may try to
exploit as a result of circumstance. So, the second principle of justice must address what
to do in the event that there are inequalities, in order to ensure that liberty and equality
are maintained.
Thus, the second principle states: “Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings [or the difference] principle, and (b) attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”^'
The Least Advantaged and the Difference Principle
Rawls defines the “least advantaged” group as those “whose family and class origins
are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural endowments (as realized) permit them
to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of life turn out to be less
happy, all within the normal range ... and with the relevant measures based on social
primary goods.”^^ In the event of unequal distributions of primary goods, (which refers

Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 266. See also Rawls, “A Liberal
Theory of Justice,” 587.
Ibid., 83 - 84. “I shall assume that everyone has physical needs and psychological
capacities within the normal range, so that the questions of health care and mental
capacity do not arise. ... The first problem of justice concerns the relations among those
who in the everyday course o f things are full and active participants in society and
directly or indirectly associated together over the whole span of their life. Thus, the
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to the excess of basic liberties which have already been maximized to the highest point of
equal distribution, or to the fact that some persons or group of persons have some
advantage over the other in terms of access to these goods) the second principle states
that these excess goods should be distributed so that they have the effect of maximizing
the lot of the least advantaged group.

If in a situation, certain individuals have superior

talents, and gain higher benefits than others, Rawls feels they do not have any intrinsic
sole right to these benefits arising from personal merit.®Thus if they receive an excess
of goods, they are obligated to distribute these goods, unless as the “difference principle”
states, their receiving or keeping these goods would benefit the least advantaged.
According to the “difference principle”, also referred to as the “just savings
principle”:
Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and
fair equality o f opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated
are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the
expectations o f the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive
idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage
of those less fortunate. ... The difference principle is a strongly egalitarian
conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes both
persons better off (limiting ourselves to the two-person case for
simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred.®*

difference principle is to apply to citizens engaged in social cooperation; if the principle
fails for this case, it would seem to fail in general.” Rawls also notes that there are three
main kinds o f contingencies, possibilities, or unforeseen unequal situations that will
affect persons in society in w hich the least advantaged status is based upon: fam ily and

class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the course of life.
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Campbell, 106.

®’ Ibid., 107.
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Rawls, yf Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 65-66.
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For example, if a student has shown to be talented in the medical field, the
government may offer that person a scholarship for school. This advantage is not to
‘secure the prospects of the better o f f ’ But, if the loan required the student to give back
to society in partial compensation for his loan, by practicing medicine upon graduation
for a certain period at a free clinic, or as lawyers are required to provide a certain amount
of pro bono cases, the federal scholarship becomes an advantage that benefits the least
advantaged as well. The difference principle assumes that rational persons would not
permit inequalities in positions where they might not be able to compete on equal terms,®®
so the second principle o f justice ensures that inequalities should be arranged to the
greatest benefit o f the least advantaged.
Another illustration o f the second principle of justice and the difference principle
given by Rawls is a hypothetical situation of limiting free trade.
For example, persons engaged in a particular industry often find that
free trade is contrary to their interests. Perhaps the industry cannot remain
prosperous without tariffs or other restrictions. But if free trade is
desirable from the point of view of equal citizens or o f the least
advantaged, it is justified even though more specific interests temporarily
suffer. For we are to agree in advance to the principles of justice and their
consistent application from the standpoint of certain positions.^®
Thus when faced with inequalities inherent in society, and for the purpose of
distribution and justice, the priority of benefit is that of the least advantaged, not the
majority of participants or specific interests.

®®Campbell, 107.
60

Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 85.
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Application of the Principles - Reflective Equilibrium
The process for “justice as fairness” - the original position, the veil of ignorance, and
the two principles of justice - can be used to analyze present day justice issues, whether it
be the criticism, reform, or creation of political policies. The advantage of the
hypothetical procedure is that it can be used at any time by rational persons in pursuit of
justice. The original position is a state of deliberation, and a part o f the process of
decision making that establishes guidelines and principles to follow in order to maintain
justice. Rawls stated:
At any time we can enter into the original position,... simply by
following a certain procedure, by arguing for principles of justice in
accordance with these restrictions.^'
The use o f the original position when in deliberation as to whether or not a policy
serves justice as fairness, Rawls refers to “reflective equilibrium.” Once the principles of
justice are decided, we can apply them to our particular policies and convictions of
justice to see if they match or extend them in an acceptable way.^^ Using the principles
of justice as a guide to goodness and right, we can determine whether or not reforms are
necessary. Procedural justice asserts that with correct deliberation guided by the
principles o f justice and the original position, justice as fairness can be achieved.^®

Rawls,

Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 17.

^ Ibid. [The reflective equilibrium is used] “...to see if the principles which would
be chosen match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable
way. We can note whether applying these principles would lead us to make the same
judgments about the basic structure of society which we now make intuitively and in
which we have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases where our present judgments
are in doubt and given with hesitation, these principles offer a resolution which we can
affirm on reflection.”
Ibid. 18. “We can either modify the account o f the initial situation or we can revise
our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are
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For in the deliberation of a policy, even if we can only determine what we ought to
do, or how the process or procedure should he, we are closer to achieving justice than not
carefully reflecting upon the policies at all, or waiting for some end result to justify or not
justify its existence. So despite the hypothetical nature of ‘justice as fairness,’ this theory
appeals to normative views because it focuses on the procedure fo r establishing standards
for determining justice in society.
So, for the sake of this thesis, we will use a reflective equilibrium and apply it to the
distribution policy of punitive damages. Reformers argue that since punitive damages are
calculated for multiple harms,^' the punitive damages award should not be given solely to
the plaintiff. Reformers argue that this is process does not serve justice and provides a
‘windfall’ gain to the plaintiff. Reformers feel that the punitive damages should go to the
state, in order to beheld for and benefit, those for whom the award was calculated, not
just the plaintiff who took the time, effort, and opportunity to sue. In order to apply
‘justice as fairness’ to the policy in question - whether or not punitive damages should
continue to be received by the plaintiff, or if the purposes of justice and punitive damages
would be better off served if received by the state, or split between the plaintiff and the

liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that
both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective
equilihrium.”
^ Sharkey, 15. Section III A New Category o f Compensatory Societal Damages, “The
concept of societal damages is particularly relevant to widespread harm torts. These tots
comprise two categories; (1) single tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple
victims; and (2) ‘pattern or practice’ torts, which consist of repeated conduct that likewise
affects multiple parties. If a defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part of a pattern
of similar repeated conduct, a higher punitive damages award may be permissible.”
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State - one must first ask: How do compensatory and punitive damages fulfill the two
principles o f justice?

Given the first principle of justice, that of equal distribution o f liberties or primary
goods, the purpose of the processes of the civil court system is to correct the imbalance of
liberties that may result from private transactions. Although compensatory and punitive
damages are liberties or primary goods, they are not ‘public g o o d s , f o r primary goods
in private transactions are private goods. The primary responsibility and concern of
societal institutions is the distribution of public goods;^^ Societal institutions become
concerned with private goods only when private entities seek the assistance of the
institution to settle injustices or imbalances of private transactions.
Although the actual goods distributed as compensatory damages or punitive damages
are not public goods, the assistance provided by societal institutions in correcting
injustices in private transactions is a public good. Thus, access to the civil law system
should be equal and fair to all citizens. Assuming that access to the civil law system is
equal, the policies that regulate distribution, policies for compensatory and punitive
damages, should aim to ensure equality to the participants in the civil law arena.

Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 235. .. .public good has two
characteristic features, indivisibility and publicness. That is there are many individuals, a
public so to speak, who want more or less if this is good, but if they are to enjoy it at all
must each enjoy the same amount. The quantity produced cannot be divided up as
private goods can and purchased by individuals according to their preferences for more
and less. There are various kinds of public goods depending upon their degree of
indivisibility and the size o f relevant public. ... A standard example is the defense of the
nation against (unjustified) foreign attack.”
^ Ibid., 236. “It follows that arranging for and financing public goods must be taken
over by the state and some binding rule requiring payment must be enforced.”
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That punitive damages go to the plaintiff is supported by the second principle of
justice; the principle that inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged or in accordance with the difference principle. The inequalities in private
transactions are the goods that are being sued for by the plaintiff as punitive damages. If
we contemplate pure compensation (compensatory damages only), if a guilty verdict is
decided, the goods are distributed to the plaintiff. But compensatory damages, unlike
punitive damages, are not inequalities. The civil law system and compensatory damages
are merely correcting the inequalities created during private transactions. Thus,
compensatory damages are not concerned with ‘inequality’ as it is referred to in the
second principle; for the second principle addresses inequalities that are a result of an
excess of advantages for some person or group, which is produced from a just situation.
Thus, in terms of the second principle of justice, an unjust transaction occurs only when
an inequality of excess, not rightly deserved, is created; but correction and compensatory
damages re-distribute and settle inequality for the sake of restoration.
Punitive damages, on the contrary, serve as punishment - further damages for further
harm caused. It can be argued that this may be just a problem of semantics. For the harm
weighed for punitive damages, although not nominal, is also an inequality resulting from
an unjust action, so they are no different or not ‘in excess’ (just as compensatory damages
are not.) For punitive damages punish or correct for harm that is not monetary. The only
difference is the term and application, but in theory, they seem similar. But since the
civil law and the public discourse clearly make the distinction between the two, as
discussed in Chapter One, we will proceed on the premise that punitive damages do not
represent in any way simple compensation or correction.

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If we view punitive damages as an inequality which is an ‘excess liberty’ or in this
case ‘further damages’ which are to be distributed, then according to the second principle
the inequality - which I will define as the defendant having to pay further damages and
the plaintiff receiving additional damages beyond compensation - should be distributed
and is allowed as long as it is to the benefit of the least advantaged group. Since the
plaintiff, in the situation of the civil law suit is “the least advantaged group,” distribution
of punitive damages should be to the plaintiff.
To explain: if we refer back to the definition of “the least advantaged” group: those
“whose family and class origins are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural
endowments (as realized) permit them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the
course of life turn out to be less happy, all within the normal range ... and with the
relevant measures based on social primary goods,”^^ how is the plaintiff the least
advantaged? The three contingencies which we can weigh to determine the least
advantaged are family and class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the
course o f life. Given the plaintiff and the defendant, it is entirely possible that the family
and class origin and natural endowments of each could be equal or weigh more to the
plaintiff. But since the civil law arena, as stated earlier, does not take into account family

Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 83 - 84. “I shall assume that everyone
has physical needs and psychological capacities within the normal range, so that the
questions of health care and mental capacity do not arise. ... The first problem of justice
concerns the relations among those who in the everyday course of things are full and
active participants in society and directly or indirectly associated together over the whole
span of their life. Thus, the difference principle is to apply to citizens engaged in social
cooperation; if the principle fails for this case, it would seem to fail in general.” Rawls
also notes that there are three main kinds of contingencies, possibilities, or unforeseen
unequal situations that will affect persons in society in which the least advantaged status
is based upon: family and class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the
course of life.
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and class, or natural endowments when deciding compensatory damages, they should not
be weighed into the distribution for punitive damages. In civil law, the personal positions
of the participants do not and should not weigh into the decision of guilt in private
transactions. In this way, the civil law arena applies its veil of ignorance, thus so will I.
But, I do argue that the last contingency can apply - one’s fortune and luck in the course
of life. For given the situation - the private transaction - we can conclude that the
plaintiff did not fair luckily in this private transaction in the course of his/her life, since
we are assuming a guilty verdict has heen established. If any of the three contingencies
of the least advantaged are to apply at this point, given that the defendant is guilty, the
plaintiff is the least advantaged in the situation since the plaintiff is judged a victim of a
wrong that has been deemed worthy for punitive damages. Thus, the punitive damages
should he received by the plaintiff according to the second principle of justice.
Arguments against distribution to the plaintiff would argue that the least advantaged
in this situation would be society, especially if the harm was one that required mass
litigation or caused the defendant to change policies that applied to the whole of the
nation or state in which the wrong was committed. And so the damages should go to the
state, which would in turn serve society as a whole.
The problem with this view is that it is conditioned on the premise that the harm was
a mass litigation and punishment did (as an end result) affect society, this is a special
circumstance. But reform of punitive damages policy should not be changed for specific
occasional conditions. Even if societal damages are desirable from the point of view
which requires attention to certain situations, the proposed reform is based upon specific
conditions and interests. But, keeping in tune with the original position and the veil of
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ignorance, policies and rules of law, in order to sustain justice, policies and rules should
not be made on the premise of specific interests. Given the possibility that I could be one
of the least advantaged, the plaintiff in a law suit, my mutual disinterest®* in the benefits
to society as a whole or to specific groups would lead me to conclude that I should
receive the punitive damages, and that they should not be held for others who did not
pursue legal suit. Since I was judged the victim in a wrong-doing and went through the
long process of civil court, the benefit, if any that initially would come from the
judgment, such as punitive damages, should be awarded to me, the plaintiff. This is not a
purely selfish decision, but it is mutually disinterested.®^ For as addressed in the next
chapter, purposes of punitive damages that include punishment do benefit society through
deterrence, both specific and general.
Thus I will briefly conclude that through my deliberation, for the punitive damages
policy, the plaintiff is the least advantaged and should continue to receive the award. The
following chapters discuss further the purposes of punitive damages - punishment, honor,
insult, and plaintiff incentive - and how these purposes contribute to why the plaintiff
should receive the damages. For, although procedural justice can direct us in the further
deliberation of this issue, it is not the sole guide to correct policy.

®* Campbell, 101. [Mutually disinterested refers to those in the original position,
where in pursuit of their disinterested claims,] “the parties are free to propose and argue
for the principles of justice that they believe would be of greatest benefit to themselves;
and it is assumed that they, as rational persons, will agree only to the best bargain they
can obtain in return for the benefits of social cooperation.”
®^ Independent, not coerced by special interests, be the special interest of society or
any group, but only the interest of a participant in the pursuit of justice, as one in the
original position.
58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Criticisms to Rawls
Critics argue that the circumstances to sustain the original position - free, equal, and
ignorant - are not possible. Although our minds can be creative enough to imagine
hypothetical situations, it is not likely that persons could communicate, let alone
deliberate without personal convictions influencing decisions. Criticism that the
hypothetical situation is not easy to achieve, is not surprising, since it is an ideal situation.
But it is that very superlative situation that hopes to create ideal principles. It may be
difficult, but I would not say that it is impossible. If idyllic justice principles are what we
are striving for, then a perfect process is the best way to achieve this.
“The principal weakness of Rawls’s [hypothetical contractual] approach is the
uncertainty which surrounds the original position and its outcome.”’® Since average
utility offers everyone the best chance of the best life, it is assumed that persons in the
original position would rationally choose average utility. Critics argue that it “seems
desperately ad hoc for Rawls to rule this out by insisting on the unrealistic proviso that
rational individuals would not be prepared to take the risks involved in such a strategy
and [yet] to not know the probabilities involved.”’* But it is this very choice which
Rawls relies upon in order to accept his hypothetical contractarianism over a principle of
universal beneficence as the basis for social choice. Since it cannot be certain that these
rational agents would make this choice, then his justification is weak.
The uncertainty is also evident in “that the basic liberties must be given priority by
purely self-regarding individuals with a sound knowledge of human nature, for actual

’®Campbell, 109.
’* Ibid.
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people are prepared to forgo political rights for economic gains well beyond the point of
economic subsistence.”” In response to this criticism I argue that it is important to re
emphasize that it is not an actual situation, but an ideal situation. It is true that actual
people may not make these choices. But under the veil of ignorance, Rawls argues, they
would. Again, Rawls’s goal in developing his theory “was to gain general acceptance for
this as a method of political reflection in a liberal society.”’^ It may also be argued that
depending upon the nature of the culture and society, be it not a liberal one, the principles
may be different, even under the veil of ignorance. But Rawls’s theory is attractive for it
“promises to provide a means whereby citizens of liberal societies, with their emphasis
on individual autonomy and commitment to toleration of individual and group
differences, can reach working agreements as to the basic normative structure of
society.”” Thus it is this type of society in which Rawls premises the conclusion that
basic liberties will be given priority by purely self-regarding individuals. As noted,
earlier, participants are mutually disinterested, independent and autonomous sources of
claims on the benefits of social cooperation.
“Controversy has also attached to the exclusive emphasis which the difference
principle puts on the situation of the worst-off-group. It is argued more weight would
attach, for instance, to those whose position is only marginally better than this one class
of persons.”’® If a society’s main objective was economic efficiency, this criticism could

” Ibid.
Ibid
74

Ibid., 109.

’®Ibid., 110.
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be warranted. For the worst-off-group would most often be the least economically
efficient.
Economic efficiency in criminal or civil law is best described by Richard A. Posner.’®
Posner’s theory justifies legal punishment, in criminal and civil law, in that it promotes
efficiency. He argues that the main reason for law in a capitalist society is to prevent
people from “bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange - the ‘market,’
explicit or implicit - in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is
a more efficient method for allocating resources than forced exchange.”” Since a
punishment (criminal or civil), according to Posner, deters persons from bypassing fair
exchange through the market, punishment is therefore justified in that it promotes
efficiency. Posner also argues that due to economic deterrence, it is also efficient to
punish according to an offender’s wealth. Also in this sense, imprisonment is designed
primarily for the non-affluent, who would not be deterred by economic sanctions, since
they have little economically to lose, whereas the affluent, in contrast, may be deterred by
monetary fines, compensatory and punitive damages.’* With this view, the worst-off
group would be considered to be the non-affluent, and since monetary threats are not
effective on them, neither would it make sense, in criticism to Rawls’s principles, to

’®See Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law”, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1193,
193, (October 1985) and/or Richard
Ric
A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 6* ed.
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003).
77

Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” 1195 : 2.

’* Benard E. Harcourt, “Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the
Relationship Between The Moral Limits o f the Criminal Law and The Expressive
Function of Punishment,” 146 Buffalo Criminal Law Review Vol.5:145-172 (2001) : 152.
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ensure that in distribution of basic liberties, they are distributed to the worst-off s benefit,
for they are the most inefficient in society.
Posner’s economic efficiency of the law can most efficiently be applied when
determining fines, amounts of damages, and lengths of incarcerations. Posner may be
most effective in addressing the excessiveness issue of punitive damages. His view of
the end for punishment is efficiency and general deterrence. But, when determining
whether or not a procedure serves justice, namely, whether or not the plaintiff should
receive the punitive damages, regardless of the amount, I argue that procedural justice is
most appropriate to measure justice.
So in the liberal society to which Rawls refers, he is assuming that individualism
would outweigh economic efficiency. And as addressed earlier, the second principle
assumes that there are divisions in society. The second principle addresses the
distribution of social and economic advantages in order to distinguish “among primary
social goods that one should try to exploit. It suggests, [and recognizes, an inherent and]
important division in the social system.”’^ The choice of the difference principle is a
reaction to the assumption that individualism would lead to exploitation at times, and it is
a reflection of the view that economic efficiency is the more important consideration.
Although the idealistic nature of Rawls’s argument is the biggest criticism, I argue it
is that which makes it suitable to criticize existing laws. “It is hard to reject the view that
there is some objectivity and universality in the [hypothetical contractarian] method in so
far as it incorporates and institutionalizes the role of impartiality in the moral debate and

” Harcourt, “Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship
Between The Moral Limits o f the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of
Punishment,” 152.
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political decision-making.”*® Impartiality is key to any decision that would be considered
just and any action that would serve justice. Since procedural justice embraces
impartiality, it is suitable in measuring the procedures of justice.

*®Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3

PUNISHMENT IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As stated in Chapter One, the major purpose of punitive damages is to serve
punishment, specifically for retribution and deterrence.* The first section of this chapter
will address how punitive damages are defined as punishment in civil law. The next
section describes legal punishment and its justification. The following sections will first
define the punishment theories of retribution, deterrence, and a punishment goal which is
not commonly referred to in the justification o f punitive damages - vengeance
satisfaction.’ Each section of the punishment theories will examine their benefits and

* David G. Owen, “The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages,” general overview
of article. See also BMW o f North America, Inc. v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct.
1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; U.S. LEXIS 3390 (1996). Syllabus (a) [refers to punitive award
that should be “... in relation to the State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition, cf. TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.” See also Bowden v.
Caldor 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; Md. LEXIS 407 (1998). Opinion by Eldridge, J., I.
“One of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish the wrongs of the defendant.” See
also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 ,19, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032
(1991) “Punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.” See
also National Conference o f Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Model Punitive
Damages Act Final Draft 1996 accessed [on-line] at
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/finaldft.htm on 27 April 2005, Section 1. Definitions
“"Punitive damages" means an award of money made to a claimant solely to punish or
deter.” See also Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damage Awards; Reforming the Tort Reformers,” The American University Law
Review, 42, 1269,1284-97 (Summer 1993) : 13 of 64. section 2. Punishment and
Deterrence “The punishment and deterrence functions are the most frequently cited
rationales for the remedy o f punitive damages.”
’ Vengeance satisfaction is referred to as a Utilitarian aim of punishment. Vengeance
satisfaction is seen as a good or increase of happiness as a result of punishment. This is
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detriments to the justification of legal punishment and in conclusion, I evaluate how these
theories justify punitive damages as punishment and more specifically, if they in any way
reinforce whether or not the plaintiff should receive the award.

Civil Remedies
In our legal system, there are different types of legal punishment, - criminal, civil,
economic, administrative, etc. In the civil law arena, wrongs are brought to justice
through compensatory damages.® It is important to distinguish that compensatory
damages are not seen as analogous to punishment,"* for they are measured as direct equal
compensation for losses. Punitive damages are “civil style”®punishment which is

different from retribution. Retribution argues that vengeance represents equality and
punishment is deserved, not because it has any positive results. Thus vengeance
satisfaction will be addressed as separately from retribution.
®See pages ix, supra, in the Introduction, Civil Law section.
"*Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 5. See also State Farm v. Campbell 583
U.S. 408; 123 S. Ct. 1513; 155 L. Ed. 2d 585; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 2713. Opinion by
Kennedy, II [***LEdHR2A] [2A] “We recognized in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674, 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001),
that in our judicial system compensatory and punitive damages, although usually awarded
at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different purposes. Id , at 432.
Compensatory damages "are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct." Ibid. (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 903, pp. 453-454 (1979)). By contrast, punitive damages serve a
broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution. Cooper Industries, supra
at 432; see also Gore, supra at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to
further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition")” See also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
Model Punitive Damages Act Final Draft 1996 accessed [on-line] at
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/finaldft.htm on 27 April 2005, Section 1. Definitions
“"Compensatory damages" means an award of money, including a nominal amount,
made to compensate a claimant for a legally recognized injury. The term does not include
punitive damages.”
®Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 2.
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imposed in addition to compensation. Unlike criminal fines or incapacitation, punitive
damages are an infliction of further® harm on the wrongdoing party, in addition to
compensatory damages, in the form o f monetary payment. Punishment in the form of
monetary payment is distinct fi-om a civil fine, which has a set amount for a particular
violation. The amount of punitive damages is determined by a jury or judge, on a case by
case basis.’ As explained in Chapter One, punitive damages should by common law be
proportionate to the additional harm that is not covered by compensatory damages, as
well as serve as punishment and with intent to deter.
If punitive damages are defined as punishment served with the defendant paying
goods or money to the plaintiff to serve purposes other than direct compensation, the
development of the doctrine of punitive damages can be traced back to Babylonian and
ancient Hindu traditions, the Bible, and Roman Law.* In England, punitive damages
originated in a dispute between the Secretary of State’s agents and a publisher named
Wilkes. The dispute was due to an unlawful search and seizure in the case of Wilkes v.
Wood? The plaintiff demanded that the jury award more than trivial fines to ensure that

®Further, because it is in addition to compensatory damages.
’ Any general guidelines that exist for determining this amount were discussed in
Chapter One.
* Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” The American University Law Review, 42,
1269, 1284-97 (Summer 1993) : 5. “The doctrine of punitive damages has an ancient
lineage. The Babylonian Hammurabi Code, Hindu Code of Manu, and the Bible all
contain precursors to the modem remedy of punitive damages. The Roman law of
multiple damages blended compensation with punishment.”
^ Wilkes V. Wood, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). In Wilkes v. Wood, John Wilkes,
the publisher o f The North Briton, sued a member of Parliament for trespassing. Wilkes
V. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489-99 (K.B. 1763). This case was cited as the beginning of
punitive damages in Eighteenth-century English cases in the following references.
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unlawful search and seizures would not be taken lightly by officials and never happen
again. The Chief Justice agreed and upheld that a jury had it in their power to give
damages for more than the injury received and that “damages are designed not only to
satisfy the injured person, but also to punish the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding
for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.”*® Thus the
purposes o f victim vindictive satisfaction, retribution (to punish), deterrence, and social
expression of norms were established for punitive damages. This case set precedence for
the punishment purposes of pimitive damages. It also infers “that the punitive and
deterrent purposes of damage awards could be separated fi"om their compensatory
function.” '*
Punitive damages as punishment serves two unique purposes for civil law. First,
punitive damages provide moral evaluation of civil wrongs. Specific conditions for the
levy of punitive damages vary from state to state. Most state laws require that in order
for punitive damages to be awarded, their “imposition ... [must be] based upon reckless

Thomas J. Collin, ed.. Punitive Damages and Business Torts: A Practitioner’s Handbook,
(Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1998), 7. See also Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages:
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,” 6. Also cited in
Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” 5 and detail of the case in n95.
*®Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages,” 6. “In Wilkes v. Wood, Lord Chief Justice Pratt announced his
view that: [A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received.” Also see Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” n96. “In Wilkes, the
publisher of The North Briton asked for "large and exemplary damages" in his suit
because actual damages would not punish or deter this type of misconduct. Wilkes, 98
Eng. Rep. at 490. The jury awarded him 1000 poimds.”
** Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages,” 6.
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or grossly negligent conduct;... the requirement o f ‘public harm’; ... and [damages are
subject to] federal appellate ‘reprehensibility’ review.”*’ So, even if a defendant is found
guilty o f harm which deems compensation, further harm must be evident in order for
punitive damages to be awarded. Because of this, punitive damages takes civil law
compensation further - this is why it is deemed punishment. Punitive damages, since
they are additional to compensation, introduce into the civil law wrong the evaluation of
intangible losses of victim as well as the intent o f the defendant when assessing the
damages,*® compensatory damages do not take these into account.

*’ Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 7. “federal appellate ‘reprehensibility’
review considers, as factors relevant to determining the constitutionality of the size of
punitive damages in a given case, whether the defendant’s conduct ‘evince[s] an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety o f others’ or ‘involved
repeated actions.” See also Kolstad v. American Dental Association, (98-208) 527 U.S.
526 (1999) 139 F. 3d 958. In Syllabus section 1. “... An employer’s conduct need not be
independently “egregious” to satisfy §198la ’s requirements for a punitive damages
award, although evidence of egregious behavior may provide a valuable means by which
an employee can show the “malice” or “reckless indifference” needed to qualify for such
an award.” See also For example, from BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr.
701 So. 2d 507; 1997 Ala. LEXIS 126, under section I. ... “Alabama, by statute, provides
notice concerning the conduct that will subject one to punitive damages in this state. Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-11-20, expressly set forth defines the acts, as well as the state of mind:
‘(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for
wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the
plaintiff. ...”
*®Ibid., 6. See also Kolstad v. American Dental Association, “Section 198la ’s twotiered structure-it limits compensatory and punitive awards to cases of “intentional
discrimination,” §1981a(a)(l), and further qualifies the availability of punitive awards to
instances of “malice” or “reckless indifference”-suggests a congressional intent to
impose two standards o f liability, one for establishing a right to compensatory damages
and another, higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for a punitive award.
The terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” ultimately focus on the actor’s state of
m ind,... Intent determines which remedies are open to a plaintiff here as well. This focus
on the employer’s state o f mind does give effect to the statute’s two-tiered structure. The
terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” pertain not to the employer’s awareness that it
is engaging in discrimination, but to its knowledge that it may be acting in violation of
68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Second, to this moral evaluation of wrong-doings, punitive damages provide society
with a particular method to serve punishment to groups, corporations, and otherwise
nonindividual entities through hindrance of economic activity. “[PJunitive damages
serve a vital function for which neither criminal punishment nor administrative controls
can substitute;”’"*the ability to threaten private groups, corporations, and organizations
“control over their subjects - be they members, customers, clients, or employees. The
ability to sanction flourishing economic actors is the major strength of punitive
damages.” ’® Thus punitive damages subsist as unique type of legal punishment, not only
because o f the restitution characteristics, or punishment through monetary payment, but
also as a method to punish groups, corporations, and organizations in order to hold them
accountable for their contracts, transactions, products, and policies.
Punishing Corporations
Since Wilkes v. Woods in 1763, similar cases in England continued to set precedence
and expand the purposes of awarding punitive (at that time also called compensatory,
exemplary, or vindictive) damages. Each case substantiated and expanded the purposes
of punitive damages. In addition to the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and the

federal law, see, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37, n. 6,41, 50. ...Although there is
some support for respondent’s assertion that the common law punitive awards tradition
includes an “egregious misconduct” requirement, eligibility for such awards most often is
characterized in terms o f a defendant’s evil motive or intent. Egregious or outrageous acts
may serve as evidence supporting an inference of such evil motive, but §198la does not
limit plaintiffs to this form of evidence or require a showing of egregious or outrageous
discrimination independent of the employer’s state of mind. Pp. 5— 11” See also supra
FN3.
’"*Galanter and Luban, 13.
’®Ibid. Detail discussion of the unique characteristic of punitive damages to punish
corporations and the like will be addressed in following chapters.
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demonstration of social detestation, judges and juries awarded punitive damages in order
to penalize the powerful elites who were usually above the law.*® Courts commonly
awarded punitive damages against those who oppressed the physically weak and socially
powerless.*’ In some cases, the awarding of punitive damages forewarned that acts of
oppression would not be overlooked, that the common people deserved protection by the
law, and that individual rights against the mighty would be preserved.**
By the end of the 1800’s, “punitive damages cases against corporations, courts
typically held that the corporation was liable only if it either ordered the misconduct or
condoned it by a refusal to take remedial steps. The standard for corporate punitive
liability, therefore, was functionally equivalent to that of individuals.” *® The powerful
elites o f the 1700's became the corporate entities of our time.
A corporation is “an association of shareholders (or even a single shareholder) created
under law and regarded as an ‘artificial person’ by courts.”’® The advantages that came
with corporations were that a person or persons could have an entity that was “entirely
separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it.”’ * This entity could not die,
so its assets could be passed down to generations. And the entity had “the capacity as

*®Rustad and Koenig. 5.
*’ Ibid., 6.
** Ibid.
*®Rustad and Koenig, 6. Referring to Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,
147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893). See, e.g., Prentice, 147 U.S. at 116 (discussing corporate
punitive damages).
’®Gifis, s.v. ‘corporation.’
21

Ibid. quoting 200 N.W. 76, 87. See 17 U.S. 518, 657.
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such legal entity, o f taking, holding and conveying property, suing and being sued, and
exercising such other powers as may be conferred on it by law, just as a natural person
may.”” What is advantageous to corporations is the limit of liability. “A corporation’s
liability is normally limited to its assets and the stockholders [and their deemed personal
assets] are thus protected ... in connection with the affairs of the corporation.”’® So with
the new ways o f doing business, also came some new ways to commit crimes. Whitecollar crimes like fraud, embezzlement, bribes and kickbacks, income tax evasion, and
business violations evolved.
As businesses and corporations grew, so did the legal regulations that applied to
them. The law was “a way to control and hold accountable remote and overwhelming
actors.”’"* For instance, “a special income tax was imposed on personal holding
companies in 1937 in order to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxes by placing their
assets in corporations. Previously, taxpayers would avoid income taxes by placing their
assets in one or more corporations, thereby splitting their income among several
taxpayers and taking advantage of the lower marginal tax brackets.”’® Since corporate
liability was multifaceted in shareholders, managers, employees, acquired corporations,
brother-sister corporations, controlled, de facto, private, professional, member, and public
corporations, etc.... and their influence on society and the market grew; punitive damages
became an important tool to guard against these powerful interests, since responsibility

” Ibid.
’®Ibid. referring to Henn & Alexander, Law of Corporations 694 (3'^®ed. 1983).
’"*Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 5.
’®Gifts, s.v. personal holding company, I.R.C. §§541 et seq.
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could not always be traced back to an individual. Juries saw punitive damages as the
only way to punish a corporate entity, not only because “[cjorporate entities cannot be
sent to jail in any realistic sense,”’®but also because affecting their profits appeared to be
the most effective way to influence their behavior.
[T]he use of punitive damages can be viewed as a partial offset to
weak administrative controls. For example, in Wisconsin a truck driver
injured in an accident caused by smoke from a forest fire ignited by a
railroad received a $500,000 punitive award. Because fines were minimal
[prior to this,] railroads had ignored the state Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) rules requiring them to fix faulty exhaust systems and
clear brush from tracks. After the punitive award, the ‘railroads got the
message ... and railroad caused fires dropped from 339 in 1980 to 102 in
1986.’ A DNR fire specialist said, ‘The punitive damage award showed
the railroads that there was a need to do what we had been trying to get
them to do - clean up portions of their right-of-way and begin a
locomotive exhaust maintenance program.””
Punitive damage awards facilitated the individual consumer, families, the smaller
business owner, and even other corporations, in protecting their rights against
conglomerates. In 2001, “in 83% of all [civil] trial cases, the plaintiff was an individual.
Businesses were plaintiffs in 16% of all trials, government agencies, 1% and hospitals,
0.3%. .. .Defendants in all trials were primarily divided between individuals (47%) and
businesses (42%).”’*

’®Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 41.
” Galanter and Luban, 13. Quoting Cary Segall, “Bill Would Ease Punitive
Damages,” Wisconsin State Journal, Nov. 29, 1987, at 12.
’* CivilJustice Survey o f State Courts 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin,
April 2004 NCJ 202803, 3. [on-line] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gOv/bjs/pubalph2.htm#civil;
accessed 12 November 2004.
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Questionable business practices caused many o f the nation's most serious economic,
political, and social evils:” fraud and embezzlement, bribes and kickbacks, income tax
evasions, antitrust violations.®® Modernity gave birth to the culture of business ethics:
questioning and regulating decisions in business transactions. Academic, political, and
social discussions regarding corporate social responsibility, truth telling, employee rights
and responsibilities, attracted public attention, possibly because of the amount of money
that was often involved in these crimes.®* Furthermore, when publicized, “the poor man
sees the white-collar criminal able to obtain the aid of experienced lawyers who can
prolong the proceedings, take advantage of every technicality and obtain favored
treatment from the courts, then the impact of white-collar crime is compounded.”®’ The
majority of the lay public do not comprehend the complexities of corporate white-collar
crime, which adds to the fact that they could easily go unnoticed. Punitive damages
uphold an avenue to justice for victims of corporate crimes. Punitive damages “are

Rustad and Koenig, 6. “By century’s end, most courts generally agreed that
exemplary damages could be assessed against corporations.” Referring to Seymour D.
Thompson, Liability o f Corporations for Exemplary Damages, 41 Cent. L.J. 308, 308
(1895).
®®Whitney North Seymour Jr., “The Professional Criminal: Organized Crime and
White-Collar Crime,” Why Justice Fails, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.,
1973), 71-73.
®* CivilJustice Survey o f State Courts 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin,
April 2004 NCJ 202803,4. During 2001 plaintiff winners in civil trials were awarded an
estimated $4.4 billion in compensatory and punitive damages in the Nation’s 75 largest
counties. Contract cases [Subrogation, Partnership disputes. Tortious interference.
Rental/lease, Employment disputes. Mortgage foreclosures, Buyer/Seller plaintiff. Fraud
] garnered higher median awards ($45,000) compared to tort ($27,000) cases.
®’ Seymour Jr., 74.
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perhaps the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral

disapproval of economically formidable offenders.”®®

General Justification o f Legal Punishment
Punishment requires justification. Why? A thorough examination of the definition of
punishment will illustrate. Punishment in general is defined as the deliberate infliction of
harm upon someone, or the withdrawal of some good from them, in response to a
committed offense.®"* According to this definition, punishment is an act which is
dependent upon, since it is a reaction to, a first act. This first act is specifically an
offense, which is a violation of moral, social, or other accepted standards.®® So, the
committer of the first act, which we also refer to as a crime, is the punished. From this,
the definition o f punishment assumes the punished is guilty.®® Thus, for the purposes of
this paper, when referring to punishment and the punished, the establishment of guilt will
be assumed.®’
Who then is responsible for inflicting the second act, the punishment? Our society
®®Galanter and Luban, 14.
®"*Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy, s.v. “punishment,”
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) : 310.
®®Encarta World English Dictionary [North American Edition] Microsoft
Corporation, s.v. “offense,” On-line: http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/offense.html
(Bloomsbury Publishing Pic., 2005) accessed on April 15,2005.
®®Ibid. s.v. “guilt,” “awareness of wrongdoing: an awareness of having done wrong
or committed a crime, accompanied by feelings of shame and regret, feelings of guilt;
fact of wrongdoing: the fact of having committed a crime or done wrong an admission of
guilt; responsibility for wrongdoing: the responsibility for committing a crime or doing
wrong; legal culpability: the responsibility, as determined by a court or other legal
authority, for committing an offense that carries a legal penalty.”
37

Thus punishment of the innocent will not be specifically addressed.
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has placed the responsibility of punishment on the legal system. Society developed the
legal punishment system to take responsibility for legitimizing punishment, developing
rules and procedures, and deciding what is punishable and how. Thus we can assume
that each member of society has consented to and understands this authority. This
assumption o f consent is based upon the view that membership in society is voluntary
and that members are rational, or are able to decide upon this consent.
“A rational being is someone who is capable of reasoning about his conduct and who
freely decides what he will do, on the basis of his own conception o f what is best.
Because he has the capacity he has the responsibility for his actions.”®* Due to this
rational ability, every member of the community that has this ability agrees to be
governed by the community’s social contract, since they have rationally chosen to live in
the community. This is demonstrated in Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a social contract:
To escape the state of nature, then, people must agree to the
establishment of rules to govern their relations with one another, and they
must agree to the establishment of an agency - the state - with the power
necessary to enforce those rules. According to Hobbes, such an agreement
actually exists, and it makes social living possible. This agreement, to
which every citizen is a party, is called the social contracC^^
But consent alone is not justification of an authoritative practice. Since punishment
involves the infliction of harm or the deprivation of good, legal punishment requires
ethical justification."*® In order for anyone in society to punish another, and avoid

®* James Rachels, “Kant and Respect for Persons,” The Elements o f Moral
Philosophy, 4**’ ed. (New York: McGrawHill, 2003), 138. See also Igor Primoratz,
Justifying Legal Punishment, (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989)
“Punishment as Retribution: Hegel,” 72, 76.
®®Rachels, “The Idea o f a Social Contract,” The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, 144.
"*®Blackburn, s.v. “punishment”. Ethical referring to that it need to be justified as a
good thing. See also Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, (New Jersey:
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punishment in return, legitimacy and justification of this act in the community needs to
be established in order to ensure that it is good - has utility which is beneficial to citizens.
It is this justification that ethical theories of punishment address. The different theories
of punishment"*' which address the moral justification of legal punishment can be
classified into two main groups: “utilitarian or retributive theories.”"*’ These theories
attempt to morally justify pimishment by resolving the problem of how harm to a citizen
can be socially approved.
What set these two theories apart are their particular views of the rational member of
society."*® Retributivists argue that since individuals are rational, their best choices are
made through rational deliberation. Assuming that persons do deliberate rationally when
making choices, criminals choose to commit an offense, and thus can be held responsible
for its consequences. So for retributivists, punishment is justified because it is deserved.
The Utilitarians argue that since individuals are rational, they can choose to commit or
not commit an offense. But from the utilitarian perspective, these rational choices are
ruled by a person’s preference for pleasure over pain. The choices that one makes are
Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 1. Because legal punishment is deliberately
inflicted on an “ojfender by a human agency which is authorized by the legal order
whose laws the offender has violated.”
"** Different theories include: Retribution, Reparation, Reformation, Deterrence,
Incapacitation or Prevention, (from Blackburn, s.v. “punishment”).
"*’ Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 9. See also page 11 : Utilitarian theories:
Deterrence, Reformation or Rehabilitation, Educative. Also page 19 which classifies
Disablement or Incapacitation, Material Compensation or Restitution, and Vindictive
Satisfaction under Utilitarian theories. Retribution does not specify sub-categories of
punishment theories. Thus, if it is not retribution, it is some type of utilitarian theory, or
neither. But the most popularly discussed, are listed under utilitarian, or as retribution.
"*®Although presenting a general overview here, detail on the view of rational persons
for each theory will be reiterated in the sections following.
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those which bring the most pleasure and the least amount of pain. Thus the justification
of punishment should be based upon influencing this choice.
In order to imderstand and criticize these theories, I first identify their purpose or aim,
and the application o f this purpose or aim for punishment in general. I classify the
purposes of legal punishment by asking two questions: why we punish, and then how we
punish?"*"* I do not argue that any one theory of punishment is better than or more just
than the other, but that each plays a part in morally justifying punishment by determining
particular criteria for moral justification. The two objectives (retribution and social
utility) are important to the justification of punishment, and they are both needed to
completely justify punishment. I argue that these theories alone do not completely
answer both questions, but they can be used together to morally justify punishment. I
argue that these theories, although seemingly philosophically competitive, should be
viewed as complementary."*®

"*"*Only after answering the question of why we punish can the questions of how we
should punish and what is just punishment be analyzed or discussed. In other words, we
must first define and justify the purpose of legal punishment before we can justify its aim
or consequences. This is a distinction that I concluded when studying the differences
between retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment.
"*®I found support for this view of punishment theories also in H.L.A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) : 3. “...what is needed
is not a simple admission that instead of a single value or aim (Deterrence, Retribution,
Reform or an other) a plurality of different values and aims should be given as a
conjunctive answer to some single (emphasis in text) questions concerning the
justification o f punishment. What is needed is the realization that different principles
(each of which may in a sense be called a ‘justification’) are relevant at different points in
any morally acceptable account of punishment.”
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The Retributive Theory o f Punishment
The punishment theory of retribution asserts that legal punishment serves justice
because it is deserved. “This means that it is justified because it is retribution - it is an
evil the offender has deserved by his offense, an evil by which the state or society,...
pays him back for what he has done.”"*® The basic principles of retribution which support
this justification are as follows: (1) that a person may be punished if and only if he has
voluntarily done something wrong; (2) that the punishment must be proportionate to the
wickedness or heinousness of the offense; and (3) that the justification for punishing
persons is desert, the return of suffering for moral injury voluntarily committed, thus it is
itself just or morally good."*’
Voluntary Principle
The first principle of retribution requires that the wrong-doing was voluntary or out of
one’s free will. This voluntary principle is derived from the premises that the rational
member of society is (1) free and equal, (2) has knowledge of the act’s consequences, and
thus chose to commit the offense.
Retributivists see the individual as ‘truly’ free when he subjects his urges, desires,
and interests to the rule o f ethical principles that were established by the community.
With reason, he knows what he ‘ought’ to do, or what ‘ought’ to be done if he was guilty.
He would conclude that he should be punished for the harm against others."** And

"*®Primoratz, 12.
"*’ H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) :
231. Also referred to in Hugo Adam Bedau, “Retribution and the Theory of
Punishment”, The Journal o f Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 11, 601-620 (Nov., 1978) : 602.
"**Primoratz, 68.
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retribution embraces equity in society for each individual, and thus one is equally
deserving o f harm as one is deserving o f good, depending upon one’s acts.
Retributivists also assume that wrongdoers are aware of the laws and the
consequences for breaking them. Since the general will of the community is expressed in
laws,"*® to break these laws is to go against the general will of the community of which
you are a member. “It is obvious, for example, that we could not live together very well
if we did not accept rules prohibiting murder, assault, theft, lying, breaking a promise,
and the like. These rules are justified simply by showing that they are necessary if we are
to cooperate for our mutual benefit.”®® Every member of society implicitly agrees to
obey the law - obey and live freely. When one disobeys the law, one agrees to
punishment.

So breaking the laws of which one is aware is performed out of free will -

free from influence or coercion, and so one is willing to accept the deserving
consequences of one’s actions.
[Rjational beings are responsible for their behavior and so they are
accountable for what they do. We may feel gratitude when they behave
well and resentment when they behave badly. Reward and punishment - .
.. are the natural expressions of this gratitude and resentment. Thus in
punishing people, we are holding them responsible for their actions in a
way in which we can not hold mere animals responsible.. . . We are
responding to them . . . as people who have freely chosen their evil
deeds.®’

Rachels, in Chapter 11, “The Idea of a Social Contract,” 150. “The Social Contract
Theory of Morals is . . . the ideal that morality consists in the set o f rules governing how
people are to treat one another that rational people will agree to accept, fo r their mutual
benefit, on the condition that others follow those rules as well. . . . The key idea is that
morally binding rules are the ones that are necessary for social living. ”
®®Rachels, in Chapter 11, “The Idea of a Social Contract,” 150.
®’ Rachels, in Chapter 10, “Kant and Respect for Persons,” sect. 10.3 Kant’s
Retributivism, 139. [The Kantian view is only one, others do not presuppose ‘free will,’
such as Artistotle and Hume.]
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Since the responsibility to obey laws comes with freedom, blameworthiness and
desert - as a result of knowledge of these laws - are seen as morally justified reasons for
punishment.
Proportion Principle
According to the second retribution principle, the guilty should not be punished more
or less than he/she deserves, but only to the extent that he/she deserves. This implies that
punishment must be proportional to the harm caused.
Punishment is an action of taking away from the wrongdoer, be it in the form of
monetary possessions or harming in the form of incapacitation. This is serving harm with
equal harm. This perspective of punishment is criticized because if causing harm is seen
as ‘bad,’ then the infliction of more harm or the increase in the amount of harm being
caused in society through punishment is ‘worse.’ This criticism follows the sayings ‘turn
the other cheek’ and embraces the values of forgiveness and beneficence.
But to retributivists, serving punishment is seen as a second and different type of
harm than the first. For sanctioned punishment is a harm that is a consequence of, or a
reaction to, the first harm - the wrong. As a reaction to the first harm, a harm against
harm, even if it increases the overall amoimt of harm being caused, is just because it is
deserved (the third principle) and it is necessary because it treats the criminal as a fi"ee
and equal member o f society.®’

®’ Primoratz, 69.
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Desert Principle
The retributivist view opposes the common convictions®® that we ought to ‘turn the
other cheek,’ or ‘not render evil for evil.’ Retributivists argue that “man ought to be bad
towards badness, to take ill the evil done to him, to harm those that harm him. As a man
has done, so it should be requited to him; he has deserved it by his act.”®"* Retribution is
in this way an act of reciprocity, punishment is something that the person on whom it is
inflicted has deserved; therefore it is morally justified, and legitimate.®®
Since the wrong-doer, according to the first principle, is rational, free, and equal;
when one harms another in a community, one is infringing on the rights and respect of
the harmed as an equally free person. Wrongdoers are violating the victim’s entitlements
by diminishing her value as an equally free member of society.®® Therefore, desert is a
result of the “moral injury as damage to the realization of a victim’s value, or damage to
acknowledgement o f the victim’s value, accomplished through behavior whose meaning
is such that the victim is diminished in value.”®’ So to ensure equality and respect for all
rationally choosing persons, not only must we punish to restore respect to the harmed, but

®®Primoratz, 70. Primoratz notes that “This standpoint is opposed to Socrates’
convictions that ‘we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil
we may have suffered from him’, [Plato, Crito, 49c (Jowett).] as well as to Plato’s view
that ‘it is never right to harm anyone at any time,’ [Plato, The Republic, 335e (D. Lee).]”
®"*Primoratz, 70, Note 13, quoting G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ilber die
Rechtsphilosophie, 1818-1831, ed. K.-H. llting (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 197374), vol. l,p . 274; 3, p. 319.
®®Ibid.
®®Jean Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution,” UCLA Law Review, 39:1659 (August, 1992.) : 11 of 28.
®’ Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:...,” 1 1 -1 2 .
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we must also punish to ensure respect for the harmer. We respect their choice to commit
a crime as a choice they willingly made, and thus respect and respond to that choice with
punishment.
Retribution is a justification for punishment that views the punished as ‘ends in
themselves.’®* And the reason and justification for punishment is that of desert, hased on
the premise that the person has broken the law or social contract,®® thus one is deserving
of punishment. One is not being punished for a consequentialist reason - for the
restoration or betterment o f the self (the perpetrator) or the betterment of society.
Instead, one is being punished based upon what one has done and what one deserves. In
a sense, the theory is backward-looking,®® in that it looks back on one’s obligations to
society as a member of society and judgment is based upon what has been done, not what
can be done in the future.
Since wrongs are voluntary and punishment is proportionate to the wrong, it follows
that “penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but a sufficient reason for
punishment.”®’ This means that punishment is justified because it is a deserved response
- the return of suffering for moral injury. “Punishment in the form of retribution thus

®* Rachels, 138. Referring to Kant “we could describe punishing someone as
“respecting him as a person” or as “treating him as an end-in-himself.” ” “for Kant,
treating someone as an “end-in-himself’ means treating him as a rational being."
®®Rachels, 144. Referring to Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a social contract.
®®Primoratz, 12. See also Dorsey D. Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages:
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages.” Southern California
Law Review 56 (November 1982). 3. “Retribution is backward-looking (ex-post) and
provides a complete reason for imposing a detriment.”
®’ Duff, "Legal Punishment", 8. If we punish, then it is deserved. If it is deserved,
then we punish.
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implies desert, which in turn requires that the person being punished must, by a fair
procedure, be found to have chosen to commit an act that has been authoritatively
declared wrongful.
Benefits and Detriments of Retribution
Retribution morally justifies (1) how the individual as well as the community as a
whole is the harmed party, such that when a wrong occurs the value of the victim and the
community is diminished; (2) why punishment is due only to those who fi-eely choose to
perform unjust acts, since everyone is a rational, free, and equal member of the
community; and (3) why imposing degrading through punishment does not demean them,
but respects them as a person and the harm imposed equals the moral injury they have
caused to others.^^ It is consistent with maintaining and treating all members in society
who meet the qualifications as rational, free, and equal persons, and in turn justifies the
existence of the system of punishment.
The theory of retribution focuses on answering the question of why we punish. It
ethically justifies the act of punishing by deeming it deserved. But justifying punishment
goes further. How do we determine what type of punishment is just? It is here that the
theory of retribution falls short.
Retribution calls for punishment proportionate to the harm caused; this is not a
normatively applied answer. Measuring harm, from stealing $5 to a loss of a life, is not
that simple. Retribution, particularly in the case of punitive damages, fails to specifically
Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages,” 3.
Gerard V. Bradley, “Retribution and the Secondary Aims o f Punishment”, The
American Journal o f Jurisprudence, 44 - 105, (The University of Notre Dame, 1999).
[Supports how retribution considers and benefits the community as a whole.]
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guide us in how severely to punish. Although retribution boasts the principle of
proportionality, this is easier said than done. For instance, how is society to measure
noneconomic and heinous wrongs for punitive damages, for “heinousness cannot be
assigned a straightforward dollar value.”^'^ How are we to determine the amount of unfair
advantage gained by a civil wrong if nominal damages have already been calculated
through compensatory damages?
The theory of retribution alone gives no guidelines for such determinations. It also
misrepresents what it is about crime that makes it deserving of punishment; what makes
murder, or rape, or theft, or assault a criminal wrong, deserving of punishment, is surely
the wrongful harm that it does to the individual victim - not the supposed unfair
advantage that the criminal takes over all those who obey the law.^^ The wrongful harms
can at least be compared to the existing state statutes, but the unfair advantage is vague
and hard to detail. Advantages the defendant may possess may include their economic
worth, status in society, etc. - possessions that existed prior to the wrong. How are those
to factor or not factor into the weight o f the harm?^^
The problem o f measuring harm was recently addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court

^ Galant and Luban, 17.
Ibid.
Chapter One discusses the nine judicial guidelines that were established by Bowden
Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md. LEXIS 407. These guidelines were
established to be used upon appeal of a large punitive damages award, to evaluate if an
award was excessive. Included in these guidelines were the any of the punitive damages
awards the defendant had already paid in regards to the harm, and the defendant’s
economic standing - to ensure the award would not cause bankruptcy,
V.
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in the case of BMW v. Gore^^ The guidelines by the Court advise that punitive damages
amounts must be in proportion to the compensatory damages and the existing similar
state statutes. The Court does not give a set ratio, but does say it must be in proportion
and not out of proportion. The Court also states that the aggravating factors of the wrong
must be taken into consideration and recognizes a gradient o f wrongs, but there is no
specific dollar amount assigned to these wrongs, except for what is already set forth in
the state statutes.
Despite this detriment, the theory of retribution fiilfills the primary aim of
punishment, for society must first justify the means before the ends, why to punish before
it can punish. When the courts advise, “Punitive damages serve retribution and
deterrence” - retribution is synonymous to punishment and deterrence refers to
prevention. Retribution represents the act of disapproval society expresses to wrongs
committed in the community and its principles justify the act and remain apart fi'om the
consequences of the act. “When a punishment is deserved, when it is a retribution and
execution o f justice, it is thereby morally justified; it is irrelevant whether, at the same
time, it does or does not have those consequences in which utilitarians claim to have
found its moral justification;”^^ such as deterrence. But the secondary purpose or end
goal of punishment, determining how or the amount of punishment, is better served by
other theories of punishment such as deterrence, a Utilitarian view o f punishment.

See Chapter One referring to BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517
U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court guidelines
advised that punitive damages must be proportionate to compensatory damages and
similar state statutes.
Primoratz, 12.
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The Utilitarian Theory o f Punishment
Utility represents “that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness ... or ... to prevent the happening of mischief,
pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.”^^ Utilitarian theories
(moral, legal, and political) are based on the principle of utility, “that principle which
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question ... to promote or to oppose that happiness.”’*’ The principle of utility relies upon
the human rational choice, and argues that this choice is subject to governance by pain
and pleasure.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
m a s t e r s , a n d pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain o f causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do and in all
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. ... The principle
o f utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of
that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands
of reason and of law.”
Since our choices are governed by subjection to pleasure and pain, utilitarian theories
conclude that the measure o f pleasure and pain is the determinate for what is right or
wrong, just or unjust. The Utilitarian view holds the basic tenet that an action is morally
good if it brings the greatest amount of good or happiness to the most persons affected by
^ Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in
Philosophic Classics Volume IV: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Forrest E. Baird
and Walter Kaufmann (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997), 6.
’**Ibid.
” Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” 5.
86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that action and its consequences.
Utilitarian views in general attempt to justify how the state should punish, with aims
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or education.”

To Utilitarians, crime is viewed as a social

problem that disrupts the peace and harmony in the community. Therefore a
governmental system is established to deal with any harm to social harmony. If crime is
a problem, then punishment is a means to resolve that problem. The need to deal with
crime, or any type of behavior that is detrimental to the good of society, is resolved by
establishing an institution that serves punishment to and for the community. Punishment
is a means for handling the problem of crime and controlling behaviors that may harm the
community or its individual members.
The utilitarian view ethically justifies punishment by requiring the imposition o f harm
to result in the greatest amount of happiness or good for the person being punished, the
victim, and/or society. In this sense, the Utilitarian justification for punishment is based
upon the consequences or outcomes of the punishment. “The evil inflicted on the person
punished is morally justified because punishment has consequences which are good and
to such a degree [the consequences] outweigh both [the evil inflicted] and the good
consequences of any alternative reaction to law-breaking behavior.”’^
The main positive consequences of the Utilitarian view of punishment include (1) the
prevention of harm, through deterrence and rehabilitation, and (2) the satisfaction to the
harmed or victim, through compensation or vindictive satisfaction.” Since deterrence is

” Primoratz, 11. Distinguishes three varieties of the utilitarian view of punishment,
‘deterrence, reformation, educative.”
” Ibid., 10.
” Ibid., 19.
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referred to in the legal system as a justification of punitive damages,’^ I will first address
the Utilitarian theory of deterrence.

Deterrence
According to the Utilitarian theory, punishment is morally justified by deterrence in
two ways: specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific or particular deterrence
refers to prevention of the wrong by “influencing the behavior of the actual offender, so
as to get her to desist from repeating her misdeed.”’^ General deterrence as punishment
serves to prevent others in the community fi'om committing the same offense by setting
an example o f unwanted punishment (displeasure) as a result. Therefore, punishment for
deterrence serves two good consequences - to discourage, or attempt to prevent future
wrongs, by the initial wrongdoer as well as by others in the community.
Benefits and Detriments of Deterrence
Unlike the retributive theory, the Utilitarian view is forward looking. If the
justification o f the act of punishment is dependent upon its consequences, then it is only
after punishment, that one can then see if it was justified by its result. This can be seen as
using the punishment as a “means to an end.” ”
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Supra, Civil Remedies. See also Sharkey, 6. Punitive damages in legal doctrine
has been stated to serve retribution and deterrence. Other utilitarian theories of
punishment such as rehabilitation or restorative justice are not specifically cited as
purposes for punitive damages.
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Primoratz, 19.

” Rachels, 136. Since the purpose of punishing the criminal is in pursuit of a
particular end, it is separate or different fiom the criminaTs current state.
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Therefore, the Utilitarian justification of the purpose of punishment does not first
justify the act prior to the action, regardless o f whether or not the punishment actually
deters. Since the Utilitarian view focuses on the end or consequence to justify
punishment, and if the main purpose of punishment is the intent to deter, deterrence can
be achieved regardless of whether or not the accused is guilty. Oddly enough, therefore,
under the Utilitarian theory, the punishment o f even an innocent person could be justified
with the intent only to deter.’®
Retributivists argue that deterrence as a sole purpose removes punishment from the
sphere o f justice. They argue that whether or not a punishment is deserved is the only
question that concerns justice. Whether or not it deters, may be a question asked, but it is
not one o f justice, but rather one of social fact.
The Humanitarian theory [Utilitarian] removes from Punishment the
concept of Desert. But the concept of desert is the only connecting link
between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that
a sentence can be just or unjust [serving justice as opposed to morally
justified]. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the
only one we can reasonably ask about punishment. We may very properly
ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But
neither of these two last questions is a question about justice.. . . Thus
when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only
what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the
sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject o f rights, we
now have a mere object, a patient, a “case.”
The deterrence theory is challenged in two aspects: (1) whether punishment is
morally and legally justified if it deters, and (2) whether punishment is still justified if it
does not deter. Deterrence predicates that all crime is “pathological,” or what can be
’®C.S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.” in Reason and
Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems o f Philosophy. 7* ed. ed. Joel
Feinberg, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989). 450.
Lewis; 448.
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interpreted as a bad decision, and that this bad decision can be modified by weighing the
consequences. In order for a deterrent to affect human actions, the person must consider
or reflect upon his act before performing it. There is a wide range of thought that is
possible prior to actions being performed, fi'om little planning, such as a spontaneous
offense, or with systematic planning, such as a premeditated offense. It can be argued
that many wrongs are committed in the ‘heat of passion’ or with very little rational
consideration for the consequences. Wrongs without thought cannot be deterred by
punishment, for there is no opportunity to consider the consequences. Wrongs committed
with thought are not necessarily deterred by punishment because the risks have been
considered and the appropriate adjustments have been made to account for them.
Therefore, it can be argued that punishment does not always deter.
Despite the criticisms, the existence of an institution of punishment must exert some
control over wrongs to society as opposed to its nonexistence. For instance in the case of
BMW V. Gore,

after the initial judgment for the punitive damages award of $4 million,

BMW immediately changed its nationwide policy to include full disclosure of all repairs
made to its cars prior to sale.®’ So in this case, the large punitive damages award
succeeded in instilling immediate deterrence for the defendant. O f course this situation
raises the question of whether or not a smaller initial award would have had the same
result. But previous cases show that it did not:

®° BMW V. Gore, 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; 1996 U.S.
LEXIS 3390. From Summary, “The distributor promptly amended its nationwide policy
so as to require full disclosure of all repairs. Following the trial court's denial of the
distributor's motion to set aside the punitive damages award, the distributor appealed.”
®' See Chapter One for case details.
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Just months before Dr. Gore’s case went to trial, the jury in a similar
lawsuit filed by another Alabama BMW purchaser found that BMW’s
failure to disclose paint repair constituted fraud. Yates v. BM W o f North
America, Inc. [This case resulted in an awarding of comparable
compensatory damages, but the jury for the Yates trial awarded no
punitive damages.] Before the judgment in this case, BMW changed its
policy by taking steps to avoid the sale of any refinished vehicles in
Alabama and two other States. When the $4 million verdict was returned
in this case, BMW promptly instituted a nationwide policy o f full
disclosure of all repairs, no matter how minor.
Further, there is more to deterrence than the simple attempt at prevention through
intimidation. Although prevention is fundamental, punishment through deterrence helps
structure the moral education and habits of society.®® Punishment not only deters through
the fear or avoidance o f a result, it also deters because it strengthens the public moral
code. Justifying punishment through deterrence sends a message to all members of
society that society is willing and able to do what it must to establish social order
according to the agreed upon laws. “The idea that punishment is a concrete expression of
society’s disapproval of an act helps to form and strengthen the public’s moral code and
thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing a crime.”®'* In

®®BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. No. 94-896. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct.
1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3390. See Opinion by Judge J. Stevens, I.,
text above Footnote 8. As well as see Footnote 8 describing the judgment of Yates v.
BMW of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993). “In Yates, the plaintiff also
relied on the 1983 nondisclosure policy, but instead o f offering evidence of 983 repairs
costing more than $300 each, he introduced a bulk exhibit containing 5,856 repair bills to
show that petitioner had sold over 5,800 new BMW vehicles without disclosing that they
had been repaired.”
®®Gordon Hawkins, “Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and
Habituative Effects”, in Theories o f Punishment, ed. Stanley Grupp, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1971), 164.
®^*Hawkins, “Punishment and Deterrence:...,”166. (taken from quoting Andenaes,
Johannes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 141, in Theories o f Punishment, ed.
Stanley Grupp. 1971)
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this case, deterrence as a goal or aim for punishment not only tries to prevent but also
socializes citizens through social control. For example:
The Madison Parks Commission,... asked the City Council to remove
asphalt under playground equipment in city parks. The asphalt, would be
replaced by softer m aterials,... Mark Peterson, parks operations analyst
[said,] ‘It’s a good idea, since (liability lawsuit) settlements are going
through the roof.’®®
In this sense, punishment as a deterrent gives opportunity to and prevents further
wrongs, and provides a system to support moral codes in society.®^ Referring back to the
principle of utility, these are considered good results. Whether or not punishment
actually does deter, and whether or not punishment does educate and contribute to social
control, regardless of its hypothetical consequences. Utilitarians argue it is practical and
justified because it generates good (as opposed to bad) goals or aims for legal
punishment.
Although the Utilitarian view alone fails to justify legal punishment, retribution
fulfills the initial justification for punishment - desert, while the Utilitarian view justifies
how much to punish - enough to deter. Deterrence alone is not enough to justify why we
punish, in place of retribution. Therefore, although deterrence may aim for good results,
it alone cannot be used to create a system of legal punishment that serves justice in
society. It may be a benefiting factor, an aim, and a guide to how we punish, but it alone
should not be used to formulate, structure, regulate, or support the legal system of
punishment. Nor can Retribution alone govern how we punish. This shows that when

®®Marc S. Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 18. from Waller,
“Liability Fear Spurs Park Safety Steps,” Wis. State J., August 28, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
®^ This is consistent with the purpose of punitive damages as stated in the
Introduction, preserving the peace.
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criticizing punishment theory and policy, it is important to clarify the two aspects of
punishment - why and how - and to morally justify the why before the how. Retribution
tells us that if someone wrongs another, punishment is justified since it is deserved.
Deterrence tells us to punish with the intent to deter. Both endorse punishment in order
to uphold the law, enforce social control, and convey social expectations. So these
theories compliment each other in the moral justification of punishment.

Applying Punishment to Plaintiff’s Receipts
Since punitive damages’ main purpose is to punish justified by the concepts of
retribution and deterrence, how does punishment apply to the plaintiff receiving the
award?
Deterrence, alone, does not particularly enforce who should receive punitive
damages, for the recipient of the award does not necessarily support nor does it
undermine deterrence. The act of paying the award is the punishment and the deterrent to
the defendant. And the defendant and society as a whole would be deterred regardless of
who receives the punitive damages. The defendant is deterred because the punishment
itself, not because the payment is given to the plaintiff. Society and others in turn are
deterred by knowledge o f punishment for harm, and social deterrence is not changed by
who the recipient of the damages may be. Although this view may be used to support
either distribution of the award, the plaintiff or the state, it requires neither in particular.
There is no distinction. Therefore, I argue that the justification of punitive damages
specifically being awarded to the plaintiff is not fully supported by deterrence.
The justifications for punishment - retribution and deterrence - work together to
support punitive damages policy, which is the awarding o f additional damages other than
93
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compensation - but they alone do not require that the punitive damages award be
received by the plaintiff, for retribution justifies punishment be served to the guilty by a
legal institution based on just deserts, and deterrence determines to what extent, and to
what aim punishment should be levied. However, both retribution and deterrence
justifications for punishment can be fulfilled by the state receiving the award.
The function of retribution is to justify the act of punishment, because it is deserved.
Guilt is established prior to punishment. The victim is relevant to the punishment in
order to weigh the amount of harm. According to retribution, the amount of punishment
should equal the harm. The outcome of the punishment, whether it does affect or how it
affects the victim, is not a factor for justification.
Deterrence principles, on the other hand, assert that the effect justifies punishment,
and that the aim of deterrence to the punished and the others in society are both essential.
But deterrence to the punished and society can be achieved with the state receiving the
punitive damages, therefore it does not require that the award go to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the existence and application of punitive damages policy can be justified
by the punishment principles of retribution and deterrence. But the procedure of punitive
damages going to the plaintiff is not justified by punishment theories since the goals of
retribution and deterrence can be fulfilled by the state receiving the award.
So, are there punishment theories other than retribution and deterrence that can help
explain who should get the award? Although it is not commonly referred to, vindictive
satisfaction is a Utilitarian punishment goal, and does contribute to the support o f the
plaintiff receiving the award.
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Vindictive Satisfaction
If we all appealed to altruism when we have been harmed, perhaps the satisfaction of
vengeance would not be a justification for punishment. The support for satisfying
vengeance may not be at the top of the list for moral values, but it is a historically
supported requirement for governing institutions - just as there is a need to punish for
reasons to enforce laws and social control, so there is a need to satisfy vindictiveness for
those who are victims of those wrongs. Punishment is justified since it contributes to the
satisfaction of vengeance for the victim. The utilitarian views of punishment justify
bringing more good than harm, and the satisfaction of vengeance through punishment is
viewed as a resulting good to the victim and society.®’
This satisfaction is a useful motivator to the individual victim as well as, “to the
public; indeed, it is necessary. It amplifies social control, which in-tum supports the
legal punishment system. It is this vindictive satisfaction which sets the tongues of
witnesses in motion; it is this which animates the accuser and engages him in the public
service, in spite of the embarrassments, the expenses, the enmities to which it exposes
him.”®® Vindication o f honor is prevalent to “a status-oriented society that typified
England”®^ and has carried over to the United States. One o f the main reasons the legal
system is given the authority to punish is to ensure individuals do not take justice and

®’ Primoratz, 21 - 22. The type “of satisfaction attainable by punishment [if any,] is
vindictive^ Punishment of an offender not only satisfies the victim, but also “all those
who, for whatever reason, feel indignation at the offense committed and want its
perpetrator punished.”
®®Ibid. Quoting J. Bentham, Theory o f Legislation, trans. From the French of E.
Dumont by R. Hildreth, 2d ed. (London: Triibner, 1871), 309.
®^ Ellis, 6.
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punishment in their own hands - to avoid a chaotic society, and to maintain order and
self-control. The courts were obligated to assist in deterring personal dueling or feuding
which could lead to persons taking punishment into their own hands.^”
The desire for revenge or satisfaction leads to disorder if the victim
resorts to self-help rather than to the judicial process. Avoidance of the
social disorder caused by duels, feuds, and the more extreme forms of selfhelp that historians denominated ‘bastard feudalism,’ was a major
influence in the establishment and maintenance of an effective judicial
mechanism.^*
The establishment o f a legal system to serve punishment legitimizes the act of
punishment” and maintains social order by ceasing the need for vigilante justice.
Moreover, vengeance satisfaction to the plaintiff is a fitting justification for
punishment in civil law. As explained in the Introduction of this thesis, civil law is
viewed as the private law arena. Viewing vengeance satisfaction as a justification for
punitive damages, in application and distribution to the plaintiff, affirms the private law
aspect of civil law. The purpose of satisfying private vengeance for the plaintiff^® was a
“characteristic of insult cases that makes exemplary [or punitive] damages seem
appropriate ... [since] they evoke a compelling desire for redress or satisfaction on the

^ Rustad and Koenig. 5., And also see Ellis, 7. Both refer to 2 W. Holdsworth,
History o f English Law 416-18 (3d ed. 1923).
” Ellis, 7.
” Binder, 328.
” Rustad and Koenig. 5. “Clarence Morris believed that the remedy [punitive
damages] functioned as an ‘orderly, legal retaliation ...to be preferred to ...private
vengeance which will disturb the peace of the community.” Quoting Simon Greenleaf, A
Treatise on the Law o f Evidence 240 (16th ed. 1899) (asserting that punitive damages
remedy abandons principle of compensation, which is purpose of tort action). 253, at 240
(arguing that exemplary damages should only be awarded in cases where traditional
methods of damage assessment are inapplicable).
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part of the victim.”” Awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff satisfied the desire for
vengeance and in turn assisted in the maintenance of social order. Vengeance satisfaction
through monetary gain provides an incentive for the plaintiff to bring the crime to legal
suit instead of dealing with the injustice on their own; since “[cjompensatory damages do
not always provide sufficient incentive”^®for the average person to bring wrong-doings
to court.
The American tradition of punitive damages is modeled after English law. In Genay
V.

Norris,^ in 1784, instead of settling a quarrel with a duel of pistols, the defendant

offered the plaintiff a poisoned drink which caused extreme and excruciating pain.
Vindictive damages were awarded against the defendant, who was a physician and could
not plead ignorance from the operation and powerful effects of the poison.^’ Considering
the plaintiff was initially ready to settle the dispute with a duel, and the added insult of
trickery by a professional, convinced the jury that the plaintiff was “entitled to very
exemplary damages.”^® Early American punitive damages cases continued to award
punitive damages for conduct that reflected willful and wanton indignities, and to protect
social order.” Thus, although not commonly referred to in the modem doctrine of

” Ellis, 7.
” Rustad and Koenig. 9.
” Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784). Cited in Rustad and Koenig. 6.
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Ibid.

” Ibid.
” Rustad and Koenig, 6. Referring to Coryell v. Colbaugh 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).,
Bateman v. Goodyear, 12 Conn. 575, 575-77 (1838)., Boston Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske
3 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1681).
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justification of punitive damages, vindictive satisfaction is historically supported by civil
law and one o f the original purposes of punitive damages.
Punishment o f any type, be it incarceration or monetary fines, can be argued to help
satisfy the victim and society’s need for vindication, as long as the punishment fits the
crime. Ideally, the appeal to altruism and the greatest good for the greatest number
would argue that for the satisfaction of vengeance, punitive damages should be received
by the state. The victim should be satisfied with the very act of punishing the wrong
doer, regardless of who receives damages. But appeasement of the victim should be
specifically addressed by civil law, since civil wrongs are defined as personal wrongs’*’*’ personal to the victim who brings the case to court. So, the payment of punitive damages
specifically to the victim, instead of the state, for the satisfaction vengeance is fitting for
civil law procedure.
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As explained supra, page ix. Introduction, section Civil Law.
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CHAPTER 4

HONOR AND INSULT
When justifying any act, we most often refer to its purpose or utility. As noted in the
previous chapter, punitive damages’ first and foremost purpose is punishment. Punitive
damages punishment goals include deterrence, vindictive satisfaction, and punishment for
corporate entities. But the goals of punishment do not completely justify why the
plaintiff should receive the damages. So we turn to the purposes of punitive damages that
are not a direct result of punishment. This chapter reviews the historical development of
the purposes o f punitive damages, to unveil that the policy also served to restore honor
and repair insult to the plaintiffs.
The personal nature’ of civil lawsuits results in specific attention to the personal
insult of the victim. Since the correction of personal effacement by civil wrongs was not
included in compensatory damages.® So punitive damages were awarded to encompass

’ See Introduction and other chapters where civil law is referred to private law arena
since the plaintiff is responsible, with the assistance of his/her lawyers, for the pursuit of
justice in a civil case, as opposed to criminal law where the police and other law
enforcement agencies are obligated to assist in enforcing the law.
®This does not mean that compensatory damages cannot be awarded for
noneconomic damages, pain and suffering, and the like... but compensatory damages are
most often distinct from punitive damages for this reason. The specific application of
compensatory damages can, and does, vary from state to state; and is dependent upon the
type of case, the type of harm, and the varying opinions of the state’s or case’s judge and
jury. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, I will maintain the general definition of
compensatory damages, which focuses on concrete, economic, nominal harms. In
contrast, punitive damages are always only awarded when ‘further’ harm is established,
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the satisfaction of insult and vengeance to the plaintiff, and in order to restore his honor
and self-respect.® Previous to punitive damages awards, insult and honor were
uncompensable losses.

Insult
Awarding of punitive damages in order to recognize insult as a compensable injury
developed in the early 1700’s.'* The earliest case cited came from England, Huckle v.
MoneyP in 1763. Exemplary damages were awarded for the defendant causing the
plaintiff “feelings of wounded pride and dignity.”^ But considering insult as a reason for

malice, willful intent, or in certain cases of strict liability. But the specific scope of this is
beyond this thesis. This thesis will focus on procedures after punitive damages awards
have been deemed necessary, which implies desert and guilt. The main concern of this
thesis is: after punitive damages have been deemed applicable by judge and jury,
regardless of the amount (excessiveness issue discussed in Chapter One), who should
receive the damages?
®John Rawls, “A Liberal Theory o f Justice,” in the introduction by Pojman, L.(ed),
Ethical Theory Classical and Contemporary Readings, 583. “. . . the chief primary goods
at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and
wealth. (Later on . . . the primary good of self respect has a central place.)”
'*Ellis, 6-7.
®Huckle V. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
^ See also Rookes Appellant; and Barnard and Others Respondents, [House Of
Lords.], [1964] AC 1129,21 January 1964, (c)2001 The Incorporated Council of Law
Reporting for England & Wales. Referring to historical cases to set precedence for the
purposes of punitive damages.. .“But there are also cases in the books where the awards
given cannot be explained as compensatory, and I propose therefore to begin by
examining the authorities in order to see how far and in what sort of cases the exemplary
principle has been recognised. The history of exemplary damages is briefly and clearly
stated by Professor Street in Principles of the Law of Damages (1962) at p. 28. They
originated just 200 years ago. ..In Huckle v. Money the plaintiff was a journeyman printer
who had been taken into custody in the course of the raid on the North Briton. The issue
of liability having already been decided the only question was as to damages and the jury
gave him oe300. A new trial was asked for on the ground that this figure was "most
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damages did not merely repair the plaintiffs hurt feelings. In eases involving intangible
losses, establishing insult explains the importance given to the consideration of intent and
motive. Intent to insult increases the aggravation of the harm, and thus gives reason for
further or increased punitive damages. In Sears v. Lyons^ “the jury was instructed that it
‘might consider not only the mere pecuniary damage sustained by the plaintiff, but also
the intention with which the fact had been done, whether for insult or injury.’ ”® The
consideration of insult adding to injury is also evident in Forde v. Skinner,'^ where the
jury was instructed to note that according to the evidence, the harm included “malicious
intent imputed of ‘taking down their pride,’ ... [and should be considered] an aggravation
and ought to increase the damages.”’*’ So in this case, the intent to insult gave the jury
reason to increase the amount of punitive damages.
Insult in addition to malice, willfulness, and other aggravating factors in the awarding
of punitive damages continues to be considered today, although not always mentioned in

outrageous." The plaintiff was employed at a weekly wage of one guinea; he had been in
custody for only about six hours and had been used "very civilly by treating him with
beefsteaks and beer." It seems improbable that his feelings o f wounded pride and dignity
would have needed much further assuagement; and indeed the Lord Chief Justice said
nl08 that the personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the "jury had been
confined by their oath to consider mere personal injury only, perhaps oe20 damages
would have been thought sufficient..." But they had done right in giving exemplary
damages. The award was upheld.
’ Sears v. Lyons, 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1818). Cited in Ellis, 7.
®Ellis, 7. Referring to Sears v. Lyons.
^ Forde v. Skinner, 172 Eng. Rep. 687 (Horsham Assizes 1830). Cited in Ellis, 7.
’**Ellis, 7. Referring to Forde v. Skirmer.
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the forefront of reasons for punitive damages.” Insult, like vengeance, to the altruistic
ideal should not be a valued. But the reparation of insult is important, because personal
insult bruises a person’s honor. And honor was a historically significant personal value,
and honor continues to be an important personal and social value in our community.

Honor
The importance of personal honor in society is evident in professional, social, and
family structures. “Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes,’ as well as ‘in the
eyes of his society.”’® To the individual, honor “is his estimation of his own worth, his
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized

” See for example Industrial Technologies, Inc., and Richard Hill v. Jacobs Bank;
Jacobs Bank v. Industrial Technologies, Inc., and Richard Hill 1011966,1012064
Supreme Court of Alabama 872 So. 2d 819; 2003 Ala. LEXIS 130 (April 25,2003).
Opinion by Justice Woodall, Section II. Industrial’s Appeal “Indeed, "punitive damages
are recoverable in a conversion case when the evidence shows legal malice, willfulness,
insult, or other aggravating circumstances." Schwertfeger v. Moorehouse, 569 So. 2d
322, 324 (Ala. 1990) [**20] (emphasis added). '"Punitive damages [in an action for
conversion] are justified when the evidence discloses the conversion to have been
committed in known violation o f law and o f owner's rights, with circumstances of insult,
or contumely, or malice.'" Roberson v. Ammons, 477 So. 2d 957, 961 (Ala. 1985)
(quoting Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 46 Ala. App. 50, 57, 237 So. 2d 855, 859-60
(1970)). "The conversion committed in known violation of the law and of plaintiffs'
rights is itself legal insult, contumely, or malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive
damages." 477 So. 2d at 961 (emphasis added). Consistent with Ala. Code 1975, § 6-1120(a), a punitive-damages award will not be vacated where the evidence supporting the
award is "of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons
could find by clear and convincing evidence," Ex parte Norwood [*827] Hodges Motor
Co., 680 So. 2d 245, 249 (Ala. 1996), that the conversion was associated with "malice,
willfulness, insult, or other aggravating circumstances."”
’®Ellis, 6. quoting from Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor and Social Status,” in Honor and
Shame: The Values o f a Mediterranean Society, J.G. Péristiany éd., (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1966), 21.
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by society, his right to pride.” '® In this sense, honor is not simply an individual emotion,
but it is also produced by social recognition to acts. If an employee does a good job, they
are honored with verbal praise, a raise in pay, a certificate, or an award at the annual
employee party.” Employee of the month plaques and reserved parking spots are present
at most places of employment. The world of academia teaches our children about social
honor with simple lists like the ‘honor roll.’ Ceremonies and celebrations honoring
graduates, employees of the month, or the bride to be - by her maid o f honor - surround
our everyday lives. Honor is not limited to the personal or emotional sphere, but is given
and taken within society. “[Honor] implies not merely a habitual preference for a given
mode of conduct, but the entitlement to a certain treatment from society in return.”'®
These examples o f honor are those that are due to the praise of an action. Thus an
important aspect to honor is the deserved receipt of this recognition. Desert is an
important aspect of honor. “Deserts is a relative term that refers to external goods; and as
the greatest external good,

we define honor. The degree of desert affects the degree

of honor. And honor is only of its greatest when it is most deserved.”

13

Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor and Social Status,” 21.

Praise of an employee is not only done out o f good faith, but can be found in
company policies and taught in management courses. Praise and honor are important to
business and correct treatment of employees. This is a reflection o f the importance of
honor and praise in our society.
'®Pitt-Rivers, 22.
1123b. 15-20.
” NE 1123b.24-26. “A small-minded man falls short both in view o f his own deserts
and in relation to the claims of a high-minded person [who is deserving of honor], while a
vain man exceeds his own deserts but does not exceed the high-minded.”
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Given the importance and value of honor in our society, it is not surprising that our
legal institution, which is responsible for punishment (the taking o f honor) should also
have responsibility to take part in maintaining honor in our society. The honoring of
citizens in the community is not limited to the ceremonial ‘keys to the city’ or awards for
community service. Praise and honor from the government should, and does, come from
all branches - executive, legislative, and judicial.
Government institutions bear the responsibility of sustaining socially agreed rights
and wrongs.'® When the government punishes, it reflects the social scorn of the wrong
doing, and takes honor from the guilty and at the same time restores social honor to
society and the victim. This is why it is important for the government to participate in the
recognition and distribution of social honor to citizens. Honor is not left to the private
sector, government participation in recognition of honorable acts is as necessary as the
government punishing - it maintains justice.
According to Rawls’s justice as fairness, in order to ensure justice, moral
considerations such as ensuring equal distribution of social values are incorporated into
the government policies.'^ Honor is considered a good that is desired, a good social
value. That is why for situations in which one’s honor is bruised, resolution can be
gained through “some tribunal, the ‘fount of honour’: public opinion, the monarch, or the
ordeal o f the judicial combat.”®" Another reason the legal system takes into account

'®For instance the law enforcement agencies enforce the laws that are made to ensure
equality and prevent crime, legislative bodies make laws to ensure equal treatment in the
work-place, enforce the minimum wage, prevent discrimination, etc....
See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Procedural Justice.
®" Pitt-Rivers, 23.
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affronts to honor is to discourage citizens to take matters into their own hands which
would, and did, result in private dueling and feuds, and social unrest. In general,
promoting social control is a goal of legal punishment. Incorporating insult and honor
into punishment supports this goal.
Therefore it is historically and communally justified for the legal system to
incorporate in its policy some type of restoration that represents honor. Punitive damages
awarded for the purpose of repairing insult are an example of political policy restoring
honor.
The compensation for non-monetary injuries, unrelated to tangible losses, developed
“from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century through the first quarter of the
nineteenth century.”®' These injuries included “cases of slander, seduction, assault and
battery in humiliating circumstances, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution,
illegal intrusion into private dwellings and seizure of private papers, trespass onto private
land in an offensive manner, and false imprisonment.”®® Prior to punitive damages these
claims had no legal monetary value. And these cases entire show one common factor.
®' Ellis, 6.
®®Ellis, see n61 - n68. Citing n61 See, e.g.. Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867
(Banc. Sup. 1655); Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677). n62 See, e.g.,
Tullidge V. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769). n63 See, e.g., Benson v. Frederick, 97
Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766); Ash v. Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701); Grey v. Grant,
95 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P. 1764). n64 See, e.g., Duberley v. Gunning, 100 Eng. Rep. 1226
(K.B. 1792). Butterworth v. Butterworth & Englefield, 1920 P. 126; A. OGUS, THE
LAW OF DAMAGES 29 n.6 (1973). n65 See, e.g., Hewlett v. Cruchley, 128 Eng. Rep.
696 (K.B. 1813); Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777 (C.P. 1780); Chambers v. Robinson, 93
Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1726). n66 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (C.P. 1774);
Bruce v. Rawlins, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770); Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep.
790 (C.P. 1764); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). n67 See, e.g.. Sears v. Lyons, 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1818);
Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). n68 See, e.g., Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 96
Eng. Rep. 549 (C.P. 1774).
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“they involved acts that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims.”®® Therefore the
legal system incorporated satisfaction of honor into the civil law system; punitive
damages provides for this purpose.
Moreover, as stated earlier, the satisfaction o f honor is greatest when it is most
deserved, and in a civil law suit, it is most deserved by the plaintiff, if it is at all deserved.
Also, due to the restoration of honor, punitive damages are, and should continue to be
awarded to whom rightly deserves them - the plaintiff. In the instance of offending
honor, the victim “requires satisfaction if [he] is to return to [his] normal condition.”®'*
The plaintiff is most deserving firstly, because the damages serve as a return of his
honor after being victimized; and secondly, the plaintiffs endeavor to bring the wrong
doing to court and the guilty to punishment, not only for him, but also for the good of
society. These are honorable acts. Often when pursuing a suit, “it is an extremely
painful process, exposing the claimant to social discreditation and self-doubt.”®® Thus,
not only is the wrong-doing an injury o f honor to the plaintiff, but so is the pursuit of
seeking justice. These insults are vindicated with a guilty punishment, and the plaintiff is
honored with praise for a good job, or perhaps if the judge or jury find worthy, with
punitive damages. Therefore, the purpose of honor justifies the awarding of punitive

®®Ellis, 6. Also see Rustad and Koenig, 6, n l 19. “damages ...for mental anguish, or
personal indignity and disgrace.” The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 9 Law
Rep. 529, 535 (1847).
®'*Pitt-Rivers, 26.
25

Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 11.
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damages specifically to the plaintiff because after the usually long pursuit, the award is
deserved.®^

Serving Justice
The purposes of repairing insult and restoring honor enforce that punitive damages
should be awarded to the plaintiff because it also ensures procedural justice. Procedural
justice is served in two ways. First, awarding the punitive damages to the plaintiff
restores self-respect, which is a principle of procedural justice. Self-respect is a basic
social value which includes honor and respect from society. Since the government
agencies are responsible for maintaining social values amongst the community,
government agencies should actively participate in governing self-respect.®’ One way
that the government can do this is through acknowledging the importance of self-respect
in its policies and procedures. Since civil law is the private law arena,®® its concern for
the restoration of the plaintiffs personal self-respect should be maintained in its policies.
Private wrongs harm self-respect through insult. Punitive damages awarded to the
plaintiff, instead of the state, restore this personal harm.
Second, procedural justice also states that in the government distribution of benefits
or burdens, the excess should be distributed to the benefit of least advantaged. Civil law.

®^ It must be noted that the award must be in proportion to what is deserved, just as in
punishment for retribution. Punitive damages in excess of desert are not rightly deserved,
which is why they are usually and justly appealed and struck down. See Chapter 1,
briefly addressing the excessiveness issue of punitive damages.
®’ See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Procedural Justice, Determined Principles of
Justice, p. 48.
®®Disputes amongst private parties: Contracts, torts, etc...
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as described in corrective justice, weighs its participants as equals^^ when calculating
compensation and the amount of harm caused. So civil law does not first consider the
plaintiffs or the defendant’s actual economic or social status prior to judgment of guilt.
So, if a guilty verdict finds that further punitive damages should be awarded, the plaintiff
is, in the civil law arena, the least advantaged for two reasons. First, the burden pursuing
justice is on the plaintiff and places them as the disadvantaged, since the passive system
requires the plaintiff to take on the full initiative to pursue justice. Second, the burden of
prosecution alone bruises the plaintiffs self-respect in the eyes of society. Add this
insulting burden to the original injury or harm, and the plaintiff is again the least
advantaged, regardless of their actual social and economic status.^®
So, since procedural justice principles advise that if there are burdens or benefits that
are to be distributed, then they should benefit the least advantaged. And since punitive
damages are an additional burden to the defendant as well as an additional benefit to who
receives them, they should be received by the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is the least
advantaged in the civil law procedures. The plaintiff is the least advantaged because of
See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Correction. The status of the plaintiff and the
defendant are not considered when calculating the amount of harm for compensation,
only the harm itself. Participants in civil law are rendered equal before the eyes of the
law, the only difference is the harm that was caused.
Noted, that it is possible that the plaintiff may be of great wealth and status, and the
defendant quite the opposite. It cannot be assumed that the plaintiff is always o f lower
status economically and socially. But, for evaluative purposes, and since the civil law
arena first judges correction as though the plaintiff and defendant are equal, when I refer
to the least advantaged, in formal procedural terms, the plaintiff in the civil law system is
the least advantaged or o f lesser advantage than the defendant due the claim that they
have been wronged (a victim) and due to the fact that the burden o f proof is on the
plaintiff. If the system should allow a plaintiff with more power and money to
unlawfully persecute a defendant only because they have less power or money, that is an
issue of judicial process prior to the awarding of punitive damages that is not in the scope
of this paper.
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their injury, their insult to honor, and their burden of proof. All of which also make the
plaintiff most deserving of the punitive damages award.

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 5

PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE
Reminisce to the early 1900’s Old West and think about those ‘Wanted’ posters they
used to post for criminals. According to the Library of Congress* one of the earliest
‘Wanted’ posters that displayed a photograph was for John Wilkes Booth by the War
Department in Washington, D.C. dated April 20, 1865, offering a $100,000 reward. At
the bottom of the poster it stated:
LIBERAL REWARDS will be paid for any information that shall
conduce to the arrest of either of the above named criminals, or their
accomplices... .Let the stain of innocent blood be removed from the land
by the arrest and punishment of the murderers. All good citizens are
exhorted to aid public justice on this occasion. Every man should consider
his own conscience charged with this solemn duty, and rest neither night
nor day until it be accomplished.^
Turning to private citizens to assist in law enforcement is historically supported. As
stated above, the government requested that every man make it his duty to assist in the
persecution of wrongs. Today, we may assume that incentives to persecute wrongs in
society are not warranted, but indeed they are. Even with modem technology and the
vast law enforcement departments, there are wrongs that are sometimes only witnessed
by the victims or by-standards. In the Old West, towns were far apart and criminals

' Library o f Congress, American Treasures Exhibition website [on-line] at
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm075.html accessed on 8 May 2005.
^ Ibid. Poster can be viewed on-line as part of the Library of Congress American
Treasures Exhibition.
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hence the private law aspect.
In addition to this, in this chapter, I argue that the complex and costly civil law
system gives further reason that plaintiffs should be offered incentive to persecute.
Ideally we would ask that the only incentive for justice, be justice.^ But realistically, the
civil law system is complex and costly; and the pursuit for justice can be discouraging.
The incentive to the plaintiff provided by civil law is also known as promoting ‘private
attorneys general.’ This incentive, in addition to the other purposes discussed earlier, is
an important purpose for the awarding of punitive damages. Most importantly, this
purpose requires that the damages be awarded to the plaintiff, and not to the state.
Awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff not only completes procedural justice,
satisfies vindictiveness, heals insult, and restores honor; it also advocates ‘private law
enforcement.’ Also in this chapter I discuss why ‘private law enforcement’ not only
serves the plaintiffs needs for justice, but also society’s.

^ The only reasons that concerned members of society should pursue a case is to right
wrongs, to punish wrong-doers, for the good of society.
Ill
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could hide in the vast empty plains. Today, although we are closer together, criminals
can still find some remote places to hide. And, specifically addressing the wrongs of
civil law, wrong-doers can hide in plain site, since it is only the ‘duty’ or decision of the
plaintiff which will uncover any injustice.
Plaintiff incentive is necessary in the arena of civil law, more so than with eriminal
law, sinee civil persecution is reliant upon the plaintiffs decision to litigate. Civil law is
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The Complex - Passive Civil Law System
The rules and procedures of the legal system are complex. One reason lawyers are
regarded as professionals, along with doctors and teachers, is that these fields require
specialized knowledge through specialized education. This specialized knowledge is
required to participate in the legal system since there are also different laws for different
states, different resources (other than lawyers) and different ways to access these
resources. The policies and procedures of the legal system are not common knowledge,
and the basic architecture creates and limits equal use of the system."* It follows, similar
to any complex system or process, the more experienced or more familiar one is with the
puzzle, the more advantaged. The limited equal use of the system usually plaees one
party at a disadvantage.
This gap o f advantage between participants in litigation has been explicated by Mare
Galanter, in his article “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change.”* Galanter states that partieipants vary but can be generally classified in a
gradient that has the “one-shotters” (those who have only occasional recourse to the
courts) at one end and the “repeat players” (those who are engaged in many similar
litigations over time) at the other. ^
The repeat-players at one side of the gradient are anticipatory, prepared, and more
resourced than the others. In addition, since repeat players frequent the system, they are

"*Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speeulations on the Limits of
Legal Change,” Law and Society Review, Vol. 9:1 (Fall 1974) : 95.
*Ibid.
^ Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: ...,” 97.
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able to buy professional legal services more steadily, in larger quantities, in bulk (by
retainer) and at higher rates, in order to get services of better quality/
Most one-shotter participant claims are either “too large or too small to be managed
routinely and rationally.”^ They usually have limited resources and must stop to initially
research the system before they can familiarize themselves with what they require to
pursue a case.
The differences between the experienced and the inexperienced, along with the
advantages and disadvantages, can be pointed out with almost every legal system
(criminal or civil); any governmental transaction (paying taxes, obtaining licenses,
registering your car), or any private transaction (applying for a loan for a major asset
purchase, applying to college, arrangements for a wedding). Our society values, seeks,
and pays for experience. ‘Leave it to the professionals,’ is the common phrase when one
is faced with a complex system. But, in the pursuit for justice these differences and
advantages do not result in perhaps a higher tax return or a smooth run wedding
reception, these differences have the potential to be the key between justice served or
withheld.
The differenees in these participants are not solely based upon actual social power,
wealth, or status; but the differences “define a position of advantage in the eonfiguration
of contending parties and indicates how those with other advantages tend to occupy this
position of advantage.”^

^ Ibid., 114.
* Ibid., 98.
^ Ibid., 103.
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How can these differences be resolved, or at least maintained to ensure equal access
to justice for all participants? Well, the simple answer would be that everyone needs to
be aggressive in their education of social processes. Before you go to register your car,
call the Department of Motor Vehicles to find out what documents are required. Before
you decide to buy a house, get some consultation, ask someone you know who has gone
through that experience, be informed. And before you enter into a legal transaction,
make sure you know your rights, the limits, and the laws. Read your contracts carefully,
and consult a lawyer. As a professor at the local community college, I often advise my
students to be aggressive in their education - ask questions! Granted everyone in society
should be an active participant in transactions that involve their person. But for the
purpose of analyzing legal procedures, we must ask for more. The difference in position
of advantage to the participants in civil litigation is an inequality in which the legal
system could, and should, neutralize through use o f the process. But more often than not,
the legal system has institutional features that increase the advantageous gap between
participants.
The civil litigation system is passive in that it must be mobilized by the claimant.***
As we have noted earlier, the burden of pursuit for litigation is on the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff chose to dismiss the wrong, leave it for someone else, or the next victim to
pursue, the claim is dropped. The government and law enforcement officials offer no
assistance to the victim in pursuit o f a civil suit.
The institution is also passive in that it does not regularly solicit for civil suits. The
system is present and available, but does not go out to the world of private transactions

10

Ibid, 119. As stated earlier, the burden of litigation is on the plaintiff.
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looking for, soliciting for, or encouraging victims of wrongs to pursue suit. This
passivity of the institution also gives advantage to the participant with more information,
with the greater ability to overcome cost barriers, and procedural requirements.**
Probably one of the main reasons why the institution itself is not adamantly
encouraging suits, like businesses soliciting customers, is because the system is busy.
Reported tort cases filed in California and New York for 2002 was over 80,000 for each
state; Nevada reported over 7,000; and New Jersey over 70,000.*^ According to the
National Center for State Courts Caseload Highlights^^ in a study of appellate cases
resolved in 1996 and 1997 from five state supreme courts (Florida, Georgia, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Virginia), the number o f days it took for 90 percent of mandatory appeals cases
to be resolved ranged from 363 -8 1 8 . The American Bar Association (ABA), Appellate
Court Performance Standards Commission recommends that state supreme courts should
resolve 50 percent of mandatory appeals from the dates of their filings within 290 days or
fewer.*"* And the ABA recommends that 90 percent o f mandatory appeals for review

" Ibid.
See Courts Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, 2003 (National
Center for State Courts 2004) accessed [on-line]
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Researeh/csp/2003_Files/2003_SCCS.html, 8 May 2005.
Fred Cheesman, Roger A. Hanson, and Brian J. Ostrom; Caseload Highlights:
Examining the Work o f State Courts, Caseload and Timelines in State Supreme Courts,
Vol. 7 No. 2 (National Center for State Courts, December 2001). Accessed [on-line] at
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/esp/Highlights/Highlights_Main_Page.html on 8 May
2005.
*"*Roger A. Hanson, Brian J. Ostrom, and Neal B. Kauder, Caseload Highlights:
Examining the Work o f State Courts, Timeliness in Five State Supreme Courts, Vol. 8 No.
1 (National Center for State Courts, March 2002). Accessed [on-line] at
www.ncsconline.org/D_Researeh/esp/Highlights/Highlights_Main_Page.html on 8 May
2005.
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should be resolved within 365 days or fewer.'* According to the National Center for
State Courts study for cases resolved in 1996 and 1997 in the above mentioned five
states, the number of days from date of filing to resolution for mandatory appeals cases in
the 90* percentile (excluding the death penalty) ranged from 318 (Minnesota), to 624
(Ohio). Although these numbers may seem large, the study concludes that the numbers
do vary from state to state, and that some courts are more expeditious than others. The
“popular images o f supreme courts taking painfully long periods of time to resolve their
cases are not supported by the data.”'® Note this study encompassed appeals cases. So
this does not include the actual time from the initial filing of the case. What this does tell
us is that courts cases are not resolved immediately. According to the Las Vegas Justice
Court for Clark County, Nevada; a small claim filing tentative court date is
approximately 90 to 120 days after the claim is f i l e d . I n summary, when filing a claim
in civil court, patience is a virtue. The civil system is passive, not aggressive in assisting
the plaintiff in pursuing justice.
Now, if the claim is lucky enough to make it through the system (overcoming delays,
raising costs with delays, restrictive rules, and temptations o f settlement), the passivity of
the institution continues. The burden to proceed - the development o f the case, collection
of evidence, presentation of proof - are left to the parties, this further defines the
passivity of the system.

'* Ibid.
16

Ibid. See section ‘Summing Up and Looking Ahead.’

See Las Vegas Justice Court website general information on Small Claim Filing,
www.co.clark.nv.us/justicecourt_lv/smallclaim.htm, accessed 8 May 2005.
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Furthermore, in the civil law system, the “parties are treated as if they were equally
endowed with economic resources, investigative opportunities and legal skills.”** Even if
the participants were of equal resource, the burden of litigation is still on the plaintiff, and
the burden is not a light one. So for the participant who is the least advantaged (in terms
of resources, information, funding, and motivation), which is most often the plaintiff, one
must have more than just a strong will to pursue justice.
Due to arbitration or mediation, out of court negotiations, the lack of ability or
knowledge as to how to even consult a lawyer, most civil disputes do not even get to
court.

Suitors, lawyers, and the court system are not the only players in litigation.

“Organizational actors such as large manufacturing corporations, financial institutions,
[insurance companies], educational and cultural institutions, political parties, etc.,”^**are
in contact with the potential plaintiff before the thought of a legal suit. It has been found:
[There is an] absence of sizable numbers of legal actions in which
individuals or firms o f substantial or large means appear on both sides of
lawsuits. Such potential suitors can afford, and are likely to make
extensive use of skilled professional help to channel their affairs so as to
prevent trouble.... [T]hey are likely to be equipped to make sophisticated
choices of alternatives to litigation to resolve difficulties through
bargaining, mediation or arbitration.^*

** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: ...,” 120.
*^ Marc S. Galanter, “Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,”
UCLA Law Review, 31:4 (October 1983): 8. “Miller and Sarat report that about 11% of
disputants [ . . . ] took their middle range disputes [between $1,000 and $10,000] to
court.” Miller & Sarat, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 527 (1980 - 81).
Galanter, “Reading the Landscape o f Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,” UCLA
Law Review, 31:4 (October 1983): 9.
^* Ibid. Referring to Hurst, “The Functions of Courts in the United States,” 1950 1980, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 401,422 (1980-1981).
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The process o f litigation is a deterrent not only to single plaintiffs, but also to large
companies. “For plaintiffs and defendants alike, litigation proves a miserable, disruptive,
painful experience.

Therefore, if even large corporations are deterred from civil court

complexities, the single citizen must also be deterred. Incentive and the award of
punitive damages is necessary to compensate the plaintiff for ‘taking the extreme trouble’
to sue, as well as to support the private law aspect o f civil law.
The complex and passivity of the civil legal system is another reason, in addition to
insult, harm, and bruised honor, that the plaintiff is the least advantaged as compared to
the defendant. This supports why, incentive is necessary.

The Costly System
For criminal law, the government carries the burden of costs for prosecution.^* But
for civil law, the costs of persecution fall entirely upon the plaintiff. The possibility of a
punitive damages award provides additional incentive for the plaintiff to pursue litigation,
since additional monetary compensation aids in attorney fees and other costs that may
accompany a legal suit.
The actual cost of litigation is highly dependent upon the type of injury, whether a
death is involved, and whether or not the case actually goes to court or is settled.
** Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 4.
** Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, s.v. ‘Criminal law - an overview’
viewed [on-line] at http://www.law.comell.edu on 9 May 2005. “Criminal law involves
prosecution by the government of a person for an act that has been elassified as a erime.
Civil cases, on the other hand, involve individuals and organizations seeking to resolve
legal disputes. In a criminal case the state, through a proseeutor, initiates the suit, while in
a civil case the victim brings the suit. Persons convicted of a erime may be incarcerated,
fined, or both. However, persons found liable in a civil case may only have to give up
property or pay money, but are not incarcerated.”
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“Empirical research from the Wisconsin Civil Litigation Research Project, reveals that
...the cost to litigate an average or "typical" civil suit rarely exceeds $10,000.”^'*
Specifically, only eight percent o f the cases studied reported legal fees
of more than $10,000. Another eight percent reported legal fees ranging
between $5,001 to $10,000. In thirty eight percent o f the cases, the legal
fees ranged between $1,001 to $5,000. Most surprisingly, forty six
percent o f the cases studied reported legal fees of only $1,000 or less.^*
So the majority of case costs were less than $5,000. Although it is important to note
that the cost of litigation varies with the type of harm. The Rand Institute for Civil
Justice in 1988 found that legal fees for asbestos and air accident cases where the cases
involved the death of a plaintiff and the stakes are mueh higher, “the average litigation
expenditure amounted to $72,000 and the defendant’s average costs amounted to
$49,000.”*®
The question is: how important is the cost of litigation? Is the decision to pursue
litigation heavily weighed upon the cost? Or will plaintiffs do whatever they can,
whatever it takes, to pursue justice? The answer to this question is dependent upon the
type of harm. The more severe the harm, the more one would be motivated to pursue
justice. But at the same time, the more severe the harm, the more costly the pursuit
becomes.

*"*David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel
B. Grossman, “The Cost of Ordinary Litigation,” UCLA Law Review, 31:72, 80 (1983).
** Than N. Luu, Reducing the Costs o f Civil Litigation, Public Law Research Institute,
[on-line] http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/cstslit.html; (UC Hastings College of the
Law 2004), accessed 20 January 2005, 5.
*®Ibid. referring to James S. Kakalik, Elizabeth M. King, Michael Traynor, Patricia
A. Ebener, & Larry Picus, Costs and Compensation Paid in Aviation Accident Litigation,
R-3421-ICJ (Rand Institute for Civil Justice) 1988.
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Since punitive damages can compensate for attorney’s fees, it has the possibility** of
softening the burden of incurring the costs up fi-ont for the plaintiff. Furthermore, even if
the plaintiff does not come out successfully, the fact that the possible outcome is there,
eases the mental pursuit of litigation. Fairness of the procedure gives the participants a
sense of justice, even if the outcome is not in their favor. This implies that “process is
important because our notion of fairness includes not only the end result but the sense of
fair process by which the result occurred.”** According to Robert E. Lane, in
“Procedural Goods in Democracy: How One is Treated Versus What One Gets,”*^ people
often care more about how they are treated than what they get. Because of this, the
essential moral ingredients in procedural justice are just as important as justice principles
concerned with outcomes such as distributive and retribution principles.*® In order to
determine fair procedure, moral ingredients need to be applied. O f these moral
ingredients, one is self-respect. Lane also refers to Rawls’s view of self-respect as an
important primary good, and thus should be used as a “prime criterion for assessing
justice procedures.”*' Self-respect can be gained through self-esteem from small groups.

** I emphasize possibility since the punitive damages award is not guaranteed. Only
after a defendant is found guilty and compensatory awards are determined, are punitive
damages considered. So it is possible for one to pursue litigation with no possibility of
receiving punitive damages, even if they win the case. Also refer to Chapter One
regarding the discourse o f punitive damages, they are rare and only awarded in a small
percentage of civil cases.
** Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision Making, Revised
Edition. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 51.
*®Robert E. Lane, “Procedural Goods in Democracy: How One is Treated Versus
What One Gets, ”Social Justice Research, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1998) : 177-192.
*®Ibid., 177-178.
*' Ibid., 179.
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personal achievements, and ‘“reflected appraisal,’ judging yourself as you imagine others
judge you. This means that being treated with respeet affects self-respect.”** This
judgment includes treatment by authorities such as policemen, employers, or legal
institutions.
Lane explains that once a person is treated with respect, they are more likely to
exercise personal control over actions and motives.** It is this control that allows them to
consider the price of justice (whether or not to bring a ease to court) and dignity in the
midst of procedures in “which distributive justice and dignity are compensations,”*"* such
as in civil law. After the unpleasantness of justice procedures, which Lane concludes
actually result in more pain,** the level of overall satisfaction is factored by adding the
intrinsic pleasure of procedure: having one’s problems solved, receiving benefits, or
avoiding burdens, the sense of having been dealt with fairly.*® These pleasures represent
“a kind of achievement, validating one’s self-respect,”** and at the end are more of a
relief from the pains of litigation than actual pleasures. Therefore, procedural goods,
such as punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff, serve justice. Not only because the

** Ibid.
** Ibid. When treated with respect one has the “opportunity to know what one can do,
opportunity to control by one’s own acts one’s own economic destiny.”
*"*Ibid., 182.
** Ibid., 183-4, in the section “Relief From Procedural Pain,” where he refers to court
proceedings being taxing, full of painful conflict, time costs and information costs.
*®Ibid.
** Ibid., 183-4,
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plaintiff is at the least advantaged, but also beeause the existenee of the procedure itself,
provides a sense of fairness, regardless of the outcome.
Reformers** who favor split recovery awards,*® criminal punishment,"*® or societal
distribution"** disagree. The arguments against plaintiffs receiving the punitive damages
beg that the award is an inappropriate way of compensating plaintiffs for taking the
trouble to sue. Reformers who propose alternatives to punitive damages distribution
argue that allowing plaintiffs to keep punitive damages, motivates frivolous or imjust
lawsuits, and that plaintiffs bringing civil suits to court should be seeking justice, not
monetary “windfall gains.”"** Reformers for punitive damages distribution believe that
the potential for receiving the punitive awards in addition to compensatory awards, in
some cases significant amounts, promote inappropriate civil litigation.
But as I have shown, the ‘trouble’ to sue is immense and can be overwhelming to
plaintiffs. And the purpose of a punitive damages award is not solely to compensate for
attorney’s fees. Its foremost purpose is to punish and deter, it repairs insult and honor to
the plaintiff, it satisfies vengeance, it provides incentive to the plaintiff for carrying the
burden of pursuing justice, and lastly, it assists with attorney’s fees and the cost of
litigation.

** See Chapter One, Arguments to Reform the Distribution.
*®Where the punitive dam ages amount is shared with the state.

"*®Volokh, 1.
"*' See Sharkey.
"** supra. See Chapter One. The reform proposals for Societal Damages and Split
Recovery.
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The claim that punitive damages encourage frivolous litigation is a discounted claim
through the oversimplifieation of the issue. Again, punitive damages are rare, as stated in
Chapter One, only oecur in about 2 - 5 percent o f all tort cases. If attorneys or plaintiffs
are pursuing frivolous cases assuming that punitive damages will be easily awarded, they
are mistaken. Also, contingency fee lawyers must cover the costs of litigation upfront.
Thus it simply makes no economic sense for them to bring frivolous litigation because
there is only cost and no guaranteed benefit."** Another problem with the claim that
frivolous litigation applies to punitive damages is that it assumes that monetary gain is
the dominant motivation to pursue justice. Lawyers and plaintiffs many not only be
seeking monetary gains with frivolous lawsuits, but also social attention or possible
career moves. So, if one wanted to pursue a frivolous lawsuit, then they would,
regardless of the possibility of the punitive damages award. The reformation of
distribution to the plaintiff based solely on prevention of frivolous lawsuits is impetuous.
Calling attention to frivolous lawsuits is the interest groups’ way o f distracting policy
makers from the real purposes of punitive damages, namely, to punish, to provide
incentive for, and repair further harm to the plaintiff.
For, even if monetary gain was a dominant factor in litigation pursuit, punitive
damages going to the plaintiff serve purposes that rise above ethical maintenance of
greedy lawyers and false plaintiffs. Adjusting the distribution of punitive damages is not
the solution to preventing frivolous lawsuits, because the risk o f losing legitimate

"**Capra, “An Accident and a Dream....,” 35. Although there are statutes such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, SubChapter IV §12205
that states “the court or agency, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party, ...a
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs...”
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lawsuits is too great. Punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff plays too important o f a
part in ensuring legitimate lawsuits make it through the system.

The Private Attorney General Principle
The purpose o f inducing private law enforcement is instituted by the system of civil
law. Civil law is distinct in that the plaintiff is required to bring the case to court on their
own - with no or little assistance from the police. Whether or not to bring a case to court
is the sole decision of the plaintiff."*"* This is why it is referred to as private law. The civil
legal system operates only when the process is triggered by parties."** “The punitive
damage system . . . is driven exclusively by private litigants and their lawyers.”"*®
Civil law “is a matter of private law in the sense that its goal is to provide
compensation and satisfaction for the offended, [only] i f she chooses to pursue the
case.”"** So it can be concluded that civil law is distinct from criminal law since the
burden of bringing the wrong-doing to court is on the plaintiff. Given that civil law
procedures begin vrith this distinction, it can be concluded that the ‘private law’ aspect is
inherent in the purpose o f civil law, and therefore an important purpose that procedures

"*"*Duff, “Legal Punishment, ”4. “Civil law deals in part with wrongs which are non
private in that they are legally and socially declared as wrongs —with the wrong
constituted by libel, for instance; but they are still treated as ‘private’ wrongs in the sense
that it is up to the person who was wronged to seek legal redress. She must decide to
bring, or not to bring, a civil case against the person who wronged her; and although she
can appeal to the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the
defendant.”
"** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead...,” 103.
"*®Volokh, 22. Quoting Theodore Olson of the Civil Justice Reform Group.
"**Duff, "Theories of Criminal Law", 6.
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must support.
In order for plaintiffs to suceeed in extensive civil court cases, the damages,
compensatory and punitive must go to the plaintiff. If it did not, then the private law
aspect of civil law would be lost with this procedure, and it is possible that some private
wrong-doings would not make it to court and the responsible entity or individual would
be free to repeat harm. The alternatives to not pursuing a case are not attractive: inaction
is often a response by “claimants who lack information or access, or who decide the gain
is too low, cost too high;”"** withdrawal from the situation by relocation is a common
expedient to trouble; resorting to some unofficial control system such as insurance
agency settlements, mediation or arbitration, ombudsmen, tribunals, etc.; and private
oppositional remedies that may include gangs and the mafia. Most o f these alternative
resolutions to justice are temporary or do not reach justice at all.
The legal system has its barriers. But once overcome, the system offers the best
opportunity to justice through adversarialism. Litigation benefits not only the
participants by ensuring a fair and just trial, a fair and just punishment, but it also benefits
the community in several ways.
General social deterrence results when wrongs are publicly exposed and punished.
Citizens or groups in society may change their policies and procedures to comply with
the result of the trial in order for them to avoid similar repercussions. Also, court trials in
general influence change in society in a variety of ways. As an agenda-setting forum for

"** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead ...,” 125.
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political policies/® civil court cases have set precedent regarding influence on product
safety efforts, and sexual discrimination policies.*® Court decisions provide social
communication of social moral evaluations of specific actions or conduct. Knowledge of
court proceedings and decisions invite society to evaluate and possibly adjust their views
of these actions. The result is that “the law may maintain or intensify existing
evaluations o f conduct.”*' Therefore, litigation is important to society in regards to
change and communicating social norms as they do change.
Litigation and private attorneys general should be encouraged. The greatest barrier to
the legal system is the initiation of suit and the motivation to continue, which makes
incentive through punitive damages vital. The private attorneys general pursue and
prosecute actors who have committed egregious acts beyond the practical reach of
criminal law. It is believed appropriate for this reason, to reward these private
prosecutors for their public service in bringing the wrongdoers to account.**

"*®Lawrence Baum, American Courts: Process and Policy, S®* ed. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 2001.), 1. Also see Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation
Explosion,” 20.
*®Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 18. Listing the beneficial
effects of litigation.
*' Ibid. 19.
** Thomas J. Collin, Punitive Damages and Business Torts: A Practitioner’s
Handbook. (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1998). 14.
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Punitive awards are a common law remedy in which citizens serve as
prosecutors, bringing wrongdoers to justice. The possibility of being
awarded punitive damages encourages plaintiffs to act as ‘private
attorneys general’ and provides incentive for plaintiffs to sue in instances
where conduct has caused widespread harm. Punitive damages permit the
litigation of claims that might otherwise be too expensive for an individual
plaintiff to prosecute, and they serve as ‘bounty’ for the plaintiff. Without
exemplary damages, a corporation would run the risk if it harmed a large
number of people, each in a relatively minor way. Punitive damages are
particularly necessary where there are ‘gaps’ in the criminal law. Private
attorneys general provide a ‘backup’ remedy in situations where
government enforcement agencies fail to adequately protect the public.**
Therefore, the plaintiff receiving the award is more than just “windfall gains” or a
winning of a lottery - it serves to support the main functions of civil law, viz. private law
enforcement. Private law enforcement is an important social benefit as well as the initial
step for all civil law, and therefore should be supported. Punitive damages awarded to
the plaintiff specifically support private law enforcement by providing incentive. This
purpose outweighs other concerns to reform distribution of punitive damages awards, and
so the procedure should remain.

** Rustad and Koenig, 14 of 64.
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CHAPTER 6

RECOMMENDATIONS
My initial question regarding punitive damages was not of amount, but of the award
distribution. However, the excessiveness issue, as discussed in Chapter One, could not
be ignored. With careful research I found that the excessiveness claims derived mostly
from special interest groups and the media. This is common. Like most political
policies, the legal court system is utilized as an agenda-setting arena. Special interest
groups employ the court system, just like the legislatures, to change political policy.
After reviewing the case history o f ‘excessive’ punitive damages awards, 1 also learned
that the court system has taken measures, through appellate guidelines, to address the
claims that awards are excessive or violate Constitutional rights. And, since most of the
larger awards are remitted, appealed, and struck down; 1 became assured that
excessiveness was not an issue.
But regardless of the amount, what justified the plaintiff receipt? Whether the
amount is small or large, how are punitive damages justified to be received by the
plaintiff, if they represent punishment? The punishment theories of retribution and
deterrence are classic justifications for m eting out punishm ent in order to correct harms

in society. Punitive damages are appropriately awarded as a method for civil
punishment. Since civil law through compensatory damages does not always take into
account further (non-nominal) harms, punitive damages policy allows civil law to punish,
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especially corporations, without having to merge with criminal law. But retribution and
deterrence as punishment justifications do not require punitive damages to be received by
the plaintiff. Nor do they rule out punishment justifications for the plaintiffs receipt of
the damages. As I have discovered, the punishment justification of vengeance
satisfaction does require the punitive damages be awarded to the plaintiff. Vengeance at
first glance may not seem to be a virtuous justification for punishment, but it is
historically supported as a purpose for punitive damages. Although purposes for punitive
damages have expanded and been updated with time, it is important to validate damages
through the original purposes or see if the original purposes still apply today; for although
times change and new generations cause us to shift focus from the original purposes, we
must remember to first learn from the past, before we can adjust for the future. So, since
it is the particular plaintiffs vengeance' that punitive damages seek to satisfy, given
private law; vengeance satisfaction supports the punitive damages be received by the
plaintiff. For it is through this individual exchange that personal vengeance is satisfied.
Along with the satisfaction o f vengeance, the original purposes of repairing insult and
restoring honor to the plaintiff are historically supported purposes for punitive damages.
Given the personal nature of all three, they all support that punitive damages should be
received by the plaintiff. It could be argued that vengeance, insult, and honor could be
served by the plaintiff not receiving the punitive damages - for punishment o f the wrong-

' This does not discount that some punitive damages are calculated for harm that
occurred in the state or predicted harm. In this sense, the exeessiveness issue comes into
play. This view will be addressed in this section regarding societal damages claims.
Most punitive damages are initially calculated according to the further harm caused to the
plaintiff. And as discussed in Chapter One, calculations that include national or state (as
opposed to individual) harm, cause eoneems for due process violations and
excessiveness.
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doer alone should satisfy all three, just as they suffice for criminal law. But, I argue that
since civil law is labeled ‘private law’ and deals with personal and private transactions,
the damages should remain so, personal and private to the plaintiff. And sinee the private
law arena deals with private wrongs, unlike criminal law, then the punishments are
servingyir^r the plaintiff, and second the community. The private law aspect of civil law
is inherent and important to the distinction of the system, so that it is equally important as
a determinant for the policies.
Also inherent in the private law aspect is the justification o f the plaintiff receipts
policy. The main reason why civil law is referred to as private law is because the
decision and burden to pursue litigation, to accuse of a wrong, and to follow through for
justice is the sole responsibility of the plaintiff. Plaintiff responsibility for litigation is the
major characteristic of civil law. And since the plaintiff is procedurally responsible for
the burden of litigation, the plaintiff becomes procedurally the least advantaged in the
process. According to the procedural justice principles of John Rawls, as discussed in
Chapter Two, excess liberties such as punitive damages, should be distributed to benefit
the least advantaged. Thus the punitive damages should be awarded to the plaintiff
because they are the least advantaged and to provide an incentive for their seeking relief
for this burden.
Support for plaintiff incentive or a private attorney general is not only needed due to
plaintiffs responsibility. For moral obligations, parental for example, do not always
require incentive. But since the obligation to pursue justice requires that the plaintiff take
on the civil legal system, it requires incentive because the system is inherently passive,
complex, eostly, and usually requires expert assistance. In order for the legal system to
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ensure justice, it can either make the pursuit of justice more aeeessible for the private
attorneys general, or it can provide some kind of assistance and incentive.
Is providing incentive just in itself? Or should we require moral obligation alone to
manage civil suits? As I have shown in earlier chapters, incentive to pursue justice is
nothing new. The legal system has offered awards and incentives to citizens for many
years. Until society is ready to rely on moral obligation alone, incentive is necessary for
achieving justice in society. Punitive damages being received by the plaintiff serve this
purpose in civil law.
Referring back to my original question, what justified plaintiff receipt? Initially when
I began research, I assumed that there were no reasons for this justification. I have
discovered the justifications exist: vengeance, insult, honor, incentive, and benefiting the
least advantaged. But are these justifications enough? Shouldn ’t the traditional
justifications (retribution and deterrence) for punishment alone be enough to determine
distribution of punitive damages just as they do for criminal punishment? And for with
criminal punishment, the emphasis of justification lies in community benefits, not the
plaintiffs. The community benefits since criminals are incapacitated, rehabilitation of
the criminal is important, and fines, if any, go to the institution that is responsible for
serving the punishment. Shouldn’t institutional punishment o f any kind benefit first
societal eoneems? These are the arguments against the plaintiff receiving the award.
Reforms to amend distribution include split-recovery statutes and soeietal damages
proposals, as introdueed in Chapter One. Both o f these reforms utilize a “eentral concept
. . . that societal, as opposed to individual, interests may be vindicated by punitive
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damages.”^ But societal interests continue to be served with the punitive damages award
received by the plaintiff: the maintenance of social order and deterrence. Regardless of
who receives the award, the wrong-doer is being punished and societal benefits are being
served. But just as this is not a reason for the plaintiff to receive the award, it is also not
a reason for the plaintiff to not receive the award. Purposes served when the plaintiff
does receive the award, as listed above, should receive precedence in civil law. Since
civil law leaves the burden to seek justice solely to the plaintiff, so for the distribution
procedures of punitive damages, the individual interests outweigh societal interests of
split-recovery and societal damages.
Although split-recovery procedure varies from state to state, the basic process
requires a portion o f the punitive damages award distributed to a state general fund, or
some type o f state managed compensation fund for specific victims, and the proportions
vary between states.^ Listed goals of split-recovery statutes are (1) “to discourage
plaintiffs from bringing [frivolous] punitive damages claims by decreasing the amount of
their recovery,"* (2) to eliminate the “windfall gains” to the plaintiff,^ and (3) as a revenue

^ Sharkey, [endnote72]*373 From endnote72: “Current law recognizes that punitive
damages may serve the societal objective of deterring similar conduct by the defendant..
. to ‘punish [ ] and deter[ ]’, [dual purpose] focus solely on vindicating society’s
interests”.
^ Volokh, see “Table 5: States that divert part of punitive damages awards to public
purposes”, pgs. 41-42 of 60. See also The American Tort Reform Association,
http://www.atra.org/show/7343 © 2002, “States With Punitive Damage Limits, As of
June 30, 2001.” Listing “Punitive Damages Assigned To State Funds: Alaska (1997);
Alabama (1995)*; Illinois (1986); Iowa (1986); Missouri (1987); Oregon (1987); U t ^
(1989) *Alabama Supreme Court directed 50% to an Alabama General Fund.''
"*Sharkey, 11. “The Illinois split-recovery statute [ ] was enacted specifically to
discourage punitive damages,”
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raising measure for the state/
I have argued in Chapter One and in Chapter Five that frivolous lawsuits are not a
result of punitive damages’ receipt by the plaintiff. The fact that punitive damages assist
the plaintiff with lawyers’ fees does not necessarily entice frivolous law suits. Lawyers
still take the risk of losing as well as the burden of costs up front with contingency fees,
so logic follows that they would he discouraged to take on frivolous suits. Punitive
damages receipt by the plaintiff provides an incentive that encourages the private
attorneys general aspect o f civil law. Reformers do exaggerate and distort this claim by
rephrasing it as ‘encouraging frivolous law suits.’ The ‘frivolous law suit’ claim also
assumes that suits that involve punitive damages are frequent, thus plaintiffs can be
enticed with them. But as statistics have shown, the awarding of punitive damages is
rare.’ Taking on the burden of a law suit for the sole hopes of being awarded punitive
damages is a big risk.
The last two purposes for split-recovery statutes, preventing windfall gains and
raising revenue for the state, assume that the punitive damages awards are large enough
to be considered “windfalls” and would be substantial revenue for the state. According to
the U.S. Department o f Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics summary findings for state
^ Ibid, “a plaintiff is a fortuitous beneficiary o f a punitive damages award simply
because there is no one else to receive it. [endnote85].”
^ Ibid. also see endnote 86, endnote 87, endnote 88.
’ See Chapter One as well as U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
CivilJustice Statistics, “Summary Findings,” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/civil.htm,
accessed 12 November 2004. Surveying the 75 largest counties in the United States, from
a total of 11,908 tort, contract and real property trial cases, of the 8,859 Jury trial cases,
plaintiffs won in only 4,715 of the cases and of those, 260 cases were awarded punitive
damages. O f the 2,828 Bench trial cases, plaintiff winners were in 1,849 cases and of
those, 79 were awarded punitive damages.
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courts civil justice statistics, in 2001 for jury trials, the median total award for the
plaintiff winner was $37,000. The median punitive damages award for the plaintiff was
$50,000.^ Juries awarded punitive damages in only 6% of civil cases with a plaintiff
winner. 10
Now the revenue raising concerns of reformers would like to assume that most
punitive damages awards are in the millions of dollars. But in reality they are not. And
as established in Chapter Five, the average case costs approximately $10,000; thus the
gains provided by punitive damages are hardly windfall to the plaintiff. Since the states
have many other options for raising revenue, this reason for reform is moot. Therefore,
the purposes that punitive damages being received by the plaintiff fulfill deserve
precedence over split-recovery concerns.
Compensatory Societal Damages'* specifically apply to “pattern or practice”'^ torts.'
It is argued that since a “defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part o f a pattern of
similar repeated conduct, [and] a higher punitive damages award is permissible.”'"* It is

* Ibid.
^ Ibid. Forjudge decisions, the median total award was $28,000 and the median
punitive damages award was $46,000.
Ibid. Judges awarded punitive damages in only 4% of the civil cases with a
plaintiff winner.
" Sharkey, 15. Part III A New Category of Compensatory Societal Damages.
*’ Ibid. Repeated conduct that likewise affects multiple parties, as opposed to single
tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple victims.
Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “tort” : a wrong; a private or civil wrong or injury
resulting from a breach of a legal duty that exists by virtue of society’s expectations
regarding interpersonal conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. 26
N.E. 2d 254, 259.
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also argued that the punitive damages - sinee ealculated based upon the repeated conduct
- should be held by the state for the other harmed plaintiffs to collect after judgment,
even though they did not directly participate in the specific legal case.
These assertions are made on the premise that instead of taking advantage of the class
action lawsuit, in which a lawsuit is brought by a representative member of a large group
o f persons on behalf of all members of the group,

and since punitive damages is

permissible to be calculated based on a pattern of repeat conduct (meaning that others
have been harmed in the same way), the policy should ease the pursuit of litigation for
those who do not take the “trouble to sue.”
The legal system is complex and costly, and as I have established, awarding the
plaintiff for taking the time and effort to sue is a justifiable purpose. Filing and following
through with a civil suit is not as easy as applying for your driver’s license. Even the
filing of a small claims case consists of forms, copies, fees, time lines, serving of papers,
etc... So, if the other plaintiffs wanted to take the time to pursue justice, they should, and
the statutes of the law need not be changed for this purpose.
Does this mean that justice is only served to those who take the time and have the
resources to pursue litigation, even though the award may be calculated on other’s harm?
Due to the passiveness o f the system, it does mean this. But, in order justify a change in
policy, I argue that there must be some consistency in what can be viewed as the
problem. Multiple calculations of harm is not the standard and varies from state to state,
case to case, jury to jury. Again, these societal damage reforms are based upon the

Sharkey, 15. refer also to her endnote 149.
Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “class action” : Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 23.
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premise that awards are calculated on multiple harms and that the award includes not
only compensation, but also punitive damages. But since these conditions are not the
standard nor are they consistent throughout the nation, I see little justification for
entertaining reform.
If class action lawsuit statutes need to be reformed in order to better accommodate
groups filings, then perhaps they are in need of examination.'^ But the policy of punitive
damages should not be adjusted to suit class action proceedings. The calculation of
repeat conduct into the amount of punitive damages has been accused o f being unjust
according to Due Process Laws as well as violating Fair and Just Punishment Laws.'’
But, as addressed in Chapter One, these concerns have been addressed with judiciary
review guidelines. And we must remember that for most of these cases, the large awards
have been appealed and struck down. Lastly, societal damages reform is also asserted on
the premise that the awards are large and excessive, and as has been noted, they are
neither.
In conclusion, punitive damages should he awarded to the plaintiff in order to: (1)
serve as an incentive in order to maintain private attorneys general, since they directly
repair insult, satisfy vengeance, and repair honor; and (2) since they mitigate the burden
of litigation that is solely on the plaintiff. The ease of this burden is necessary because
the civil law system is inherently passive, complex, and costly. And due to the inherent
burden in the system, along with the private law aspect, (3) the plaintiff becomes the least
advantaged in the procedure and awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff serve
Due to the limited scope of this paper, I will not delve too deeply into this issue.
' ’ Jeffries, “A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,” 147. See
also details in Chapter One.
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procedural justice principles. These purposes for the plaintiff to receive the award are
justified, supported by history, and serve society, the individual, and justice.
Reformation considerations to any policy process require a structurally concise
review of the original purposes of the policy in order to determine which “implicit
principles ... on the whole make sense of the practice.” ** Once these are determined,
they are used to validate, or invalidate, the procedure. Since our repeated actions,
practices, or political policies are explained with their established rules, purposes, and
intentions, “[i]n order to justify - to make good an argument or show a person or action
to be just or right, or defend as right or proper, or give adequate grounds for action - we
need to appeal to some standard of what is right, proper or just. When we justify an
action that is part of a practice, to make our case we can often point to rules of the
practice.” *^
Thus for the policy in which punitive damages should be received by the plaintiff, I
have presented these standards. The purposes I have used to justify plaintiff receipt
complete the practice o f civil law and make sense of the practice itself, since it’s purposes
are inherent in and support the private law arena. Plaintiff receipt validates civil law
procedure and serves procedural justice. Reforms for punitive damages should not
conflict with the purposes that serve the system and society, and the awarding of punitive
damages to the plaintiff does both.

'* Mark Tunick, in the introduction to Punishment: Theory and Practice, (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1992.), 13.
Ibid., 8.
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